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Abstract 
 
 
Despite successfully setting out a novel form of government, the Constitution of the 
United States of America drafted in 1787 has not remained without uncertainties.  This 
thesis contributes to the area of study of US constitutional law by examining whether 
and how these uncertainties have remained unresolved, and how the United States 
has been managing these uncertainties since its founding.  
It will also establish that these uncertainties have created a constant conflict between 
the federal and state governments, which also had to be managed by the United States 
differently throughout the various eras.  
In order to demonstrate the above, the thesis will examine the development of three 
fundamental areas of the Constitution: the Commerce Clause, the protection of 
fundamental rights and the Guarantee Clause. The findings of the thesis will identify 
four links between the development of these areas of constitutional law: 1) the 
management of constitutional uncertainties, 2) the management of the constant 
conflict between the federal and state governments, 3) the living constitutional values 
approach, and 4) the purpose of the creation of a uniform national system.  
The thesis will conclude that the diverging approaches adopted by the federal 
government since the Founding era in these areas have created a further uncertainty 
about how the federal government will manage these uncertainties and the constant 
conflict at any given time.   
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Chapter 1: Constitutional Uncertainties and Methods of Interpretation to 
Resolve the Constant Conflict between the Federal and State Governments in 
the United States of America 
 
 
The transformations that the political climate around the world has undergone in recent 
years have not only been manifest in the area of politics, but that of constitutional law 
as well. In the European Union, parallel with political debates, the discussions in 
constitutional law ultimately focus on the powers the European Union was entrusted 
with in the Treaties of the European Union (or its competences). Whether the power 
has therefore been withdrawn from the states to act in these areas (or in other words, 
whether their sovereignty has been limited by these competences) has been an 
evident constitutional law debate. This debate became even more noticeable 
alongside the political discussions during the campaign leading up to the referendum 
of the United Kingdom whether to leave the European Union,1 which ultimately 
concluded in its decision to withdraw from the Union.  
 
During the numerous discussions in the European Union surrounding politics in the 
media or daily conversations, one can often find a lack of discussion about the 
constitutional law aspects of the arguments. A different perspective, however, 
emerged with the current ‘rule of law crisis’ of the European Union.2  
 
Since the rule of law is listed as one of the fundamental values of the Union in Article 
2 Treaty on European Union,3 one would expect that the robust protection of this value. 
The only mechanism available for the enforcement of the breach of this value is laid 
down in Article 7 Treaty on European Union, which restricts the powers of the 
                                                          
1 Macer Hall, ‘Boris Johnson Urges Brits to Vote Brexit to’ (Express.co.uk, 20 June 2016) 
<https://www.express.co.uk/pictures/pics/6566/EU-referendum-Brexit-Remain-Leave-campaign-
pictures> accessed 9 June 2018; ‘Briefing: Taking Back Control from Brussels’ (Vote Leave) 
<http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_control.html> accessed 9 June 2018. 
2 European Parliament, ‘European Parliament Resolution of 25 October 2016 with Recommendations 
to the Commission on the Establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and 
Fundamental Rights (2015/2254(INL))’ 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-
0409&language=EN&ring=A8-2016-0283#BKMD-20>. 
3 ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union’ Art 2. 
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European Union when such a value is threatened by a Member State or when a 
Member State is found to be in breach of this value.4   
 
Whilst various institutions of the European Union, such as the Commission5 or the 
European Parliament,6 have contended for years that the rule of law is in grave 
jeopardy in some of its Member States, such as Poland and Hungary,7 the number of 
actions taken by these institutions was constrained in this area. These actions included 
approving Resolutions at the European Parliament,8 the Commission adopting a 
Communication on a ‘New Framework’,9 commencing enforcement proceedings 
against Hungary for breaches of specific legislative measures in contravention of EU 
law10 and ultimately triggering the ‘nuclear option’,11 the Article 7 enforcement 
mechanism against Poland in December 2017.12 
In parallel with the shortcomings of the system to resolve the rule of law crisis itself, 
the current years have also highlighted various fundamental flaws of the European 
Union. One such characteristic is its political unwillingness to respond to serious 
threats to its common values, which it claims to be fundamental to its founding,13 
unless they are so serious that they cannot be ignored. Moreover, it also underlined 
the inadequacy of the legal provisions of the Union to address such a crisis, such as 
the Union lacking competence to act in a manner different from that set out in the 
Treaties.14 
                                                          
4 ibid Art 7. 
5 See for instance European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law COM(2014) 158 final 
2. 
6 See for instance European Parliament (n 2). 
7  European Commission, ‘Press Release: Commission Adopts Rule of Law Opinion on the Situation in 
Poland’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2015_en.htm>. 
8 See for instance European Parliament (n 2). 
9 See for instance European Commission (n 5). 
10 See for instance Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:687. 
11 Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU: Brussels and the Future of Liberal 
Order’ 2012–2013 Paper Series Transatlantic Academy Paper Series 17.  
12 European Commission, ‘Press Release - Rule of Law: European Commission Acts to Defend Judicial 
Independence in Poland’ (20 December 2017) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
5367_en.htm> accessed 5 January 2018. 
13 ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union’ (n 3) Art 2. 
14 ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ Arts 3 - 6. 
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The initial premise of this thesis was to investigate and offer a possible solution to the 
‘rule of law crisis’ of the European Union,15 by comparing whether and how established 
federal systems around the world, such as the United States of America or the Federal 
Republic of Germany, have been established to react to such crises. During the early 
stages of the study of the United States of America, however, the assumptions of the 
author that such a federal state would - without a doubt - be able to respond to a crisis 
to one of its core federal fundamental values were quite swiftly rebutted. The thesis, 
therefore, sets out to examine whether a ‘rule of law crisis’ similar to that of the 
European Union could arise in the United States of America and how it would be 
managed on a federal level. This study thus required to commence the investigations 
with the fundamental aspects of US constitutional law.  
 
I. Fundamental Aspects of Constitutional Law of the United States of 
America 
 
One of the most vital causes of debate about the constitutional nature and structure of 
the European Union is spurred by the lack of a definition of what the European Union 
is. This becomes apparent through the lack of agreement and objective understanding 
by scholars, politicians and citizens on what the European Union is and what it stands 
for. For instance, whilst scholars argue that the European Union may be regarded an 
international organisation,16 others claim that it is of ‘sui generis’ nature17 or that it is a 
‘federal union of states.’18 It is, however, less challenging to determine what the 
European Union cannot be defined as: it is most certainly not a state. If it was to ever  
aspire to become one, a model that could be suggested for the Union to adopt is that 
of a federal state, such as that of the United States of America.19 Such a federal 
                                                          
15 European Parliament (n 2). 
16 Derrick Wyatt, ‘New Legal Order or Old’ [1982] European Law Review 147. 
17 HL Mason, The European Coal and Steel Community: Experiment in Supranationalism (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1955) 126. 
18 Robert Schutze, European Union Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) 75. 
19 See for instance Winston Churchill, ‘Mr Winston Churchill Speaking in Zurich 9th September 1946’ 
<http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html> accessed 1 September 2017. 
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system, however, did not come into existence without difficulties either. Similar to the 
European Union, the objectives in the initial stages of the development of the United 
States were to create a distinct union between the ex-colonies, as opposed to creating 
a single state encompassing all of them. 
 
I.1. The Era of the Articles of Confederation 
 
Following the American Revolution, the Articles of Confederation created a 
Confederacy called the United States of America in Article I.20 The purpose of this ‘firm 
league of friendship’ between the states, according to Article III, was declared as: 
their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force 
offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, 
sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.21 
This Confederacy was also characterised by the states retaining ‘their sovereignty, 
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by 
this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States.’22 The difference 
between the Confederacy and the novel federal system is, thus, highlighted in the 
above Articles as well. The Confederacy was merely a ‘league of friendship’ between 
the states, whilst the newly created federal government in 1787 was, in fact, a state.  
Thus, without the ‘constituent governments’ the common government representing all 
‘constituent governments’ could not exist.23 The place where the interest of this ‘loose 
federal union’24 would be represented by ‘delegates from the constituent governments’ 
                                                          
20 Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts-
bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia (1781), Article I. 
21 Articles of Confederation, Article III. 
22 Articles of Confederation, Article II. 
23 Ronald Watts, ‘Models of Federal Power Sharing’ (2001) 167 International Social Science Journal 
25. 
24 Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation (Basic Books 1963) 30. 
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was the Congress.25 Under Article V, the delegates from the states would meet once 
a year in Congress.26 In Article IX, Congress was also seemingly granted with a wide 
range of powers, such as: 
entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall 
be made whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be 
restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own 
people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of 
any species of goods or commodities whatsoever.27 
As opposed to a common court acting as the supreme judicial authority, it was also 
Congress that was granted with the powers to act as ‘the last resort on appeal in all 
disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or 
more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes whatever.’28 
Another fundamental aspect of this confederate system was that Congress did not 
have any authority to ‘act on the people themselves,’ since all actions of Congress 
were concerned with the states.29 This reluctance to grant the common central 
authority with more extensive powers may be explained by the previous experience of 
the drafters of these Articles with Great Britain.30 
However, it soon became apparent that this Confederacy was not the most adequate 
choice of government for the representation of the interests of the states as a whole. 
The states comprising the Confederacy clearly placed their own interests in the 
foreground of all their activities: they ‘operated their own navies,’ ‘issued [their] own 
currency’ and had their own laws about taxation.31 Furthermore, the states diverged 
in their policies greatly and possessed key different features. For instance, the states 
                                                          
25 Watts (n 23) 25. 
26 Articles of Confederation, Article V. 
27 Articles of Confederation, Article IX. 
28 Articles of Confederation, Article IX. 
29 David L Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue (Northwestern University Press 1995) 15. 
30 ibid. 
31 Larry N Gerston, American Federalism: A Concise Introduction (M E Sharpe 2007) 25. 
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in the South were characterised as ‘plantation economies,’ where slavery flourished, 
while the North focused on ‘fishing, shipbuilding, and commerce.’32  
The problems with this system of government did not only manifest in the actions of 
the states themselves, but also in the confederate system of government. In Congress, 
under Article V, each state was given one, equal, vote, and, following Article IX, all 
actions were to be determined by unanimity.33 This made it possible for even one state 
to block any actions of Congress and reaching a unanimous decision highly 
challenging. Moreover, while Congress was conferred powers to ‘requisite’ funds from 
each state to assist in its work, the states did not oblige to these requests and by 1786 
it did not have sufficient funding to operate.34    
Following the call for an unsuccessful convention in Annapolis to reform this system 
in a situation of ‘economic decline’, a further Convention was called for in 1787 in 
Philadelphia, which would transpire into the Constitutional Convention.35 
 
I.2. The Era of the Inception and Ratification of the Constitution 
 
I.2.1. The Inception of the Constitution  
 
During the secret meetings of the representatives present during the Philadelphia 
Constitutional Convention - recorded in notes subsequently released of these 
discussions36 - it became apparent to the Framers of the Constitution that setting up a 
novel system might achieve the aims they set out more effectively than the ‘league of 
friendship’37 already set up under the Articles of Confederation.38 However, as 
                                                          
32 David Brian Robertson, Federalism and the Making of America (Routledge 2012) 20. 
33 Articles of Confederation, Articles V and IX. 
34 Robertson (n 32) 21; Geoffrey R Stone and others, Constitutional Law (7th edn, Wolters Kluwer Law 
& Business 2013) 8. 
35 Robertson (n 32) 21; Stone and others (n 34) 8. 
36 United States Constitutional Convention and James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal 
Convention of 1787 with an Introduction by Adrienne Koch (W W Norton 1987). 
37 Articles of Confederation, Article III. 
38 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, vol 1 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 
1991) 168. 
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Ackerman highlights, this included defying the provisions of the Articles of 
Confederation by firstly, attending the Convention, and, secondly, by adopting the new 
Constitution that required instead of the unanimous consent, the ratification of only 
nine states out of the thirteen.39  
The novel federal system proposed in the Constitution included two forms of 
government within the United States of America: the state and the novel federal 
governments. Thus, a fundamental question that the Framers needed to address in 
the Constitution was the balance of powers between these two forms of government 
within the same system. As illustrated in the chapters that follow, two main approaches 
about this question can be identified during the Convention debates.  
Delegates, such as Madison or Hamilton, who supported the idea of a more powerful 
central government with wider powers than those of the Congress under the Articles 
of Confederation, were keen to grant wide powers to the novel federal government.40 
This meant, however, that powers that were previously possessed by the states would 
be transferred to the new central government. This position, obviously, generated a 
point of constant conflict that this novel federalist system created.   
This constant conflict between the federal and state governments is further enlarged 
by the uncertain provisions laid down in the Constitution. Whilst key provisions did 
enumerate the powers of the federal government, this list of powers of the Congress 
under Article I section 8 raised further issues, since the Constitution did not clearly 
define what those powers entailed.41. We will look at the effects of these problems in 
constitutional history in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The second ideology that was supported by delegates at the Convention, such as 
Sherman or Ellsworth, was insistent on states retaining the majority of their powers 
and the novel federal government to be only granted with limited powers.42 It may be 
argued that supporters of this ideology had claimed victory over those advocating for 
                                                          
39 Constitution of the United States of America 1787, Article V. 
40 Robertson (n 32) 22–23. 
41 Constitution of the United States of America 1787, Article I section 8. 
42 Robertson (n 32) 23–24. 
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a strong national government when the powers of the newly formed national 
government were enumerated in the Constitution, such as those of Congress 
mentioned in Article I section 8 above.43 However, their victory cannot be 
characterised as complete. Since these provisions were not clearly defined, they 
created a further uncertainty as to what the limits of the powers of the federal 
government are.  
Therefore, the ground for the constant conflict of federalism was set: the locus of 
federal and state powers would remain a constant uncertainty, and a point of conflict 
between the states and the federal government. Moreover, this would also give rise to 
continuous debates over the method of interpretation of the Constitution: should it be 
interpreted based on the text alone or is there an ‘invisible Constitution’44 that relies 
on further sources to interpret the Constitution?  
 
I.2.2. The Ratification of the Constitution  
 
Following the Philadelphia Convention, the Constitution was sent to the states for 
ratification. It is highlighted that the process of ratification of the Constitution itself 
already differed largely from the previous process of legislation under the Articles of 
Confederation. Whilst the latter required unanimity, the Constitution only required a 
two-third majority of the votes for ratification from states under Article VII.45 However, 
not all states were keen to ratify the Constitution with immediate effect. Thus, 
ratification debates ensued in many of the states.  
While these ratification debates took place, The Federalist Papers46 were originally 
published as newspaper articles addressed to the citizens of New York under the 
name Publius.47 As James Madison highlighted, the pseudonym Publius referred to 
                                                          
43 Constitution of the United States of America 1787, Article I section 8. 
44 Laurence H Tribe, The Invisible Constitution (Oxford University Press 2008). 
45 Constitution of the United States of America 1787, Article VII. 
46 Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, The Federalist Papers (Yale University Press 2009). 
47 Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (Random House 2005) 69; James Madison, 
‘Madison’s Account of The “Federalist”’, Federalist: A Commentary the Constitution of the United States 
(1898) xlix. 
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Valerius Publicola,48 one of the leaders of the Roman Revolution. In these papers, 
three members of the group called Federalists - comprised of Alexander Hamilton, 
James Madison and John Jay -, argued for the ratification of the Constitution and a 
stronger federal government. Unsurprisingly, two key members of this group were 
Madison and Hamilton, who argued, as they did during the Constitutional Convention, 
that the federal government should occupy a strong position in this new system of 
government, through wider powers allocated to it than under the Articles of 
Confederation.  
In their work, the creation of the constant constitutional conflict between the federal 
and the state governments may also be identified. Firstly, both Hamilton and Madison 
found it important to emphasise that the states would not be abolished in the novel 
system of the United States of America created by the Constitution. For instance, 
Hamilton argued that:  
 The proposed Constitution, so far from the abolition of the State governments, 
makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty.49 
He further claimed that the states occupied such position as they were not only given 
‘direct representation in the Senate,’ but were also left with ‘certain exclusive and very 
important portions of sovereign power.’50  
The Anti-Federalists, those arguing for a federal government with limited authority, 
occupied the key positions on the other side during the ratification debates.51 For 
instance, as will be examined further in Chapter 3, in Pennsylvania and Virginia, where 
both states had adopted their own Bill of Rights, during the ratifying Conventions, the 
lack of a federal Bill of Rights – that would have mirrored these state protections at 
federal level - was raised as one of their main objections to the ratification of the 
Constitution.52  
                                                          
48 Madison (n 47) xlix. 
49 Hamilton and Madison (n 46) No IX 46. 
50 ibid. 
51 William W Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the US Constitution (Cornell University Press 1972) 68; 
Stone and others (n 34) 10. 
52 See Chapter 3, section III.2.3. for a further discussion about this. 
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It will be further analysed in Chapter 3 how this challenge was overcome by the 
Federalists, ultimately resulting in the adoption of the Constitution. Interestingly, the 
Bill of Rights was not added to the main text of the Constitution following its ratification, 
but was adopted in the form of ten amendments, attached to the end of the document. 
Whilst the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, as part of this Bill of Rights, did 
attempt to address the constant conflict between the states and the federal 
government over the limits of the powers of each, the wording of it provided further 
room for interpretation: 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.53 
Whilst the first part of this Amendment, at first sight, might seem to set clear limits to 
the powers of the federal government, the living nature of the Constitution must also 
be considered when reading this provision. If the powers delegated to the federal 
government are not clearly defined, the powers that, thus, remain with the state 
governments will, consequently, not be clearly defined either. It will, therefore, be 
examined further whether fundamental provisions of the Constitution of the United 
States of America establish limits to these powers and how these have developed 
since the Founding era. 
The chapters that follow will also examine these debates in more detail when these 
contributed to the evolution of how this constant constitutional conflict has been 
managed in the areas examined.  
During the ratification debates, it was those arguing for the adoption of the Constitution 
that could claim victory when New Hampshire ratified the Constitution as the ninth 
state.54 The methods by which the United States of America came into existence, 
however, pose constitutional questions up until today.  
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It may, on the one hand, be claimed that the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention did not have the authority to speak for the people of the United States of 
America, especially provided that the Convention itself could be argued to have been 
convened contrary to the Articles of Confederation. On the other hand, the ratification 
of the Constitution by the states may ascertain that the Constitution, in fact, speaks for 
‘We the People,’ as set out in its Preamble.55 Moreover, intriguingly, it was only 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire whose constitutions were previously ratified by 
the states,56 thus making it possible to claim that the federal Constitution was a 
manifestation of the will of the people even more so than many of the state 
constitutions at the time. 
This work will demonstrate that despite the Constitution acting as the cornerstone of 
the federal system of government of the United States of America, since its inception 
no definitive answer has been proclaimed for the conflicts highlighted above that 
resulted from the creation of this system so far. This position, thus, creates a further 
conflict in the United States of America: the Constitution and its interpretation may at 
one point in time enable, and at another inhibit advances in society.  
This works aims to demonstrate the above through examining three key and 
ambiguous constitutional provisions: the Guarantee Clause, the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Throughout the study of 
the historical developments and current state of these provisions, an emphasis will be 
placed on the transformative ‘constitutional moments’ in the history of the United 
States, adopting the definition from Ackerman:57 the Founding, the Reconstruction and 
the New Deal Era. 
 
II. Interpreting the Constitution 
 
                                                          
55 Constitution of the United States of America 1787, Preamble. 
56 Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (n 47) 6. 
57 Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (n 38). 
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Throughout the examination of the three fundamental areas of the Constitution, special 
attention is going to be placed on the interpretation of the Constitution itself. 
II. 1. Three separate branches of government 
 
One of the fundamental differences of the federal system created in the Constitution 
compared to the one created by the Articles of Confederation was the creation of the 
three separate branches of federal government. Under this structure, Congress is to 
act as the legislative branch,58 the President takes on the role of the executive59 and 
the Supreme Court acts as the judicial arm.60 Each branch of the government is 
required to act within the bounds of the Constitution while fulfilling their roles. It is, 
therefore, argued that performing the roles assigned to them by the Constitution, 
involves the interpretation of the Constitution by each branch. Thus, if the basis of a 
legislative Act of Congress is understood differently by Congress and the President or 
the Supreme Court, a conflict is consequently created that originates not only from the 
provision in the Constitution, but its interpretation as well. 
Consequently, it is argued that the separation of powers principle, which is bound to 
ensure the checks and balances within the federal system,61 also relies on the 
interpretation of the Constitution. The checks and balances system would only function 
to its upmost effectiveness when all three branches of government adopted the same 
method of interpretation of the Constitution. If the separate branches adopted different 
interpretative methods, a conflict would always be present within the arms adopting 
different methods of interpretation. A clear illustration of the above can be observed in 
Chapter 5 that sets out to study the development of the commerce clause: if Congress 
enacts legislation based on the interpretation of the Constitution that allows them wide-
ranging powers under the commerce clause, this Act would be ruled constitutional by 
a Supreme Court that adopts the same methods of interpretation. However, if the 
                                                          
58 Articles of Confederation 1777, Article I section 1. 
59 Articles of Confederation 1777, Article II section 1. 
60 Articles of Confederation 1777, Article III section 1. 
61 MNS Sellers, ‘Republicanism: Philosophical Aspects’ in Neil J Smelser and Paul B Baltes (eds), 
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Elsevier Science Ltd 2001) 13208; 
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majority of the Supreme Court Justices adopts a method of interpretation that 
advocates for the narrow reading of the same provision, the same Act would be ruled 
unconstitutional.    
In such an instance, the question arises: the actions of which branch of government 
are to be held supreme over the other. A case decided at the Supreme Court in 1803 
provided the United States of America with an answer. 
II. 2. The Supreme Court: the ultimate arbiter? 
 
Since the powers for the federal government to act arise from the provisions laid down 
in the Constitution, all measures adopted by the federal government must have a 
constitutional basis. Whilst Article III section 1 of the Constitution grants the Supreme 
Court with the judicial powers in the United States of America,62 the Framers of the 
Constitution laid down the powers of the Supreme Court in quite ambiguous terms. 
This resulted in a fundamental dispute arising soon after the adoption of the 
Constitution, requiring the Supreme Court to determine whether it had a power of 
judicial review under the Constitution.  
In the early case of Marbury v Madison63 Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to 
issue a writ of mandamus to compel Madison, the Secretary of State, to deliver the 
commission of Marbury as ‘a justice of the peace for the County of Washington, in the 
District of Columbia’ in line with an ‘act of congress passed in February, 1801,’ and 
signed by the previous President.64 Such a petition by Marbury proved necessary as 
the then President Jefferson refused to deliver his commission.65 
After establishing that Marbury did have the right to have the commission delivered to 
him, Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion, emphasised that:  
                                                          
62 Constitution of the United States of America 1787, Article III section 1. 
63 William Marbury v James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States (1803) 5 (1 Cranch) US 
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64 ibid 137. 
65 Stone and others (n 34) 25. 
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The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high 
appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal 
right.66  
He subsequently devised the political question doctrine, claiming that when ‘the heads 
of departments are the political or confidential agents of the Executive,’ their acts may 
only be review politically.67 However, he asserted, that when they perform ‘a specific 
duty [that] is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of 
that duty,’ and these rights get violated, the individual should be able to rely on ‘the 
laws of his country for a remedy.’68 After establishing that the rights of Marbury had 
been violated, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that he should be provided with a 
legal remedy.69  
The vital importance of this judgment lies in the subsequent part where Chief Justice 
Marshall discussed what remedies Marbury could be provided with. While doing so, 
he laid down the foundations of judicial review in the United States of America. He 
firstly declared that the Judiciary Act of 1789 granting the Supreme Court with the 
powers of issuing writs of mandamus was contrary to the Constitution and, thus, could 
not be relied upon by Marbury.70 In deciding whether the Act was constitutional, he 
relied on Article III of the Constitution that granted the Supreme Court with two types 
of jurisdiction: original and appellate.71 He consequently held that any Act of Congress 
expanding the powers of the Supreme Court over those granted to it by the 
Constitution was contrary to the Constitution.72 
After declaring that ‘an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void,’73  
he highlighted that it is the judiciary that should decide ‘on the operation of each,’ when 
                                                          
66 William Marbury v James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States (n 63) 164. 
67 ibid 166. 
68 ibid 166. 
69 ibid 167 - 168. 
70 ibid 177. 
71 Constitution of the United States of America 1787, Article III section 2. 
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a conflict between two laws arises.74 Thus, he asserted, in situations where a law and 
the Constitution came into conflict, it was up to the Supreme Court to decide which 
laws applied, in line with ‘the very essence of judicial duty.’75 Thus, it is argued, he 
resolved two constitutional uncertainties by arguing that the Supreme Court did, 
indeed, have powers of judicial review. The first conflict that was resolved by this was 
the one created by the silence of Article III of the Constitution, and the second was the 
conflict created based on the different methods of interpretation by different branches 
of the federal government.  
The Supreme Court, thus, also became the ultimate arbiter of the changes in the 
interpretation of the Constitution. Following the decision in Marbury v Madison,76 the 
Supreme Court has accepted this role and has adopted two different interpretations of 
the Constitution in its decisions.77 
II.2.1. Originalist Interpretation 
 
One of the methods of interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court is the originalist 
one. This technique can be summarised as the view that the interpretation of the 
Constitution should follow the original meaning of the Constitution, as viewed at the 
time of its adoption.78  
Interpreting the Constitution in light of the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution 
was undeniably less challenging while the Framers were still alive:79 those interpreting 
the document could rely on the Framers themselves to provide them with guidance 
when in doubt. If one is to rely on the intent of the Framers in interpreting the 
Constitution nowadays, however, they are faced with a highly arduous task. As Justice 
Scalia highlighted, this currently requires the investigation of ‘an enormous mass of 
material’ that would, in fact, befit a historian rather than a lawyer.80 In addition, 
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interpreting materials from the Founding era to determine the original meaning or 
intent of the Framers can also yield different results, depending on the materials 
selected for guidance and the method of interpretation chosen. Thus, for instance, 
while ‘textualists’ would rely on the ‘linguistic and social contexts’ of the era, ‘original 
structuralist’ would rely on placing ‘the institutions in their original contexts’ to 
determine the interpretation of a particular provision of the Constitution.81 
If one was to follow the strict textual interpretation of the Constitution in 1787, they 
would also be faced with another challenge: how to transform the provisions of the 
Constitution to ones that are suitable for our current era. The Framers of the 
Constitution could not have anticipated the changes in society that occurred following 
the ratification of the Constitution. In order to ensure that the Constitution may be used 
as a cornerstone for our current society, those advocating for the originalist 
interpretation had to identify a method by which this interpretation could cater for the 
situations arising throughout each period of time. Thus, for instance, the Framers 
would not have had an opinion on whether the electric chair constituted ‘cruel and 
unusual punishment’ under the Eighth Amendment, since an electric chair would not 
have been used at the time.82 
In such a situation, two originalist methods of interpretation may provide especially 
useful: first, that of attempting to identify the original intent of the Framers, and, 
second, that of relying on the democratic process set out in the Constitution.    
First, relying on the original intent of the Framers instead of the narrowest 
interpretation of the text allows those adopting the originalist interpretation to be 
adaptable to situations not previously anticipated by the Framers. Such an original 
intent can be identified as what ‘the general (or generally educated and politically 
attentive) public’ regarded the provisions to stand for at the time the Constitution was 
adopted.83 One must, therefore, pay close attention to interpreting the statements 
                                                          
81 Paul Brest, ‘The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding’ (1980) 60 Boston University 
Law Review 204, 218. 
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made by the Framers as the general opinion of the public at the time, since as Powell 
highlighted, even Madison claimed that these should be ‘regarded strictly as private 
opinions.’84 Subsequently, if a provision of the Constitution is subject to interpretation, 
the originalist method would require the examination of a wide array of materials 
available to establish what the general public opinion was at the time as the original 
intent. 
Thus, the other possible method of using the originalist interpretation to establish 
whether a transformation of the understanding of the provision had taken place is to 
use another argument of Scalia. He claimed that the Framers established a system 
whereby through elections, the people may have the opportunity to change those in 
power, thus, signalling a shift in the current values of society if those voted in 
advocated for those different values.85 However, he still claimed that elections would 
‘prevent certain changes in original values,’ thus ensuring that whilst the current values 
would be reflected in the legislation enacted by the new government, these would stay 
true to the original values laid down in the Constitution.86 
Whilst this method of interpretation may provide useful when investigating the original 
intent of the Framers, the second possible method of interpretation with its more 
flexible approach to the Constitution may prove to be more effective in allowing the 
Constitution to be adapted to each period of time. The reasons for this will be 
investigated briefly below and will also be demonstrated through the study of the three 
key fundamental areas in the Constitution in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
While examining the above, each chapter will commence with attempting to identify 
what the original understanding of each provision could have been at the time of the 
drafting and adoption of the Constitution and will consequently examine whether this 
understanding has transformed over the years. 
 
                                                          
84 Jefferson H Powell, ‘The Original Understanding of Original Intent’ (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 
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II.2.2. Non-originalist methods of interpretation 
 
If one is to look for a more effective method of adapting the provisions of the 
Constitution to the values and circumstances of our current society, this thesis argues 
that the non-originalist interpretation methods of the Constitution may prove more 
suitable.  
This method, as opposed to the textual provisions, places an emphasis on the values 
which should conform to the Constitution, while arguing that the Constitution is not a 
static document, but is ‘an evolving historical practice.’87 Subsequently, non-
originalists claim that when making decisions about a case when a dispute about a 
provision of the Constitution arises, it should also be considered that the conditions 
and the values in 1787 were different from today. The Constitution was drafted by 
white males, some of whom were slaveowners and who certainly did not know what a 
mobile phone or the internet was, since these did not exist at the time. However, the 
Constitution written in that year must conform to our current society and the connection 
between these two eras may be made by uncovering the fundamental values that the 
Constitution and each of its provisions encompassed. 
Whereas Scalia under the originalist method of interpretation argued that any changes 
in values would only be able to take effect if a change in government took place 
through elections, the non-originalist method of interpretation allows the Supreme 
Court to recognise these changes in values before such changes in government take 
place. Thus, it becomes a fundamental point of contention in such a system whether 
the Supreme Court (those unelected by the People) may be able to better represent 
the values of the People than those who have been elected by them, i.e. the Congress 
or the President.88  
This method also brings to light the conflict that if the other branches of government 
accepted the originalist method of interpretation, the same provision of the Constitution 
may be interpreted differently by the Supreme Court using the non-originalist method. 
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Following the decision in Marbury v Madison,89 it would consequently be the method 
of interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court that would prevail. This would 
consequently evolve to the same point of contention as above, if Congress or 
President (those elected by the People) adopt the originalist method of interpretation, 
why would the decision of the unelected Justices at the Supreme Court prevail.  
Those adopting the non-originalist method of interpretation may rely on the 
intentionalist technique to provide reasons for the authority of the Supreme Court in 
the above points. As Brest set out in what Monaghan referred to as his ‘constitutional 
decision making criteria,’90 the intent of the Framers may be derived from three 
sources: 
1) ‘any instances of the rule’s application which passed through [their] mind during 
the process of adopting it;’ 
2) ‘the language of the rule [they] drafted;’ and 
3) ‘the undesirable consequences [they] hoped to avoid by enacting the rule.’91 
Therefore, the text of the provision in question would thus only provide a starting point 
for establishing the intent, and the other sources would occupy the same level of 
importance as the Constitution itself.92  
Another approach utilised by the non-originalists is that of the ‘living Constitution.’93 
Ackerman described this approach by arguing that the Constitution is ‘an evolving 
historical practice’ during which ‘each generation contributed to our constitutional 
legacy.’94 Ackerman, thus, argues that instead of drawing comparisons with various 
philosophers, when adopting this method of interpretation, the focus should be placed 
on examining the decisions that were made by ‘We the People’ in America.95 
                                                          
89 William Marbury v James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States (n 63) 177. 
90 Henry P Monaghan, ‘Our Perfect Constitution’ (1981) 56 New York University Law Review 353, 385. 
91 Brest (n 81) 210. 
92 ibid 209. 
93 Jack M Balkin, ‘Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution’ (2009) 103 Northwestern 
University Law Review 549. 
94 Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (n 38) 34; Bruce Ackerman, We the People: The Civil Rights 
Revolution, vol 3 (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2014) 34. 
95 Ackerman, We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution (n 94) 34–35. 
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Two other techniques adopted by Tribe and Brest as non-originalist methods of 
interpretation of the Constitution may be grouped together as those focusing on the 
values derived from the Constitution. The two differ on how these values are to be 
determined. The focus of the technique adopted by Tribe is the current values. He 
argued that it is ‘the contemporary content of freedom, fairness and fraternity’ that 
would be required to be investigated by ‘both Court and country’ in cooperation under 
this non-originalist method.96 The emphasis in the approach advocated for by Brest is, 
however, placed on those ‘values that are fundamental to our society.’97 
This thesis sets out to demonstrate that a non-originalist method of interpretation, 
which may be referred to as the living constitutional values approach - blending the 
techniques adopted by Ackerman, Tribe and Brest - would provide the most effective 
method of interpretation of the Constitution if a threat of or an actual ‘rule of law crisis,’ 
such as the one currently taking place in the European Union would ever materialise 
in the United States of America. The living constitutional values approach, thus, 
requires the adoption of three key statements: 
1) The Constitution is not a static document that is incapable of evolving and 
adapting to changes in society. It is, however, a constantly transforming 
document based on the decisions made by each generation. 
2) The Framers intended to lay down certain fundamental values during the 
drafting and adoption of the Constitution that may be discovered by using 
various methods, such as the constitutional decision making criteria of Brest.  
3) The constitutional values of each generation may vary and the Constitution is 
able to accommodate these changes in values as long as it can be 
demonstrated that these conform to the fundamental constitutional values 
discovered as such during the drafting and adoption of the Constitution.  
Utilising three key areas of constitutional law, this thesis sets out to demonstrate the 
reasons why adopting the living constitutional values approach may provide the most 
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effective method of interpretation when the fundamental values that could be unveiled 
as part of this approach are in grave jeopardy by a state.  
Since the Supreme Court has adopted the role of ultimate arbiter, a focus is going to 
be placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court over the various eras in the ensuing 
chapters. This further sets out to reflect the living constitutional approach – how the 
interpretation of the Constitution has changed with the generations and how this has 
resulted in the Constitution being able to be adapted to different circumstances. The 
chapters will also demonstrate how the values comprised in each of the provisions of 
the Constitution examined have transformed throughout the ages. One key provision, 
where the transformations have been constant and apparent is the understanding of 
the values included in the commerce clause.    
This work aims to demonstrate how these approaches have also influenced the 
interpretation of the Constitution at various key eras in the United States and whether 
these have resulted in a successful method of dealing with its constitutional 
uncertainties and the constant conflict between the federal and state governments.  
  
II.2. The rise and fall of dual federalism 
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this work will identify and further analyse the first response of 
the federal government, and especially the Supreme Court, to the management of the 
constitutional uncertainties created by the Commerce Clause98 and the Bill of Rights.99 
The first response of the Supreme Court to the constant conflict is identified in the 
case of Gibbons v Ogden,100 which will be examined in detail in Chapter 4. In this case 
Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the Constitution and the system that it created as 
what Corwin coined a ‘dual federalist’ system.101 
                                                          
98 Constitution of the United States of America 1787, Article I, section 8, third clause. 
99 Constitution of the United States of America 1787, Amendments I - X. 
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101 Edward S Corwin, ‘Congress’s Power to Prohibit Commerce a Crucial Constitutional Issue’ (1933) 
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According to this interpretation, the two systems of government could co-exist because 
they regulated two separate spheres. Thus, as long as each level of government 
regulated only in its respective area, the status quo would be maintained and the 
constant conflict between these two governments would be managed effectively. 
 
Chapter 3 will examine that in the area of the protection of fundamental rights, a similar 
approach of the Supreme Court may be identified where the protection of fundamental 
rights was initially regarded to be an area that only states may regulate. 
 
However, the following chapters will demonstrate that this method of interpretation 
could not be maintained, and even the Justices of the Supreme Court immediately 
following Chief Justice Marshall disagreed with this interpretation of the Constitution. 
 
II.3. Civil War 
 
Another key moment in the management of constitutional uncertainties and the 
constant conflict between the federal and state governments was the rise of and the 
Civil War itself. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will concentrate and analyse the response of the federal government 
to the uncertainties created around the status of slavery. As will be demonstrated in 
these chapters, the issue of slavery did not only raise questions regarding the status 
of the slaves and ex-slaves as individuals, but also generated a dual conflict. This dual 
conflict consisted of the usual vertical conflict between the federal and state 
governments and the horizontal conflict between the Northern and Southern states. 
Whilst most Northern states advocated the abolition of slavery, most Southern states 
insisted on the maintenance of this system. In order to do so, they claimed that any 
powers to regulate the issue of slavery remained with the states, and did not belong 
to the federal government.102 
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The Southern States’ defeat in the Civil War also resulted in fundamental constitutional 
questions that will be analysed further in Chapter 2. For instance, a key question 
became whether these states remained part of the United States of America during 
the Civil War and if not, whether they would have to satisfy the condition of being a 
‘republican form of government’ under the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution in 
order to be (re)admitted to the Union.103 
The era of the Reconstruction, during which time the federal government aimed to re-
integrate the Southern states into the United States of America, resulted in further 
constitutional changes. This period is thus characterised by the federal government 
establishing a stronger position and aiming to address the constant conflict further. In 
the Thirteenth Amendment, adopted as one of the Reconstruction Amendments, 
slavery was abolished, thus bringing the issue of slavery under the authority of the 
federal government, as opposed to the states. Moreover, as Chapter 3 will further 
demonstrate, the Fourteenth Amendment also addressed the two characteristics of 
the debate around slavery. It firstly aimed to resolve the constitutional uncertainty 
created around the status of the ex-slaves, and, secondly, it aimed to resolve the 
constant conflict between the federal government and the states in the area of the Bill 
of Rights. The methods of doing so will be analysed further in that chapter.  
 
II.4. The New Deal 
 
Chapter 5 will also illustrate how the constitutional uncertainties around the Commerce 
Clause and the constant conflict between the federal and state governments played a 
role during the New Deal.  
This programme, devised by President Roosevelt as a response to the Great 
Depression, advocated for a stronger federal government. To do so, President 
Roosevelt could take advantage of the constitutional uncertainties created by the 
Constitution in the Commerce Clause and the blurred lines between the limits of the 
                                                          
103 Constitution of the United States of America 1787, Article IV section 4. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 1: Constitutional Uncertainties and Methods of Interpretation to Resolve the 
Constant Conflict between the Federal and State Governments in the United States of 
America 
 
[37] 
 
powers of the federal and state governments in this area. Whilst the Supreme Court 
was initially opposed to the expansion of the powers of the federal government under 
the Commerce Clause, ‘a switch in time’ occurred, that, in fact, accepted the approach 
espoused by Congress, expanding the powers of the federal government under the 
Commerce Clause.104  
Throughout the examination of the development of these areas of constitutional law in 
the United States, this work will also aim to demonstrate whether during these key 
times the living constitutional values approach may be argued to have been adopted 
by the Justices of the Supreme Court, thus, allowing the constitutional provisions to 
adapt to the circumstances of each era.  
III. Structure of the thesis: the guarantee of a republican government , 
fundamental rights and interstate commerce  
 
Chapter 2 of this work will focus on the constitutional uncertainty created in the federal 
Constitution in another fundamental provision: the Guarantee Clause. Article 4 section 
4 of the Constitution of the United States of America states: 
‘The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union, a republican 
form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on 
application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot 
be convened), against domestic violence.’105 
The chapter will highlight the constitutional uncertainties created in this clause 
regarding what a republican form of government entails. It will also demonstrate that 
the constant conflict manifests itself in a varied manner in this area. The conflict in this 
area, where the federal government was clearly granted authority, has not revolved 
around the powers of the federal and the state governments in this area. Instead, it 
has been the separate branches of the federal government that have entered into a 
state of constant disagreement over which branch has the responsibility of enforcing 
the Guarantee Clause. 
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Chapter 3 will investigate the constitutional uncertainties that originally arose from the 
state constitutions as opposed to the federal Constitution. It will demonstrate how the 
varying protections afforded to individuals in the United States of America in the 
various states have created an uncertainty that was to be solved with the adoption of 
the Bill of Rights. However, it will also illustrate that with a lack of clear interpretation 
on whether the Bill of Rights would apply against the states, the constant conflict 
between the federal and state governments was also present in the development of 
this fundamental area as well. It will also argue that this conflict was also manifest in 
the constitutional methods of interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court at different 
times throughout the ages. 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this work will further examine the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution. Article I, section 8 in clause 3 of the Constitution states:  
‘The Congress shall have power […] To regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.’106 
Chapter 4 will emphasise the constant uncertainty as to whether this clause prohibits 
states from regulating interstate commerce. The study of this, dormant, aspect of the 
Commerce Clause will place an emphasis of how constitutional uncertainties in this 
area have been created since the drafting of this provision. It will further illustrate how 
these uncertainties have contributed to the constant conflict between the federal and 
state governments in this area. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will also demonstrate that the constitutional uncertainties and the 
constant conflict in this area have contributed to the creation and protection of a 
uniform national market through the different methods of interpretation of the 
Constitution adopted by the federal government.  
Chapter 5 will study the Commerce Clause from the obvious aspect apparent at first 
sight in the clause. This, affirmative aspect will examine how Congress has used its 
powers to regulate interstate commerce since the ratification of the Constitution. The 
chapter will also draw parallels to the uncertainties that have been present for the 
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dormant aspect of this clause and assess whether these have also had an impact on 
the development of the affirmative understanding of this clause. It will also analyse 
how the management of the constant conflict between the federal and state 
government has also impacted upon the development of not only the interpretation of 
this clause, but that of the national market as well.  
The concluding remarks of the thesis will firstly summarise the findings of the 
examinations in the above chapters, and analyse how managing the constitutional 
uncertainties in these key areas have created similar and diverging approaches to the 
interpretation of the Constitution throughout the different eras. It will also assess 
whether these approaches have assisted the various advancement of society 
throughout the ages and the creation of a uniform, federal, approach.  
 
 [40] 
 
Chapter 2: Protecting the United States of America from a tyranny by creating 
federal and state republican governments 
 
The constitutional value set out in the Guarantee Clause  
 
I. Introduction  
 
Article IV section 4 of the Constitution of the United States sets out that the ‘United 
States’ guarantees ‘a republican form of government’ to each State by the federal 
government and pledges for the protection of the states against 'invasion' and 
'domestic violence'.107 As apparent from the clause, however, ‘a republican form of 
government’ was not clearly defined in this provision. Neither was it clearly set out 
which part of the federal government was to act as the enforcer of this clause. Since 
its inception, the meaning and importance of the Guarantee Clause has, therefore, 
been a subject of academic, judicial, and political debate.  
The chapter will firstly examine what a republican form of government that is 
guaranteed under Article IV section 4 can be characterised as in light of the originalist 
method of interpretation. It will, thus, aim to establish what a republican form of 
government may have been understood as in 1787, by examining the ancient and 
modern ideals of a republican government, and will place a particular emphasis on the 
works of Montesquieu, who, as it will be argued, highly influenced the ideologies of the 
Founding Fathers. It will subsequently assess whether United States of American may 
be regarded the first federalist state embracing the modern republican ideals and 
whether the Constitution itself may be regarded a republican instrument under these 
principles. It will consequently examine the history of the drafting and adaptation of the 
Guarantee Clause at the Constitutional Convention.  
Afterwards, the chapter sets out to examine how the concept of the republican form of 
government has been applied in the separate branches of the federal government, 
and how the meaning of what a republican government entailed had transformed 
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through the various interpretations adopted about this clause. The chapter will also 
study whether Congress, the President, or the Supreme Court has assumed the role 
of the enforcer of this clause, and if and when they did so, whether they have 
performed their role successfully. 
The chapter aims to demonstrate the hidden potentials of this current ‘sleeping 
giant’,108 and will argue that whether this giant will be awaken at any point in time will 
always depend on whether a federal government will risk intervening in highly 
sensitive, but fundamental, political questions. 
 
II. A republican form of government 
 
Article IV section 4 of the Constitution guarantees 'a republican form of government' 
to each State in the United States. In order to fully analyse the development and 
importance of the Guarantee Clause in light of the living constitutional values 
approach, what may constitute a republican government shall be defined first. This will 
involve an analysis of what a republican form of government could be defined as in 
1787 in light of the originalist interpretation.  
As a political and philosophical concept, the republican government has been present 
since ancient times, and has been examined and applied in various historical eras.109 
During this process, the understanding of what such government may entail has also 
widened and, in certain situations, transformed. It, therefore, has to be examined 
further how this understanding has transformed and what the republican form of 
government was characterised as at the time of the drafting of the Constitution.  
The word republic originates from the Latin 'res publica', which is translated to 'the 
shared or common thing'.110 A republican government, however, has been identified 
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variably by different people during history.111 The thesis will follow the approach 
adopted by Pocock, who asserts that the understanding of a republican form of 
government can be separated into two groups: the ancient and the modern ideal.112 
 
II.1. The ancient republican government 
 
The inception of the ideal of a republican government is attributed to Cicero and Titus 
Livius.113 Cicero identified the ‘republic’ as a state that is the property of the people, 
where the laws are consequently enacted for the common good of the population.114 
He further argued that in a republican government, the establishment of certain 
institutions becomes necessary to ensure that the common good is always 
observed.115 It has, therefore, been an accepted view that Cicero and Titus Livius 
introduced the concept of the 'checks and balances' into the republican government.116  
The followers of the ancient ideal of the republican government also believe that a 
republican government can only exist in a small state, such as a city-state, since this 
form of government requires the direct representation of the people themselves, which 
can only be viable and effective in a small state.117 Since the citizens of such a state 
are also limited in number, this will enhance the possibility of determining the common 
good for the population in a harmonious and effective manner.118   
II. 2. The reshaping of the ancient ideal  
 
The ancient ideal of the republican government has been revived and reshaped in 
various stages of history. In the Middle Ages, a republican government was understood 
as a political organisation against the canonic institutions, whilst towards the end of 
                                                          
111 Johnson (n 109) 358. 
112 JGA Pocock, ‘America’s Foundations, Foundationalisms, and Fundamentalisms’ (2005) 49 Orbis 53, 
53. 
113 Sellers (n 61) 13204. 
114 ibid 13205. 
115 ibid 13204. 
116 ibid.   
117 Pocock (n 112) 53; Sellers (n 61) 13205.  
118 Sellers (n 61) 13205. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 2: Protecting the United States of America from a tyranny by creating federal and 
state republican governments 
[43] 
 
the era, it became identified as the form of government opposed to tyranny.119 During 
the Italian Renaissance, a republican government was categorised as one promoting 
'the political liberty of the Roman Republic'.120 Machiavelli revived the checks and 
balances concept of the ancient ideal, and further claimed that states in history had 
two forms: a republican or a principality.121 In the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
England, a republican form of government was characterised as one where the 
aristocratic class participated in politics.122  
It may, therefore, be argued the ancient ideal of the republican government required 
the creation of laws for the common good, and the direct participation by the citizens 
in the political life of the state, which was only possible in a small state.  
Moreover, this ideal, in its reshaped form, allowed for the creation of different 
hierarchical classes of society, such as the aristocracy.123 Sunstein argued that the 
creation of these classes also assisted in the determination of common good, since 
such good was identified as the 'common interests among members of different social 
classes'.124 It is, however, argued that the existence of different classes will make the 
determination of the common good more challenging. In a small state, it may be easier 
for the different classes to assemble than in a large state with a large population. 
Depending on the size of these different classes, they may be able to influence the 
determination of the common good, which may result in a decision favouring their 
private or class interests. This decision, on the other hand, can be easily regarded as 
one against the common good, favouring the private interests of a specific class 
instead. If one follows the ancient interpretation of the common good, that only applied 
to certain members of the society, who were allowed to participate in politics. Slaves 
or women, for instance, were not provided with the opportunity to do so.  
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Consequently, it may be asserted that the ancient ideal of the republican government 
is not a suitable form of government for most contemporary societies, hence the lack 
of its application for centuries.  
II.3 The modern ideal of republican government 
 
Since the ancient ideal of the republican government has been deemed an unfeasible 
form of government, it underwent a radical transformation, thus, creating the modern 
ideal. Since the Constitution of the United States is often referred to as the 'original 
modern republican constitution',125 it can be argued that the first state to apply the 
principles developed under the modern ideal of republican government and the 
solutions devised for its incidental evils was the United States.  
The origins of this transformed or modern ideal of the republican government are first 
identifiable in The Spirit of the Laws by Montesquieu, where he argued that a 
republican government is one ‘in which the people as a body, or only a part of the 
people, have sovereign power,’ and where ‘political virtue’, meaning the love of the 
homeland, makes the government move.126 He further made the claims that in a 
republic ‘men are equal’ and its spirit is ‘peace and moderation’.127 Montesquieu also 
introduced the ideology that a republican government should function as a shield 
against the harmful effects of 'excess democracy,'128 and further claimed that a 
federation of republican states will also operate more effectively as a shield against 
external violence on the state.129 The latter argument was also supported by Hume 
and Kant, and was also adopted by the Founding Fathers upon the creation of the 
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United States.130 Later parts of the chapter will discuss how Montesquieu’s ideologies 
were supported by the Founding Fathers.  
Prominent proponents of this view further identified key characteristics of a modern 
republican government. Sellers, for instance, argued that according to the modern 
understanding of a republican government, the state has transformed its main aim as 
the promotion of 'freedom as non-domination' from the simple 'pursuit' of 'freedom as 
non-domination' of the ancient ideal.131 Pettit also claims that the followers of the 
modern ideal identify the 'subjection to the law and magistrates, acting for the common 
good,' as opposed to their private interests by freedom.132 It may, thus, be argued that 
the freedom that citizens possess in a republican government is 'a shield against 
arbitrary decision of others and equal subjection to the rule of laws'.133  
Moreover, Pettit, claimed that in order to create a modern republican government, one 
of the characteristics the state must possess is to become a 'good international citizen,' 
and a member in regional or international systems to ensure its secure position, 
protected from external forces.134 Whether this statement holds true nowadays is 
questionable, as it is seemingly evident that the interests of the United States seem to 
occupy a more important position than being ‘a good international citizen.’  
Furthermore, the modern ideal, similar to the ancient ideal, requires the laws to be 
enacted for the common good of the citizens to ensure their freedom.135 Sellers, on 
the other hand, preferred to refer to this concept as the 'common purpose', which takes 
priority over the private interests of individuals for the benefit of the state.136 Pettit also 
characterised the relationship between the government and the people as one where 
the people act as trustors, placing their trust in the government that they will not act 
arbitrarily.137 It may also be argued that the government, consequently, will ensure the 
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promotion of the freedom of the people.138 Another key element of the modern 
republican government identified by both Sellers and Pettit is the separation of powers 
that they argue has been essential for the creation of such government since the 
eighteenth century.139     
One of the advantages of the modern republican ideal is that since it lacks a clear 
definition, it has become a dynamic concept, which can be adapted to any previously 
unknown situation.140 This nature of the modern republican ideal gains increased 
importance, where the freedom element may be in jeopardy by an 'arbitrary 
government' which aims to dominate the people it governs.141 
Therefore, it is argued that if a clear definition had been provided of what a republican 
government entailed in the Constitution, it would not allow for the Constitution to apply 
in situations that may have been unconceivable at the time of its drafting.   
On the other hand, this situation creates a constitutional uncertainty. With the lack of 
a definition, it will be up to the government of each era to determine what constitutes 
a republican government. Bonfield and Hasen argue that such a decision would 
depend on the current ‘values’ of society142 and ‘theories of natural justice.’143 
However, a constitutional uncertainty arises when the values of society would differ 
greatly between different eras. In such a situation, the non-originalist interpretation and 
specifically the living constitutional values approach provides those applying the 
Constitution with the tools to ensure it adapts to the transformed values since 1787.  
One such change in values that was apparent in the United States of America was the 
abolishment of slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment. As it will be analysed in the 
Chapter 3, the position of slavery also highlighted another crucial constitutional 
uncertainty in the United States: the divide between federal and state powers. Since 
                                                          
138 ibid. 
139 ibid 178. 
140 Sellers (n 61) 13208; Pettit (n 61) 180–183. 
141 Sellers (n 61) 13208; Pettit (n 61) 180–183. 
142 Arthur E Bonfield, ‘The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional 
Desuetude’ (1961) 46 Minn. L. Rev. 513, 560. 
143 ibid 529; Rick Hasen, ‘Leaving the Empty Vessel of “Republicanism” Unfilled: An Argument for the 
Continued Non-Justiciability of Guarantee Clause Cases’ Loyola Law School (Los Angeles) Public Law 
and Legal Theory Research Paper 15 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=385920> accessed 1 November 2012.  
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 2: Protecting the United States of America from a tyranny by creating federal and 
state republican governments 
[47] 
 
the Constitution did not outlaw slavery, it remained accepted in the Southern states 
before the Civil War, whereas it was outlawed in most Northern states.144 Thus, a 
situation similar to Dredd Scott145 could arise, where federal constitutional uncertainty 
emerged due to the different legal statuses of slaves and manumitted ex-slaves in 
different states,.146 The Thirteenth Amendment, providing a federal ban on slavery, 
aimed to resolve this uncertainty.147 It may, thus, be argued that with this 
transformation of values and following the adoption of this Amendment, a state could 
only be deemed republican after outlawing slavery. However, whether this was the 
case will be examined below. 
Another threat posed by the lack of clear definition of what a republican form of 
government entails is highlighted by Pettit.148 He argues that this may lead to 
government officials being more inclined to act arbitrarily. 149 Whilst this position is not 
disputed, Pettit also recognised that government officials may also use this uncertainty 
to take actions for the ‘common good’ of the people that they could otherwise not 
take.150 Acting so would be in line with the aim of a republican government, however, 
whether this could be guaranteed at all times in practice is highly doubtful. 
The uncertainties of the modern republican ideal also resurface in certain 'inherent' 
threats that can be detected in the ideal of the republican government.151 Any 
republican system must, consequently, find a prevention mechanism for these threats 
and these mechanisms and their implementations distinguish governments from each 
other.152 
II.4. Threats to a republican government and solutions 
 
The main threat present in any republican system is the emergence of a dominating 
ruler. Such rulers may be identified as monarchs or tyrants and may also include public 
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officials.153 As it has been demonstrated above, these rulers may commence to rise 
as dominating governors of the people through acting arbitrarily, considering their own 
private interests, as opposed to the common good of the people who they govern.154  
There have been various ideological solutions offered to the above threats that should 
be applied in a republican government to stabilise the republic in the ancient and 
modern ideal. Pettit, for instance, argued that there are three conditions by which the 
instruments controlling the arbitrary exercise of power should be exercised.155 He 
claimed that, firstly, - adopting the ideology of James Harrington - 'an empire of laws 
and not of men' should exist.156 Secondly, he argued that the different powers of 
government should be 'dispersed' and, thirdly, he claimed that the laws should be 
'relatively resistant to majority will'.157 He further asserted that republican governments 
should establish 'screen' mechanisms before imposing any 'sanctions'.158   
In order to prevent the threat of a dominating ruler rising to power, Sellers and 
Saxonhouse argued - similar to the previous claims of Cicero and Machiavelli for the 
ancient ideal - that to control the arbitrary exercise of power, republican governments 
should introduce 'checks and balances' into their systems.159 Saxonhouse further 
argues that to ensure that the republican government will not transform into a 
monarchy or tyranny, 'institutions protecting against oppression' should be 
established, which will also ensure that those who are elected as public officials will 
not become corrupt and exercise their power arbitrarily.160 
As it has been mentioned above how the Constitution may be deemed the first to have 
embodied these modern republican ideals, a thorough examination of how the 
Founding Fathers applied these principles and solutions during the creation of the 
Constitution is required. 
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III. The United States, a novel federalist republican government 
 
After becoming independent from the British Empire, the Founding Fathers were faced 
with the challenge of having to create an effectively functioning system in which the 
separate States were not administered by identical forms of government. Highly 
influenced by the ideology of Montesquieu, they, however, seemed to believe that in 
order to ensure the effective functioning of such system, each state had to adopt like 
forms of government.161 Montesquieu argued that compared to Holland and 
Switzerland, where identical forms of government existed at the time, Germany 
possessed a more ‘imperfect’ system where the cities and states it consisted of were 
allowed different forms of government.162 Moreover, he argued that the forms of 
government that the states that are part of a confederate government could adopt 
were either a monarchy or a republican government, however, these two systems 
could not co-exist within a confederation. 163 
The Spirit of Laws by Montesquieu identified three forms of government, which the 
Framers could endorse in the creation of the new federal system of government.164 
These were a republican, monarchical or a despotic one.165 A republican government 
was characterised by Montesquieu as one ‘in which the body, or only a part of the 
people’ is given ‘the supreme power.’ 166 A democracy, he claimed, is established when 
the body of the people are given this supreme power. 167 An aristocracy is created 
when only part of the people are given such powers, according to Montesquieu. 168 In 
a monarchy, he argued, ‘a single person governs by fixed and established laws,’ 
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whereas in a despotic government ‘a single person’ governs ‘without law and without 
rule, direct everything by his own will and caprice.’ 169 
Understandably, as opposed to the tradition of the British Empire, the Framers were 
opposed to the idea of establishing a monarchical government in the United States.170 
Moreover, as one of the main objectives of the Framers in creating the new 
government separate from the British Empire is argued to have been to ensure that 
no tyranny would ever exist in the United States, the choice of adopting a despotic 
form of government proved unsuitable for the Framers as well. The suggestion of 
Montesquieu of adopting republican governments, consequently, seemed to be the 
most ideal choice for the Founding Fathers.171 Whilst such a form of government 
usually involved a republican system within one state only, the Framers took this ideal 
one step further and, as a political innovation of their era, devised a federalist system 
where the federal system and the states were deemed to be republican as well.172 An 
advantage of this federal republic was, highlighted earlier by Montesquieu, when he 
claimed that an exceptional characteristic of such system would be its equipment with 
the characteristics of a republican government internally and with the ‘force of a 
monarchy’ externally.173 This suggests that whilst the Framers were opposed to 
establishing a monarchy in the United States, they did recognise the importance of 
showing the strength of the new state externally.  
As it is clearly seen from the textual provision of the Guarantee Clause, the Framers 
did not provide a guideline or a standard in the clause about what a republican 
government entailed. This, therefore, makes the work of those adopting the originalist 
interpretation approach to the Constitution even more difficult. Those adopting the 
textualist interpretation are thus not able to rely on this specific clause to argue that 
the Constitution clearly laid down what a republican form of government entails. The 
originalist method of relying on the intentions of the Framers could consequently prove 
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more fruitful in the search for these intentions. During this search one would have to 
examine various other sources from the era of the framing and adoption of the 
Constitution. Adopting the living constitutional values approach would, also require 
examining the intentions of the Framers: the values they envisaged a republican form 
of government to entail and the consequences they aimed to avoid.  
Based on the above examination of the three choices of government the Framers 
could choose from according to Montesquieu, it may be argued that one of the 
consequences the Framers wished to avoid by adopting a republican form of 
government was the formation of a monarchy or a despotic state in the United Stated. 
Moreover, whilst Montesquieu further characterised a republican form of government 
into two subcategories, namely, a democracy and an aristocracy, the Founding Fathers 
opted for the support of the encompassing ideal of a republican form of government in 
the guarantee clause. A criticism of this system, however, is that it allows for the 
governing power to accumulate in the hands of only ‘part of the people’ in line with the 
ideologies of Montesquieu. 174 It, thus, follows that excluding certain parts of society, 
such as slaves or women, to possess governing powers was not contrary to the 
republican ideals, whilst it would not have suited a democratic form of government. In 
a democracy, Montesquieu claimed, people exercise sovereignty through ‘their 
suffrages, which are their own will.’175 
III.1. The Constitutional Convention 
 
During the Philadelphia Convention, even though the Framers did not expressly 
identify what a republican government was, they identified some of the key principles 
that are essential in the creation of a republican government. Wilson identified this 
principle as ‘the confidence of the people’,176 while Mason determined these as ‘love, 
affection, attachment of citizens to their laws, their freedom and to their country’.177  
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Whilst these principles provide vague guidelines for the understanding what a republic 
form of government entails, they fail to provide a clear viewpoint about the 
constitutional structure and functioning of a state. Moreover, as will be discussed in 
the next chapter, the claim that in a republican state, citizens are attached to ‘their 
freedom’,178 only applied to a select group of individuals at the time. More 
controversially, while this select group of individuals obtained their freedom from the 
British Empire, they did not find denying the freedom of the slaves they owned contrary 
to this ideal.179 Therefore, whilst these statements might have allowed for wider rights 
and protection for individuals than a monarchy, it must be emphasised that those who 
were able to benefit from these were only a select group of individuals. This, however, 
as highlighted earlier was a key differentiating characteristic between a republican and 
a democratic form of government according to Montesquieu. Thus, it is argued, the 
Framers may have intentionally chosen to establish a republican form of government 
over a democracy in order to maintain the ruling majority in the hands of the select few 
that belonged to the social group that created the Constitution.  
If this approach was adopted by originalists, it would be difficult to reconcile this with 
the subsequent constitutional developments. The non-originalist approach, however, 
is more apt to allow for this restrictive reading of the republican form of government in 
the eighteenth century to adapt to changes in society: if the understanding of who the 
select few who benefit from this form of government changes, the interpretation of the 
Constitution, according to the non-originalist method, would also follow suit.  
Departing from the above methods of leaving the republican form of government 
undefined in the Constitution, Madison attempted to lay down certain constitutional 
aspects of a republican system while characterising such form of government. He 
firstly claimed that in a republican state, an ‘extent’ that would ‘render combinations on 
the ground of interest difficult’ would be necessary. 180 Secondly, he argued that ‘the 
representation of the People’ should be refined through an election.181 Thus, it is 
argued, that in line with Montesquieu’s ideals, Madison was in favour of a republican 
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government where the supreme power would be given to the body or part of the 
people.182 
While discussing the new form of representation in Congress of the people and not of 
the states in the novel system, Mason, however, also mentioned that ‘improper 
elections’ on many occasions were an inherent characteristic of a republican 
government.183 He reasoned that no form of government was ’free from imperfections 
and evils’ and as such, improper elections can be identified as one such imperfection 
of a republican government. 184 By ‘improper elections,’ Mason made a reference to 
the claim of Wilson, who argued that improper elections would not arise in ‘larger 
districts.’185 He asserted that ‘[bad] elections proceed from the smallness of the 
districts which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.’186 
On the other hand, in line with the principles of the ancient ideal that it is the nature of 
republics to occupy ‘a small territory’, Elseworth also argued during the Convention 
that the states with the least efficient governments were those with large territories, 
including Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.187 Thus, if one is to rely on the 
arguments of Mason, improper elections would remain a constant characteristic of the 
republican system. However, the approach where it is argued that if a change in 
fundamental values in the United States occurred, it would take form in the results of 
the election with the victory of those advocating for such changes would therefore be 
in constant jeopardy. If elections are in a constant threat of bringing improper results, 
it would, logically, fall in the hands of those unelected to protect those fundamental 
values that those are elected opposed. Thus, the role of the Supreme Court, from the 
outset, may be argued to have occupied a key position as the defender of the 
fundamental values of the Constitution. 
Another principle that assists with the maintenance of fundamental constitutional 
values is the separation of powers, which is set out to guarantee that each institution 
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within the federal government acts within the bounds of the Constitution. Thus, if an 
institution is an elected one, the other institutions would be able to assist in ensuring 
the institution does not breach its bounds of power.   
The Convention also addressed the characteristics of a republican government. In 
South Carolina, Pinckney highlighted the power of the people to ‘form the legislature’ 
as one characteristic. 188 In Pennsylvania, Wilson claimed that a republican and a 
democratic government were identical, as they were characterised by the people 
possessing the sovereign power.189 
Despite these discussions, the Guarantee Clause did not lay down conditions that the 
states had to fulfil in order to be characterised as republican states. It is also interesting 
to highlight that the form of government of the federal state, however, is not discussed 
in this clause and no guarantee is provided to the people about the maintenance of 
the republican form of government at federal level, similar to that of the states in this 
clause.   
III.2. The Federalist interpretation of a republican government 
 
Since it remained unclear in the Constitution what a republican government entailed 
in the Constitution, the discussion about the characteristics of a republican 
government continued in the Federalist Papers. Hamilton, subsequently, identified four 
essential characteristics of a republic: the separation of powers, ‘checks and balances’ 
over the legislature, courts composed of judges with ‘good behaviour’ and the 
‘representation of the people’ by elected representatives in the legislature.190 He 
further added – contrary to the viewpoint of Elseworth - that in order to maintain an 
effectively functioning republican government, the ‘orbit’ of the system should be 
increased.191 He argued that this could be achieved either through increasing the 
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territory of a state (contrary to the ancient ideal) or through the creation of a 
confederation.192  
Madison further characterised a republican government as one ‘in which the scheme 
of representation takes place’ and that acquires ‘all its powers from the great body of 
the people’ and the administration is performed by officers who perform their tasks for 
a short time ‘during pleasure […] or good behaviour’.193 He also distinguished between 
a democracy and a republic in these Papers, arguing that in a republic, the governing 
powers are delegated to a limited number of elected representatives and that such a 
system is better suited for a state laying on a wide territory and possessing an 
extensive population.194 Once again, contradicting the viewpoint of Elseworth and that 
of the ancient ideal of a republican government, the Federalists were in agreement 
that the only system suited for such a large territory as the United States was a 
republican form of government. 
It is also argued that the standpoint that the concept of the republican government 
should be regarded as a 'dynamic term' has been implemented by the federal 
government since the adoption of the Guarantee Clause.195  
The claim that this perspective has been adopted by the federal government may be 
supported by Toren. 196 He claimed that a consensus now exists - following Madison’s 
claim in The Federalist Papers,197 which will be analysed later in this work - that to 
avoid a breach of the Guarantee Clause, state governments merely need to remain 
‘substantially republican.’198 This means that governments only need to ensure that 
the outcome of their actions is republican in nature.199 The adaptation of this position 
will, on the other hand, doubtlessly create a legal uncertainty as to what constitutes a 
republican form of government in each era.200 This may, therefore, either facilitate 
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more suitable actions being taken by the federal government towards the common 
good, or allow for arbitrary and subjective interpretation of the clause.201 
As it has been demonstrated above, even though the Framers of the Constitution 
seemingly aimed to devise a new republican federal system comprised of republican 
states, they failed to lay down the exact definition of what a republican form of 
government is. Nevertheless, it was argued by the Framers themselves that certain 
characteristics of a republican government may always be identifiable, such as ‘the 
confidence of the people’,202 or the ‘love, affection, attachment of citizens to their laws, 
their freedom and to their country’.203 
III.3. The Constitution of the United States, a republican instrument 
 
Whilst the Constitution fails to explicitly claim whether it is a republican instrument, it 
is argued that a republican form of government may only be effectively protected by 
republican methods. Otherwise, a risk that the methods employed by those enforcing 
republican values may not hold true and may also overthrow any republican 
government. Thus, it is required to assess whether the methods devised in the 
Constitution entail a republican one. In order to successfully assess whether the 
Constitution of the United States is, in fact, a republican instrument, this section will 
analyse the provisions of the Constitution based on the principles that may be 
identifiable in a republican government. 
The republican ideals may first be found in the Preamble of the Constitution, which 
claims that the power rests with the people in the United States, and states that the 
Constitution was established for stabilising the federal state and ensuring that the 
freedom of the people is preserved.204 This provision firstly observes the principle of 
the republican government, supported by Montesquieu,  by claiming that the people 
are the ultimate sovereigns in a republican state.205 Secondly, by declaring that the 
main purpose of the Constitution is the promotion of freedom of the people by requiring 
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its preservation, the Constitution supports one of the main aims of a republican 
government identified by Sellers,.206  
The Constitution divides the federal government into three separate branches. Article 
I section 1 identifies Congress as the legislature, Article II section 1, the President as 
the executive and, Article III section 1, the Supreme Court as the federal supreme 
judiciary. This demonstration of the separation of the powers principle, ensuring that a 
checks and balances system is introduced for the maintenance of a non-arbitrary 
government in a republican state,207 has been identified as a characteristic of a 
republican government since its ancient interpretation. 
Article V, allowing the creation of amendments to the Constitution, supports the view 
that a republican government shall be regarded as a ‘dynamic’ concept,208 since the 
amendments will ensure that the Constitution can be adapted to any new situation that 
the federal government may have to tackle. This provision, thus, also supports the 
ideology that the Framers accepted that the circumstances may change and the 
Constitution should not be regarded a static document. Therein lies the key challenge 
for those adopting the originalist approach. However, those adopting this approach 
may subsequently claim that it is only the amendments to the Constitution that should 
be regarded as true transformations in the constitutional values, all other changes 
should not be regarded constitutional until laid down in form of a constitutional 
amendment. Such an approach, however, if history teaches us anything, may not 
prove the most effective – one needs to look no further than the issue of slavery, which 
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Through the procedural guarantees set out for the adoption of these amendments, 
such as support from ‘two thirds of both houses,’ is argued to ensure that these 
amendments would only be made for the common good of the people, following 
republican ideals.  
It is also argued by Johnson that the Constitution ensures that people continue to 
possess the sovereign power in the United States by a 'circuitous process', in which 
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Congress action can be vetoed by the President.209 The President can subsequently 
lose his position in the next election by the will of the people.210 In this process, a 
legislative act can also be held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. However, the 
Constitution may be amended by the people through their representatives, thereby 
transforming the actions that had been held unconstitutional by the Court previously.211 
Thus, an originalist argument that is only when constitutional amendments are 
adopted that constitutional values are transformed may be rebutted: if an amendment 
gets adopted, it must mean that such values have commenced to be recognised to 
have transformed in the first act of this process. Therefore, a non-originalist approach 
would allow for a swifter adoption of these transformed values. After all, allowing a 
conflict in these values to persist for an extended period of time only resulted in a Civil 
War.  
Maddox further argues that the provision under Article II, which states that the 
President shall be elected, and only for a limited time, also secures that no monarch 
can be established in the United States.212 This further supports the ideology of a 
republican ideal and has been regarded as it has been regarded one of the main 
threats to a republican government. 213 Consequently, it may also be argued that Article 
IV further ensures that no monarch can emerge in any of the states of the federation.  
Despite providing support for the republican form of government in the Constitution, it 
was highlighted above that the Guarantee Clause did not make a choice between the 
two subsections identified by Montesquieu for such a system: democracy or 
aristocracy. However, it may be argued that since Article I section 9 subsection 8 
prevents the creation of the aristocratic class, it is claimed that the Framers did, in fact, 
make a decision between creating an aristocracy or a democracy from Montesquieu’s 
point of view. However, an aristocratic class, is also an essential element of any 
monarchy, and by refusing the availability to be granted a 'title of nobility' by the federal 
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government, it is argued that the republican government as opposed to the monarchic 
system was the one supported by the Framers.214 
It may also be argued that Article IV section 4, by guaranteeing each state a republican 
form of government without defining what such government entails, also ensures the 
inclusion of not only all of the above mentioned characteristics, but those regarded as 
a characteristic in a republican government in all contemporary societies. Article IV 
section 4 can further be regarded as the provision that ensures that – in line with 
Montesquieu’s ideology - the status quo of the federal system is maintained by 
ensuring that all states remain republican at all times.215 
It is thus argued that the fundamental principles of the ideal of a republican government 
have become entrenched in the Constitution by the inclusion of the above provisions. 
Furthermore, under Article VI section 2, by elevating the Constitution to the status of 
the 'supreme law' of the United States, these principles have become crucial elements 
in all actions of the federal government. This standpoint may also be supported by 
Article VI section 3, which requires all public officials to be sworn into acting pursuant 
to the provisions of the Constitution. This firstly supports the ideal supported since the 
ancient ideals of a republican form of government that decisions in such government 
would be taken for the common good. This provision, thus, aims to ensure that these 
officials do not decide arbitrarily, but based on the common good. Moreover, it is also 
argued that since it has been demonstrated above that the Constitution entrenches 
the republican ideals of government, this provision provides a further guarantee that 
the public officials will respect the above-mentioned principles of the modern 
republican state, as set out in the Constitution.  
It has been demonstrated above that the United States itself can be regarded as the 
first example of a modern republican federation of modern republican states. This has 
made the adoption of the principles attributed to such states in the laws of the country 
possible and has also given rise to the inclusion of the Guarantee Clause in the 
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Constitution of the United States, guaranteeing the dynamic principles under this form 
of government to all generations.  
IV. The history of the Guarantee Clause 
 
While it has been demonstrated above that the Constitution embodied the principles 
of a modern republican government, in order to ensure that the Constitution remains 
a republican instrument, these fundamental principles and values must be 
encompassed in the interpretation of the Constitution, regardless of the method 
adopted. In this section it will be examined how the Guarantee Clause came to be 
conceived and what the aim including this clause in the Constitution may have been. 
To unveil these, the intention of the Founding Fathers will be examined below.   
The Guarantee Clause was not included in its current form in the original proposals 
for the Constitution, and it underwent various alterations before its adoption. The 
inclusion of this clause in the Virginia plan was first suggested by Madison, based on 
the concept that he formulated in the Vices of the Political System of the United States 
and in a letter sent to Governor Randolph of Virginia on 8 April 1787.216 In these works, 
he argued that in order to ensure the efficient functioning of the federal system, a 
guarantee had to be bestowed upon states of their ‘constitutions and laws’ under the 
Constitution against internal rebellions and external attacks.217  
Subsequently, the Virginia plan presented by Randolph during the Federal Convention 
proposed a guarantee of a republican government and the territory of the states to 
ensure their security against the above two attacks.218 The proposal, however, was 
later changed by Madison, and supported by Randolph, to a guarantee of ‘a republican 
constitution, and its existing laws […] to each state,’ following the oppositions to the 
territorial guarantee by the smaller states.  
The representatives of these states were concerned about the reduced importance of 
their states under the previous proposal against the larger ones, based on the 
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territorial guarantee.219 Thus, this guarantee was subsequently omitted from the novel 
proposal, and included a guarantee of the constitution and laws of each state. Some 
Framers, on the other hand, were not pleased with this approach, as it allowed for the 
laws of states to be guaranteed that they did not regard the most suitable to be deemed 
protection. Morris, for instance, was strongly opposed to having the then laws of 
Rhode Island guaranteed.220 Houston further highlighted the risk of having the then 
laws of each state, such as the ‘a very bad’ Constitution of Georgia preserved.221 It 
thus seems that both Morris and Houston also recognised the importance of allowing 
for a dynamic interpretation of what a republican government entailed. After all, 
guaranteeing the then existing laws to apply at all times would have definitely inhibited 
any societal, economic, or political progress.  
Before the first part of the clause was presented in its current form, Randolph further 
emphasised that both purposes of the clause should be fulfilled: first, to secure a 
republican government to each state, and, second, to ‘suppress domestic 
commotions’.222 Subsequently, the current form of the Guarantee Clause was 
proposed by Wilson,223 and later adopted by the Committee in Detail.224  This 
Committee argued that the aim of the part of the Guarantee Clause referring to the 
republican government was ‘to prevent the establishment of any government, not 
republican.’225 
During the state ratifying conventions, Wilson set out his position in Pennsylvania on 
the Guarantee Clause once again.226 He argued that – similar to the ideology of 
Montesquieu – in a republic, the ‘right of suffrage is fundamental to politics’ as the 
electors would be able to take control of the government in a state with such form of 
government.227 
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In North Carolina, Iredell claimed that including the Guarantee Clause was necessary 
in the Constitution for two reasons. Firstly, he claimed, supporting the ideology of 
Montesquieu, that in order to ensure the survival and the ‘harmony’ of the newly 
devised federal system, states where governments have similar characteristics must 
be created and maintained.228 Secondly, he argued – following the statement of the 
Committee in Detail during the Convention – that this provision guaranteed that no 
monarchy or aristocratic class would emerge in the United States. 229  
Support for the inclusion of the Guarantee Clause also emerged in The Federalist 
Papers.230 Hamilton, for instance, claimed that if no guarantee was provided by the 
federal government to ensure that the states would remain republican, it would 
‘deprive us of one of the principal advantages to be expected from the union’.231 He 
claimed that the right of states to change their constitutions would not be hindered by 
this provision, provided it was performed ‘in a legal and peacable mode.’232 It was only 
when these changes were ‘effected by violence,’ however, the federal government 
could not provide ‘too many checks’ against these.233 He thus claimed that by placing 
the power in ‘the hands of the people,’  the only ‘natural cure for an ill administration’ 
would be a ‘change of men.’234 However, as discussed earlier, if in a republican 
government it is expected hat improper elections may take place, such an argument 
would not uphold. Thus, in such an instance, it is argued that the federal government 
should be able to provide protection for the fundamental values that a republican form 
of government encompasses.  
Madison further supported the inclusion of this provision in the Constitution through 
claiming that this section would ‘defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical 
innovation’235 at state level, in addition to the already existing provisions of the 
Constitution preventing this on a federal level.  
                                                          
228 4 Elliot 195.  
229 ibid.  
230 Hamilton and Madison (n 46). 
231 ibid No 43, 174. 
232 ibid. 
233 ibid. 
234 ibid. 
235 ibid No 43, 281. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 2: Protecting the United States of America from a tyranny by creating federal and 
state republican governments 
[63] 
 
Madison further claimed that with a ‘more intimate nature’ of the union of states within 
the new federal system, ‘the greater interest have the members in the political 
institutions of each other.’236 He argued that the federal government would, therefore, 
have ‘greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was 
entered into should be substantially maintained.’237 Explicitly referencing 
Montesquieu’s ideology that in a federation, all states must adopt like forms of 
government, he thus claimed that all states must adopt a republican form of 
government.238  
However, Madison did not seem to support the ideal of a dynamic interpretation of the 
republican form of government, as he claimed that this guarantee ‘supposes a pre-
existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed.’239 Therefore, as long as 
‘the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the 
federal Constitution.’240 However, he does recognise that changes may be made to 
the state constitutions, which he claimed, would be guaranteed federal protection, as 
long as they maintained their republican nature.241 However, what constituted a 
republican or an ‘anti-republican Constitution,’ based on his previous claim for the aim 
of this clause, would mean that as long as no aristocracy or monarchy was established 
in these states, they would be regarded as republican.  
Since no amendments were made to the Guarantee Clause after the ratification of the 
Constitution, a constitutional uncertainty about the meaning of the Guarantee Clause 
was created. This, therefore, allowed for a dynamic interpretation of this term,242 but 
has also resulted in various different applications of this clause. 
Since it is often unforeseeable how a government with unrepublican values may 
emerge, it is argued that the dynamic interpretation of the Guarantee Clause and a 
republican ideal prepares the United States to be able to respond to these. However, 
the federal government will, in such situation, be faced with political and legal 
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obstacles. Firstly, it will have to determine that the government of the state is 
unrepublican and, secondly, it will have to establish which branch of the federal 
government should enforce the Guarantee Clause against the state to solve such a 
crisis.  
It is therefore argued that the Guarantee Clause possesses two aspects in line with 
the two approaches to constitutional interpretation. Following the non-originalist 
method of interpretation, as Wiecek highlights, the Guarantee Clause adopted a 
positive aspect, which allowed for ‘innovation’ to ‘be possible within the republican 
framework.’243 However, the Guarantee Clause - following the originalist method -  also 
has a negative aspect that ‘was designed to prohibit monarchical or aristocratic 
institutions in states.’244 The application of both aspects and methods of interpretation 
of this clause will be examined in the subsequent section. 
 
V.  The application of the Guarantee Clause 
 
When delegating the task of enforcement of the Guarantee Clause to the federal 
government as a whole, the Founding Fathers created a vast uncertainty as to which 
branch of the government should enforce this clause. 
The application of this clause would firstly require declaring a state unrepublican. This 
would not only raise political questions, but may also ultimately challenge the 
fundamental pillars of the federal system. For instance, it may result in questioning 
whether a state has a right to secede from the United States.245 With the increased 
discussions about similar actions around the world, such as Catalonia or Scotland or 
the decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union, it would not 
be unexpected if such debates came to the limelight in the United States once again.   
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Nevertheless, if no action is taken to adequately enforce the Guarantee Clause, its 
incremental potential under the Constitution will remain hidden and could render this 
clause meaningless.246 It may therefore be argued that it is crucial to establish which 
of the three separate branches of the federal government is to act as the enforcer of 
the Guarantee Clause and how the clause should be applied in a situation when a 
state with the potential of becoming unrepublican emerges.   
It will, therefore, be examined below whether any of the separate branches has acted 
previously as the enforcer of this clause, and whether their performance of such role 
has resulted in their branch becoming the indisputable enforcer of the Guarantee 
Clause. During this examination, it is also necessary to investigate whether any of the 
branches of the government has utilised this clause in the positive aspect, allowing for 
the advances in society, economy and/or politics to be integrated into constitutional 
law. 
V.1. The application of the Guarantee Clause by Congress 
 
In the leading cases of Luther v Borden 247 and Pacific States v Oregon,248 that will be 
analysed later, it was argued by those supporting a textual interpretation of the clause, 
that based on its position in the Constitution, Congress is the indirectly recognised 
branch of government that is granted enforcement powers under the Guarantee 
Clause.249 They supported this view by claiming that since Article IV section 3 
delegates powers to the Congress to admit new states, and Article V gives the powers 
to Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution, Article IV section 4 must have 
been intended to delegate the enforcement powers of the Guarantee Clause to 
Congress.250 However, as Hasen highlights, this interpretation is strongly in opposition 
of the other clauses included in the Constitution that specifically grant Congress with 
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power, since those commence with ‘Congress shall.’251 No such wording can be found 
in the Guarantee Clause.   
V.1.1. Congress, the Guarantee Clause and slavery  
 
The Guarantee Clause soon emerged during the debates of Congress, for instance, 
about the admission of Missouri in 1818 and 1819, which state did not outlaw slavery 
at the time.252 During these debates, the representatives of the Northern states also 
claimed that the Constitution of Illinois was unrepublican as the Northwest Ordinance 
of 1787 prohibited slavery, which was allowed under its constitution.253  
It is intriguing to highlight that the Framers in 1787 did not regard a state unrepublican 
if slavery was existed within the state. Thus, if one is to follow the originalist and 
textualist method of interpretation solely based on the Guarantee Clause, a state may 
be deemed republican even if slavery existed within it. However, a non-originalist 
interpretation of the Constitution would allow for a state to be deemed unrepublican if 
slavery existed within its boundaries, if it could be demonstrated that the values of 
society have changed sufficiently for the freedom of all individuals to be deemed a 
fundamental constitutional value at the time. 
The debate surrounding slavery and the Guarantee Clause appeared once again with 
the Tallmadge Amendment, which aimed to prohibit slavery in Missouri through the 
prohibition of new slaves and the manumission of the children of the slaves.254 
However, this amendment sparked a further fundamental debate that highlighted the 
different standpoints of the Southern and Northern states on the issues of slavery and 
a republican government. The Southern states argued the Guarantee Clause did not 
allow the federal government to interfere with the ‘domestic institutions and internal 
affairs of the states.’255 
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Fuller, representing the views of the Northern states, highlighted that when Ohio and 
Indiana were admitted to the United States, based on the Northwest Ordinance of 
1787, Congress was able to impose a condition on their admittance to outlaw slavery 
in their Constitution.256 This would thus signal the adoption of the non-originalist 
method of interpretation of the Constitution by Congress, where the eradication of 
slavery was deemed to be a fundamental constitutional value.  
However, Fuller also argued that Congress was unable to impose a similar condition 
for Missouri because of Article III of the Louisiana Purchase Treaty of 1803 between 
the United States and France.257 This Article proclaimed: 
The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the 
United States and admitted as soon as possible according to the principles of 
the federal Constitution to the enjoyment of all these rights, advantages and 
immunities of citizens of the United States, and in the mean time they shall be 
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and the 
Religion which they profess.258 
However, he argued that this Article could not apply in this case, since it would have 
bound Congress to act unconstitutionally by not abiding the federal Constitution when 
admitting the state.259 
Fuller, seemingly adopting a non-originalist method of interpretation, further asserted 
that despite claims to the contrary, Congress does have a right, and ‘a duty’ to examine 
the state asking for admission.260 He further argued that  the Guarantee Clause 
granted Congress the power to examine the state, and required it ‘to ascertain that her 
constitution or form of government is republican.’261 While performing such 
examination, Fuller claimed, Congress should take into consideration Paragraph 2 of 
the Declaration of Independence that declared ‘that all men are created equal.’262 He 
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thus claimed that ‘it cannot be denied that slaves are men,’ and, thus, ‘in a purely 
republican government born free.’263 Fuller reasoned that in determining whether 
slavery complied with republican ideals, Congress could rely on the Declaration of 
Independence. He argued that this was possible since the Declaration of 
Independence could be regarded as ‘an authority admitted in all parts of the Union a 
definition of the basis of republican government,’ based on which all men should have 
‘equal rights.’264 However, this view did not prevail.265 It did, however, signal that the 
Guarantee Clause could be utilised in its positive aspect, if a non-originalist method of 
interpretation was followed, allowing the advances in society regarding the 
transformed viewpoint on slavery to be incorporated into the Constitution. Moreover, it 
also signalled that the negative aspect of the Guarantee Clause and its originalist 
method of interpretation may also be utilised if states did not prohibit slavery, if such a 
transformed viewpoint was to be accepted.  
The majority of Congress, composed of Southern states preceding the Civil War, 
however, clearly rejected a dynamic interpretation of a republican government. They 
claimed that since the states where slavery still existed were regarded republican 
when they were admitted to the United States, they could not be held unrepublican 
based on a changing viewpoint because they did not ‘substantially deviate’ from a 
republican form of government.266 The Northern states, however, aimed to rely on the 
Guarantee Clause to argue that slavery was contrary to the ideals of a republican 
government, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence. 
It is fundamental to highlight that such a debate could emerge because no clear 
definition of what a republican form of government under the Guarantee Clause was 
provided. Therefore, it became a constitutional uncertainty that had to be managed by 
Congress at the time. 
V.1.2. Congress, the Guarantee Clause and the early stages of Reconstruction 
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As a subsequent step in the development of the Guarantee Clause, President Lincoln 
in July 1861 declared that if a state wished to secede from the United States, it was 
no longer regarded a republican government under the Guarantee Clause.267  He 
stated, ‘[to] prevent its going out is an indispensable means to the end of maintaining 
the guaranty mentioned.’ In other words, he argued for the prevention of secession 
through the use of the Guarantee Clause.268  
Several proposals were subsequently submitted to Congress to address the 
Reconstruction and possible re-admission of the Southern states to the Union after 
the end of the Civil War. The first of such proposals was submitted by Baker, who 
claimed that the federal government should govern these states ‘as territories’ 
following the conclusion of the Civil War.269 This would involve, he maintained, sending 
governors to control these states.270 Additionally, Sumner proposed a more radical 
resolution in the Senate in the subsequent session. He argued that the seceded states 
lost all their ‘constitutional and legal right.’271 He further claimed, similar to the previous 
arguments of Fuller, that slavery could not exist in a republican government.272 
Moreover, he argued that the seceded states should not be governed as territories, 
but control over them should be ‘assumed’ by Congress.273 It was only providing 
Congress with these powers, Sumner claimed, that the inhabitants of these states 
would be provided with the protection of their rights under the Constitution.274 
Until 1864, however, it was the President, who led the Reconstruction under the 
Guarantee Clause and ‘appointed military and civilian governors for the seceded 
states’ once they were under Union control.275 In his Ten Percent Plan for 
Reconstruction, President Lincoln argued that the seceded states would be given the 
protection of the Guarantee Clause.276 However, this required ten percent of those 
                                                          
267 Abraham Lincoln, ‘Special Session Message July 4, 1861’ 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69802> accessed 1 September 2017; Wiecek (n 51) 171. 
268 Lincoln (n 268); Wiecek (n 51) 171. 
269 Congressional Globe 37th Cong, 2nd Session 45 (1861). 
270 ibid. 
271 Congressional Globe 37th Cong, 2nd Session 46 (1861). 
272 Congressional Globe 37th Cong, 2nd Session 47 (1861). 
273 ibid. 
274 ibid. 
275 Wiecek (n 51) 184. 
276 ibid. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 2: Protecting the United States of America from a tyranny by creating federal and 
state republican governments 
[70] 
 
who were entitled to vote in 1860 to organise a government that ‘recognised 
emancipation under executive order […] or congressional statute.’277 This implies that 
the executive was presumed as the branch of the federal government responsible for 
enforcing the Guarantee Clause. 
However, Congress challenged this authority soon after his Plan by passing the Wade-
Davis Bill.278 Davis argued that the Guarantee Clause - contrary to the claims of the 
President – vested Congress with ‘a plenary, supreme, unlimited political jurisdiction, 
paramount over courts.’279 Congress was thus allowed to enact ‘every legislative 
measure necessary and proper to make it effectual; and what is necessary and 
proper.’280 Crucially, he also argued that neither the President nor the Supreme Court 
could overrule the decisions of Congress in this regard, only the people.281 Despite the 
Bill passing through both Houses, Lincoln vetoed the Wade-Davis Bill.282 
Subsequently, President Johnson relied on the Guarantee Clause to claim that the 
President should act as the enforcer under this provision and appointed governors to 
the occupied states.283 During the Thirty-Ninth Congress, however, Congress declared 
its will to assume powers under the Guarantee Clause. Colfax argued, relying on a 
non-originalist interpretation of the Constitution, that during the Reconstruction, the 
republican ideal that ‘protection to all men in their inalienable rights’ should be 
guaranteed by Congress.284 He reasoned that this originated from the ‘first and highest 
obligation’ of Congress ‘to guarantee to every state a republican form of 
government.’285 It is argued that this method of interpretation was a non-originalist one 
as he did not rely on textualist techniques arguing that it was Congress who should 
take on the role of the enforcer and he did not rely on the original intent technique to 
infer these powers. Whether this non-originalist method of interpretation is, however, 
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correct is debatable as the Constitution did not lay down specifically that it should be 
Congress adopting this role.  
Sumner also reinstated the same position in his proposed bill in the Senate, and 
argued that since Congress was given powers to determine ‘what is a republican form 
of government,’ the seceded states cannot be considered republican.286 He further 
proposed that where no state government had been established, no government could 
be considered as republican where manumitted slaves were denied the right to vote 
even though ‘they constitute the majority of the citizens’ of a state.287 Whilst the 
proposals of Sumner were rejected, the same ideology resurfaced soon after. 
Shellabarger claimed - similar to the earlier positions submitted to Congress by 
Sumner - that the seceded states ceased to be able to claim any protection under the 
Constitution once they rebelled and, in fact, ceased to be states.288 Thus, in order to 
be readmitted to the United States, these states had to satisfy the Guarantee Clause 
and establish republican forms of government.289 
Subsequently, Sumner, once again, submitted a resolution to the Senate based on the 
Guarantee Clause. He argued that based on this clause, ‘no oligarchy, aristocracy, 
caste, or monopoly’ could exist and individuals could not be denied their rights based 
on their ‘color or race.’290  
The first time that similar proposals would be passed was in 1866, when Congress 
passed the following resolution submitted by Broomall: 
That whenever the people of any state are thus deprived of all civil government 
[by rebellion], it becomes the duty of Congress, by appropriate legislation, to 
enable them to organize a state government, and in the language of the 
Constitution, to guarantee to such state a republican form of government.291 
Thus, Congress, with the passage of this resolution, assumed the power of enforcer 
under the Guarantee Clause. A crucial moment, following this declaration, was the 
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passing of the Civil Rights Bill despite the veto of the President.292 Lawrence, in 
highlighting the importance of the Bill, argued that a state cannot be regarded 
republican without it guaranteeing the protection of ‘political’ and ‘essential civil rights, 
recognized and confirmed by the Constitution’ of all its citizens.293 The guarantee of 
such a form of government was, however, entrusted upon Congress, as Lawrence 
claimed, and, thus, had to be applied.294  
In the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, the ideals above seemed to 
emerge in a consolidated manner.295 The Report claimed that the federal government 
could ‘take notice’ of no constitutions of the rebel states.296 It, in effect, argued that no 
state constitution was left in these states because they withdrew ‘their representatives 
in Congress,’ renounced ‘the privilege of representation, by organizing a separate 
government,’ and levied ‘war against the United States.’297 Moreover, it declared that 
only Congress was granted powers to recognise the forms of government in the 
readmitted states as republicans under the Guarantee Clause.298 Therefore, states 
should be required to organise constitutional conventions and submit the draft 
constitutions to the people before they could be re-admitted.299 It is only then that a 
legislature may be formed as a republican form of government, and could ask for 
representation at Congress.300 
The forerunner of the Military Reconstruction Act 1867 utilised the Guarantee Clause 
to argue that the governments in the seceded states were of military origin and, thus, 
could not be considered republican. The Reconstruction Act, on the other hand, 
abandoned the Guarantee Clause as it major constitutional basis.301 
                                                          
292 ibid 200. 
293 Congressional Globe 39th Cong, 1st Session 1836 (1866). 
294 ibid. 
295 Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction (20 June 1866). 
296 Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction (20 June 1866) VIII. 
297 ibid. 
298 Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction (20 June 1866) XIV and XV. 
299 Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction (20 June 1866) XV. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Wiecek (n 51) 205–207. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 2: Protecting the United States of America from a tyranny by creating federal and 
state republican governments 
[73] 
 
V.1.3. Congress, the Guarantee Clause and the later stages of the 
Reconstruction 
 
The withdrawal of claims for powers under the Guarantee Clause may also be 
observed in the later stages of the Reconstruction. As Wiecek highlights, there had 
been many instances where Congress could have utilised its powers under the 
Guarantee Clause following the adoption of the Military Reconstruction Act 1867.302 
Such instances, he argued, were expelling black members from the legislature in 
Georgia in 1868, ‘the near-civil war in Arkansas from 1872 to 1874,’ or ‘similar 
conditions in Louisiana in 1872.’303 
Despite both the President and the Supreme Court allowing and even explicitly asking 
Congress to act under the Guarantee Clause in these instances, Congress refrained 
from taking any actions.304 The members of Congress, although claiming that the 
purpose of this clause was to ‘enable them to keep the states in their orbits, to preserve 
them from anarchy, revolution and rebellion,’305 thus, left these crises to be solved by 
the President. 
Even though Georgia denied the rights of black men to sit in the legislature, the 
Congress did not address whether this complied with the ideals of a republican 
government when re-admitting the state.306 The only condition that was imposed on 
Georgia was that of ratifying the Fifteenth Amendment, which ensured that after 
ratification, all necessary votes were guaranteed in Congress for the passing of this 
Amendment.307 
In the meantime, the position of Congress on what constituted a republican form of 
government transformed substantially from the views of, for instance, Sumner, which 
were presented during the earlier stages of the Reconstruction era. Howard, thus, 
claimed during the Forty First Congress that ‘a republican government is a government 
in which the laws of the community are made by their representatives, freely chosen 
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by the people.’308 He subsequently claimed that it was ‘impossible […] to give the word 
“republic” any more exact or precise meaning than that.’309 Thus, Congress seemed 
to shy away from the vast responsibility of enforcing the Guarantee Clause and 
determining what a republican government would have entailed. 
This position became even more apparent during the Arkansas crisis of 1872 to 1874. 
Despite his initial hesitation, President Grant declared that the group supporting Baxter 
in Arkansas, as opposed to the other three groups claiming power, was the republican 
form of government in the state, and thus ordered those opposing Baxter to cede.310 
A House Select Committee on Arkansas Affairs was subsequently established to 
determine which government of the state was ‘republican.’311 The conclusions of this 
Committee further demonstrated that Congress did not desire to act as the enforcer of 
the Guarantee Clause or act as the check on the powers of the President exercised 
under this clause.312 The Committee concluded that the government of Arkansas, 
backed by the President, was ‘republican in form’ and there was ‘reasonable peace 
and quiet’ in the state.313  
The support of Congress for nominating itself as the enforcer of the Guarantee Clause 
received the final blow in its response to the Louisiana crisis. In this response, despite 
a bill having been submitted based on the Guarantee Clause for Congress to settle 
the crisis, Congress rejected this bill.314 This rejection was based on the argument that 
the Guarantee Clause could not be used to resolve this crisis because the powers 
granted to the federal government under it were ‘too great’ and would be ‘too extreme 
a remedy.’315 
V.1.4. Congress, the Guarantee Clause and its silence 
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The silence of Congress on the Guarantee Clause continued into the twentieth 
century. For instance, Congress failed to invoke any powers it may possess under the 
Guarantee Clause, even when Huey P Long, ‘the American Hitler,’316 governed 
Louisiana in an undeniably unrepublican way.317 The legislative provisions that the 
'Kingfish' enacted included the creation of a 'secret police', the imposition of state 
censorship against any criticism of his government, and of 'martial laws without any 
opportunity for judicial review'.318 It may, however, be also highlighted that when 
Congress could have had the opportunity to decide whether the government of 
Louisiana, led by the 'Kingfish,' was acting in breach of the Guarantee Clause, Huey 
P Long was assassinated.319  
Based on the above analysis, it is thus argued that Congress will only invoke its above 
powers ‘in the most egregious cases’, which raise such a level of public interest that 
Congressional action will be unavoidable.320 What would constitute such case, 
however, still remains to be seen. Accordingly, it may be argued that the emergence 
of a ‘rotten’321 state, if it does not attract sufficient public interest, may continue without 
intervention from Congress, even though according to the decisions of the Supreme 
Court in two of its leading cases, Congress is the branch that is supposed to be able 
to effectively enforce the Guarantee Clause in these circumstances. 
   
V.2. Application by the President 
 
Even though the President is rarely mentioned by commentators as the person who is 
supposed act as the enforcer of the Guarantee Clause, it should be highlighted that 
the second part of the Guarantee Clause nominates the President as the enforcer of 
measures necessary to protect a state from 'domestic violence'. This position will also 
allow the President to invoke his powers as the commander in chief of the federal 
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armed forces under Article II section 2. It could, thus, follow that if one is to adopt the 
same textualist arguments that those that claim that Congress should act as the 
enforcer of this clause, that one could claim that it is, in fact, the President who should 
act as the enforcer of this clause. The same question, however, arises as a result: why 
the President is not specifically mentioned in this clause. 
It may, on the other hand, be highlighted that Congress has been granted the power 
to call upon the army to 'execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and 
repel invasions' under Article I section 8 subsection 15 of the Constitution. The 
President was, however, granted the same powers under the Militia Act 1792. Indeed, 
President Washington subsequently invoked these powers to defeat the Whiskey 
Rebellion in 1794.322 Similar provisions to those in this Act, after it expired in 1794, can 
also be found in the Enforcement Act of 1795.323 In 1807, a further Act was adopted, 
which allowed the President to ‘use regular army forces’ and the federal army ‘for law 
enforcement purposes.’324 
As preparation for the potential Civil War, Congress further enacted the Suppression 
of the Rebellion Act in 1861, which was later modified in the Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) 
Act of 1871.325 The above Acts were codified in the Revised Statutes of the United 
States in 1875 and can now be found in their revised forms in the United States 
Code,326 which is also referred to as the Insurrection Act.327  
It would therefore seem that it was the President that was granted with enforcement 
powers under the part of the Guarantee Clause that authorises the federal government 
to protect the states against invasion or domestic violence. 
V.2.1. The President: The enforcer of the Guarantee Clause during the Civil 
War and the Reconstruction 
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As demonstrated in the previous section, Presidents assumed the role of the enforcer 
of the Guarantee Clause on various occasions during the Civil War and the 
Reconstruction era.  
As mentioned above, President Lincoln declared that the President was entitled to act 
against those states that rebelled against the United States.328 Until 1864, the 
President ‘appointed military and civilian governors for the seceded states’ once they 
were under Union control and led the Reconstruction.329 He further stopped any efforts 
of Congress, such as the Wade-Davis Bill, that claimed that they were responsible for 
enforcing the Guarantee Clause – as opposed to the President.330 
After President Lincoln, President Johnson also relied on the Guarantee Clause to 
claim that he was to act as the enforcer under this provision and appointed governors 
to the occupied states.331 However, following the passing of the Civil Rights Bill, 
despite his veto, Congress took on the role of the enforcer under this clause.332 The 
power, however, returned to the President in the later stages of the Reconstruction, 
when Congress shied away from taking on this role. President Grant, therefore, had 
to assume this role and decide which governments within opposing sides within the 
states in Arkansas and Louisiana were republican.333  
Contrary to the actions of Congress and despite initial hesitations to assume this role, 
the President has been called upon as the enforcer of the Guarantee Clause following 
the Reconstruction era. 
V.2.2. The President: The enforcer of the Guarantee Clause under the 
Insurrection Act 
 
During the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, the President used the powers granted to him 
under section 331 of the Insurrection Act, which allowed him to request the deployment 
of armed forces when requested by the legislature or the governor of a state to 
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suppress any insurrection.334  The same power is also vested in the President when 
he considers that the enforcement of the federal laws is being made ‘impracticable’ by 
the ‘unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion‘ under this 
section.335 Most importantly, President Eisenhower had to invoke his powers under 
section 332 when sending militia to Arkansas to enforce the desegregation order of 
Aaron v Cooper,336 which held that black students should be allowed to attend 'white 
high schools'337 following the major decision in Brown v Board of Education, which 
signified one of the major milestones in non-originalist interpretation, accepting that 
circumstances have changed to the extent that desegregation in schools was no 
longer acceptable.338  
It may further be argued that the particular powers of the President under section 333 
(1) may provide the legal basis of him acting as the enforcer of the Guarantee Clause. 
This section confers the above powers on the President when ‘any insurrection, 
domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy’ would lead to any or some of 
the people of the states being deprived of a ‘protection named in the Constitution’ 
where the state is ‘unable, fail or refuse to protect’ this right.339 
It has been demonstrated above that the President has, indeed, assumed the role of 
the enforcer of the Guarantee Clause during various stages of history, such as the 
Reconstruction. Moreover, under the powers granted to him in the Insurrection Act, it 
is also further argued that he has the responsibility of enforcing the Guarantee Clause. 
It may, consequently, be also contended that if both the Supreme Court and Congress 
fail to act as the enforcers of the Guarantee Clause, the President has the 
responsibility of performing this task. It may, however, be emphasised that this is only 
likely to occur in the current political climate if the President would be under an 
extremely high level of public and political pressure, and the acts in the states were 
exceptionally outrageous.  
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V.3. Application by the Supreme Court 
 
Undeniably, and following Marbury v Madison,340 a fundamental and traditional task of 
the Supreme Court is to act as the ‘interpreter’ of the Constitution,341 and to exclusively 
settle the complaints of individuals based on their ‘merits’342 and the facts.343 Because 
of this position, it may be claimed that the Supreme Court is better equipped to fulfil 
the enforcement role of the Guarantee Clause than Congress or the executive.344 On 
the other hand, in order to effectively perform this task, the Court is faced with the 
challenge of the constitutional uncertainty through the lack of an unambiguous 
standard of what a republican form of government is, which, unsurprisingly, has 
caused some reluctance to make a decision on this issue.345 
 
V.3.1. Luther v Borden and Pacific States v Oregon 
 
As it has been argued above, no enforcement action may be commenced until a 
determination has been made that a state is, in effect, unrepublican under the 
Guarantee Clause. As illustrated above, there have been debates since the Civil War 
on whether Congress or the President is responsible for making this determination. 
These debates have also reached the Supreme Court. 
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In the leading cases of Luther v Borden346 and Pacific States v Oregon,347 in support 
of the political question doctrine, the Supreme Court held that Congress should be 
conferred with the enforcement powers under the Guarantee Clause.348  
Luther v Borden, 349 the first leading case under the Guarantee Clause, was brought 
to the Supreme Court following Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island. The case concerned 
a trespass action brought by a supporter of the Rebellion against Rhode Island 
government soldiers, because they searched his property 'for incriminating 
evidence'.350 With the Rebellion, two governments had been created within Rhode 
Island, and it was argued that it was up to the Supreme Court to decide which of the 
two governments was the 'real' republican government.351 Moreover, if the government 
instructing the defendants was held to be the 'real' government, the Supreme Court 
also had to decide whether their departure from the principles of republican 
government were in breach of the Guarantee Clause.352  Chief Justice Taney, however, 
held that it was the exclusive right of Congress and not of the Supreme Court to decide 
whether a government established in a state is republican.353 This argument was not 
only supported by the political question doctrine, but it may also be argued that Chief 
Justice Taney supported the republican ideal himself by refraining from making a 
decision about which government was that of the people. Adopting this approach 
guaranteed that the Court would not make an arbitrary decision based on the private 
views of the judges, but aimed to ensure that the view of the people would be upheld 
instead. However, this approach also seems to contravene the ideal that to manage 
the issues that may arise as a result of improper elections, the Supreme Court should 
take on the role of enforcing the fundamental constitutional values in order to ensure 
the maintenance of these. Shying away from this responsibility in politically sensitive 
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matters, thus, indicates that the Court was not willing to take on this highly important 
role. 
Pacific States v Oregon354 followed this argument. In this case it was held that since a 
decision whether a government is of republican nature is a political question, that 
required a decision about whether a state can be deemed a state, which is a 
determination that can only be made by Congress.355 The above two cases have also 
contributed towards the affirmation of the political question doctrine, which claims that 
the Supreme Court should refrain from enforcing certain breaches of the constitution 
despite all the conditions being met to do so, when it includes a political question and 
it should leave such enforcement action to the other branch of the government 
designated to perform this task.356  It may also be asserted that this doctrine supports 
the principle of the separation of powers principle of the ideal of the republican 
government. 
Whilst the separation of powers is a fundamental pillar of the federal republic, the 
protection of republican values under the Constitution has been endowed upon the 
‘federal government’ in the Guarantee Clause. If, as demonstrated above, Congress 
shies away from this responsibility even though under the political question doctrine it 
is that institution that is supposed to act as the enforcer of this clause, the only branch 
of the federal government that will be left to enforce this clause is the President based 
on the above decision and this doctrine. This position, however, completely 
contravenes the idea of the Framers that power should not accumulate in the hands 
of one person only, since that may lead to a tyranny. Therefore, one is left with the 
same situation as the one the Framers aimed to avoid with the Guarantee Clause, if it 
ever comes to the use of this clause at some point in the future. 
Moreover, if the Supreme Court refuses to enforce the Guarantee Clause and 
Congress possesses an ‘uncontrollable authority’ of being able to determine whether 
a government is republican, it undoubtedly generates the risk of reversing the 
fundamental agent-principal or trustor–trustee relationship between Congress and the 
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people.357 Such an agent-principal relationship is created when the citizens vote for 
members of Congress to represent their views. However, if members of Congress act 
as the principals of the individuals instead of their agents, it is questionable whether 
that forms a republican government, where people are invested with the power to 
govern. 
In addition, without the possibility of a judicial review of the actions of the Congress, it 
is argued, in line of the arguments of Congress following the Louisiana crisis, that the 
powers of Congress may become limitless and the representatives may be inclined to 
act arbitrarily, resulting in their actions eventually becoming unconstitutional.358   This 
will further result in the threat to a republican government arising within the state where 
public officials act arbitrarily, for which the theoretical solutions suggested by 
commentators, such as Saxonhouse and Sellers, is the system of checks and 
balances.359   
Therefore, it is argued that the Supreme Court, by not accepting responsibility for 
enforcing the Guarantee Clause has placed the republican values in constant 
jeopardy. It has not only risked placing too big a power in the hands of Congress, but 
its decision may ultimately result in an uncurbed and unlimited power granted to one 
person only, the President. 
V.3.2. The aftermath of Luther v Borden 
 
Following and implementing the decision of Justice Taney in Luther v Borden,360 
holding that Congress can exclusively enforce the Guarantee Clause, it has also been 
widely argued that the Supreme Court should abstain from such enforcement action 
under the political question doctrine.361   
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In Georgia v Stanton, Justice Nelson re-affirmed the position of the Supreme Court 
that cases involving the Guarantee Clause would be ‘political, and not judicial’ 
questions.362 In Texas v White, Chief Justice Chase, also confirming the decision in 
Luther v Borden,363 argued that  Congress has the power to decide whether a state is 
republican.364 Since it was, however, the President that installed a governor in Texas 
following the Civil War, Chief Justice Chase concluded that the President must have 
only been provided with ‘provisional’ powers under the Guarantee Clause to be able 
to do so.365 
Since 1962, the application of the political question doctrine has also had to satisfy the 
five criteria laid down by Justice Brennan in Baker v Carr.366 Firstly, the provision must 
designate the enforcement to ‘another branch of government;’ secondly, it must not 
set out an identifiable or working ‘standard;’ thirdly, the breach must demand a political 
decision; fourthly, a potential judgment should demonstrate disrespect ‘for the other 
branches of the federal government;’ and lastly, the question should raise a ‘need for 
“unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”’ or could lead to 
humiliation following various statements.367 
The Guarantee Clause, however, apart from the second, does not seem to satisfy the 
criteria laid down in the above case. Firstly, the Guarantee Clause does not designate 
the enforcement of this clause to Congress or the President if one is to adopt a textual 
interpretation and if one is to look for indisputable evidence of the intent of the Framers 
about this. It is also argued that according to the third criterion, the breach of republican 
values must demand a political decision, which is not always the case. For instance, 
if an act adopted by the state in question is in clear breach of the provision of a 
Constitution that was previously deemed unrepublican, that may constitute a 
constitutional, not a political question.  
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In response to the fourth criterion, ruling that a state is unrepublican would not 
demonstrate disregard towards Congress or the President on all occasions. One of 
the few instances where it would do so if these branches previously ruled in favour of 
the state in question. Moreover, this statement seems to disregard the republican 
separation of powers principle if it places the sentiments of the members of the other 
branches over the checks and balances that exists as part of such a government. 
It is also claimed that political decisions according to the fifth criteria could be deemed 
more important than the fundamental constitutional values that the Supreme Court 
was set up to uphold according to the non-originalist method advocated for in this 
thesis. Whether the approach adopted by Justice Brennan would result in the 
protection of these values is highly debatable. 
The Supreme Court has also refrained from performing the enforcement role of the 
Guarantee Clause in other cases based on this doctrine. In In re Duncan,368 Chief 
Justice Fuller argued that it was ‘the right of the people to choose their own officers 
for governmental administration, and pass their own laws’ under a republican 
government, and thus the ‘legitimate acts’ of the officers were ‘those of the people 
themselves.’369 However, he further asserted, that the people have written 
constitutions that had limited the ‘governments, national and state,’ thus placing 
‘bounds to their own power as against the sudden impulses of mere majorities.’370 
Chief Justice Fuller, thus, held that ‘whether certain statutes have or have not binding 
force’ could only be determined by the states themselves, without involvement from 
the federal government.371 This approach, however, as demonstrated in the beginning 
of this Chapter is in complete contravention of the intents of the Framers, who hoped 
for the federal government to be able to act in these instances specifically. 
In New York v United States,372 whilst Justice O’Connor upheld the decision in Luther 
v Borden,373 she mentioned that according to the claim in Reynolds v Sims374 that 
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‘some,’ not all questions are non-justiciable.375 Thus, she argued, in certain questions 
the Supreme Court may rule on the merit of the cases, as suggested by Tribe.376 
On the other hand, whether the use of the political question doctrine as a justification 
for the lack of judicial enforcement has been the correct decision is questionable. Even 
though this may assist in achieving judicial impartiality in highly political questions, the 
Supreme Court, as Chemerinsky rightly argues, should nevertheless only accept to 
refrain from ruling on a case when either Congress or the President are in a better 
position to do so.377 
Bonfield also identified a further group of cases where unsuccessful attempts have 
been made that certain provisions violated not only Guarantee Clause, but, more 
importantly, the Fourteenth Amendment.378 These cases, for instance, held that the 
judiciary determining the municipal boundaries of the state was not possible because 
that could only be performed by the state.379 Relying on the Guarantee Clause also 
proved unfruitful in Mountain Timber Co v Washington, where the political question 
doctrine was upheld. 380 
However, signals of Justices of the Supreme Court adopting a non-originalist method 
of interpretation may also be observed about the Guarantee Clause. The claimants in 
the above cases may, however, also be found to have demonstrated support for the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in Plessy v Feguson381 which claimed that whether 
a government was republican had to be decided based on 'contemporary theories of 
natural justice',382 which theories may also be held to be found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
                                                          
375 New York v United States (n 373) 185. 
376 ibid 185. 
377 Nelson Lund, ‘From Baker v Carr to Bush v Gore, and Back’ (2012) 62 Case Western Law Review 
1, 1; Jesse H Choper, ‘Observations on the Guarantee Clause-As Thoughtfully Addressed by Justice 
Linde and Professor Eule’ (1993) 65 U Colo L Rev 741, 743; Chemerinsky, ‘Cases under the Guarantee 
Clause Should Be Justiciable’ (n 321) 875. 
378 Bonfield (n 143) 550–552. 
379 Forsyth v Hammond (1897) 166 US 506 519; Bonfield (n 143) 551. 
380 Michigan ex rel Kies v Lowrey (1905) 199 US 233; Bonfield (n 143) 551. 
381 Plessy v Ferguson (1896) 163 US 537; Heller (n 108) 1732. 
382 Bonfield (n 143) 550. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 2: Protecting the United States of America from a tyranny by creating federal and 
state republican governments 
[86] 
 
Whilst the federal Supreme Court has been hesitant in ruling in cases brought before 
them under the Guarantee Clause, a certain movement has been identified by 
commentators, where they have highlighted that the supreme courts of individual 
states have become more inclined to decide in such cases. This approach can be 
divided into two separate groups.    
Firstly, in a small proportion of cases, as Heller highlighted, the supreme courts of the 
states were audacious enough to make a decision based on the merits of the case 
that were submitted based on the Guarantee Clause.383 These cases, for instance, 
determined that provisions such as tribal immunity,384 the abrogation of the judicial 
immunity of state judges,385 and racial segregation386 were violations of the Guarantee 
Clause because  these actions had resulted in harm to one or more of the values of 
the republican government.387 The second group of cases decided in these supreme 
courts was further identified by Waldrop, which he categorised as cases holding that 
any provision for taxation that had an object other than the ‘public purpose’ were 
violations of the Guarantee Clause.388  
Thus, it is argued that the national supreme courts have been more inclined to adopt 
a non-originalist interpretation of the Constitution, where upholding the fundamental 
constitutional values has been deemed more important than relying on textual 
interpretations and debating whether they have powers to rule on such matters. 
 Whilst it may be argued that there has been a tendency amongst national supreme 
courts towards the judiciary accepting and performing their tasks as the enforcers of 
the Guarantee Clause, the federal Supreme Court has failed to take on this role to 
date. The Supreme Court has further employed other justifications for the apparent 
lack of acknowledgement of the enforcement role of the federal judiciary. Whereas in 
Pacific States v Oregon389 it was argued that the Court could not rule on a claim about 
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a ‘state as a state’,390 in the earlier case of Luther v Borden,391 Justice Taney argued 
that declaring a state unrepublican would result in a ‘legal chaos’.392 The latter view 
thus claims, that in such a situation, all governmental actions could be revoked 
retrospectively, which was also referred to as a ‘parade of horribles’ situation in Pacific 
States v Oregon.393 
Accordingly, it may be argued that the Supreme Court, similar to Congress, will also 
refrain from any enforcement action based possibly on the political question doctrine 
when a ‘rotten’ state emerges. 394 
V. 4. Application by co-operation 
 
It has been examined and argued that the separate branches of the federal 
government are reluctant to take on the role of the enforcer of the Guarantee Clause. 
It is therefore proposed that instead of making a determination separately about 
whether a state is republican, the separate branches may divide the enforcement role 
between themselves and co-operate, in a sequential order, in the enforcement of the 
Guarantee Clause. Such co-operation is proposed based on the application of the 
Guarantee Clause as explained above. 
Based on the political question doctrine, which claims that it is the exclusive right of 
Congress to decide whether a government established in a state is republican,395 it is 
suggested that Congress may occupy the role of the decision-maker on whether the 
state in question is ruled by a republican government. Subsequently, the Supreme 
Court may, following this determination, be able to decide whether a certain national 
law and any action authorised by it may be held to be a breach of the Guarantee 
Clause. This is based on their exclusive ability to settle the complaints of individuals 
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based on their ‘merits’396 and the facts.397 It is further proposed that based on the 
Insurrection Act, the President may then be able to send troops to the state in question 
to ensure that they comply with the determination of Congress and the decision of the 
Supreme Court.  
Whilst this method of co-operation may at first sight seem to contravene the principle 
of separation of powers, because of its sequential order, it is argued, it allows for this 
principle to be applied. If the decision of each branch of government was held to be 
contrary to the Constitution, the other branches would be able to keep these in check. 
Moreover, as the Supreme Court is argued to have been given the ultimate power to 
review decisions following Marbury v Madison.398 However, if a branch does find that 
the actions of another branch are contrary to the Constitution, this may jeopardise the 
concentrated action against the state in violation of the republican values. If a situation 
similar to that of the rule of law crisis of the European Union emerged in the United 
States, it is thus argued that this may result in a similar stand-off to that of the European 
Union. However, in the United States the focus of this standstill would be placed on 
the question of which branch is to act, whilst in the European Union the question is 
whether the European Union can act.  
This proposal is further argued to be in line with the principles examined under the 
modern republican ideal. This mechanism would increase the possibility of the 
enforcement action being performed for the common good, since the people will have 
an increased number of representatives in all branches of the federal government, as 
opposed to simply one of them. It is also argued that through this process, the trustor-
trustee position of the people and the federal government regarding the promotion of 
the freedom of the citizens from non-domination may strengthen if a dominating and 
arbitrary government is suppressed. Moreover, it is claimed that the co-operation 
procedure would also enable the further development of the concept of the republican 
government as a dynamic term, since this procedure would allow the application of 
this term to a new situation that may arise. Furthermore, this procedure may also act 
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as the screen and sanction mechanism devised by Pettit and would allow the 
government in question to rectify any of its unrepublican provisions and actions before 
a sanction is imposed on them.399 The co-operation procedure may also provide a 
more effective preventive measure against the rise of a dominating government in a 
state if put into action, and may also serve as a deterrent for potential dominating 
public officials that unrepublican action would not be tolerated in a republican 
federation comprised of republican states.   
VI. The importance of the Guarantee Clause 
 
In light of the above, it may be argued that the Guarantee Clause occupies a hidden 
fundamental position in the US Constitution and federal system. 
Firstly, the clause could give rise to the determination of the definition of what a 
republican form of government even before an enforcement action is invoked. Whilst 
the clause itself was mainly regarded by the Framers of the Constitution as a tool to 
ensure that no monarchy would be created within the United States,400 the constant 
developments of society and the dynamic nature of the republican ideal allowed for 
the Guarantee Clause to bring republican advancements to the society, such as the 
abolition of slavery or the granting of the universal voting rights. It should therefore be 
emphasised that the adoption of a general standard instead of a clear definition has 
played an augmented role in allowing these changes in society to occur under the 
ideal of the republican government. It is consequently argued that while adopting a 
clear definition may create legal certainty, it would not allow for these changes. 
Secondly, when its enforcement is invoked, the clause could challenge what its 
contemporary purpose is. It may be argued that despite the developments of what is 
interpreted as republican, this has not changed the purpose that was initially intended 
by the Founding Fathers for the clause, since the main concern of the drafters of the 
Constitution was seemingly the maintenance of the stability and welfare of the federal 
system and the protection against tyranny. On the other hand, with current world 
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advancements and challenges, it may be argued that this purpose could change. 
Consequently, the clause would then have to adapt to such transformation in values. 
Thirdly, with the increased role of the United States as the promoter and exporter of 
the ideologies of republicanism and democracy,401 the clause also occupies a hidden 
fundamental position in determining what is deemed republican globally. Careful 
attention must, however, be paid to certain aspects of the inclusion of such exported 
philosophies in binding legal instruments as the adoption of certain unambiguous 
terms in fundamental provisions may create critical legal uncertainties as to the 
fundamental pillars of a legal and governmental systems.  
Lastly, in line with the argument that the clause is a guarantee to the people of a state, 
it may be argued that the clause provides a double shield for its citizens in 
guaranteeing them a republican form of government and the protection of the inherent 
fundamental rights of the citizens deriving from the ideal of the republican government. 
A thorough examination of the guarantee in Article IV section 4 demonstrates that the 
people of the state are firstly guaranteed a republican form by way of a shield being 
formed for certain aspects of the sovereignty of their states against any intended 
dominating impositions by the federal government.402 The particular aspects that this 
shield protects based on the study of the Guarantee Clause above may be argued to 
include the ‘pre-existing’ form of government,403 ‘the rule of law’ in the state404 and the 
‘inherent and constitutional right’ of national governments to arrange themselves ‘as 
they see fit’ as long as they remain republican in form.405 Once this condition is 
breached, however, the shield can become a sword used by the federal government 
against the state.406 On the other hand, as it has been demonstrated in the previous 
part of the chapter, it is highly unlikely that the first strike of such a sword will be prompt 
or will even occur.  Consequently, as long as the states adhere to the arguably single 
                                                          
401 Halperin and Lomasney (n 216) 60–63. 
402 Tribe (n 171) 909–910; Deborah Jones Merritt, ‘The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: 
Federalism for a Third Century’ (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 1, 26. 
403 Magliocca (n 317) 42; Bonfield (n 143) 519 and 521. 
404 Timothy Sandefur, ‘A Private Little Bush v Gore, Or, How Nevada Violated the Republican Guarantee 
and Got Away with It’ (2004) 9 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 105, 145; Thomas A Smith, ‘The Rule of Law and 
the States: A New Interpretation of the Guarantee Clause’ [1984] Yale Law Journal 561, 561. 
405 Magliocca (n 317) 27. 
406 ibid 26. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 2: Protecting the United States of America from a tyranny by creating federal and 
state republican governments 
[91] 
 
restriction contained in the clause, which forbids their governments from adopting a 
non-republican constitution,407 claimants are arguably expected to face difficulties 
when attempting to claim that a violation of the Guarantee Clause occurred.  
The second shield of the Guarantee Clause is arguably created around the 
fundamental rights granted to the people under federal laws 408 and under the modern 
ideal of the republican government. This shield ensures that the principles of the 
republican government are also protected from the threats that may be posed to the 
government and therefore also to the promotion of freedom as non-domination of their 
citizens, such as the emergence of arbitrary decision-makers. The methods by which 
this shield may provide protection to the citizens of a state will be examined in Chapter 
3, examining the incorporation doctrine. 
It may thus be argued that even though the clause is a ‘sleeping giant’,409 the fears 
about its awakening have resulted in the creation of a hidden fundamental importance 
of the clause, which may only come to light when the clause is used as a sword against 
a ‘rotten’410 state. 
VII. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the chapter has examined what protections are at the disposal of the 
federal government under the Constitution of the United States that are similar to that 
of Article 7 Treaty on European Union,411 which aims to set out a mechanism for the 
protection of the fundamental values of the European Union. Whilst initially it may 
seem that the Guarantee Clause may have entrusted the federal government with 
wide-ranging powers in this area, this Chapter has demonstrated that this aspect has 
not, in fact, been the focus of development in this area.  
The chapter has firstly examined what ‘a republican form of government' under the 
Guarantee Clause could be characterised as and the two main motives for the creation 
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of this clause: the distrust and antipathy of the monarchical form of government, and 
the protection of the people as sovereigns under the republican government ideal. It 
has further highlighted that no clear definition or standard has emerged about what a 
republican form of government is, which has created a constitutional uncertainty, 
consequently resulting in the enforcement of the clause being a challenging task. It 
has, however, further emphasised that the lack of a clear definition has provided the 
opportunity for diverging methods of constitutional interpretation to emerge and, 
ultimately, a dynamic mechanism may emerge, enabling advancements in the 
contemporary values of republican governments. This was demonstrated, for instance, 
through the clear juxtaposition that has emerged between slavery in a republican 
government, where ideals around the provision ‘all men are born equal’412 are 
constantly evolving. 
.  
The chapter has subsequently demonstrated the reasons why the Guarantee Clause 
is considered the ‘sleeping giant’413 of the US Constitution through looking at how the 
federal government would enforce the clause against an emerging ‘rotten’414 state. It 
has further analysed the importance of the existence of such giant through the debates 
about the issues created by the clause.   
It has further emphasised that the constant disagreement between the separate 
branches of the federal government, especially between Congress and the President 
about which of them should enforce this clause, has led to a critical uncertainty, which 
may impair the federal government from taking any action against an emerging 
‘rotten’415 state. A clear illustration of this was provided above through the 
Reconstruction era, when Congress would assume the role of the enforcer of this 
Clause, but would subsequently stay silent and rely on the President to fulfil this task. 
It was also highlighted that the Supreme Court, relying on the political question 
doctrine, has further refrained from making any decisions based on this Clause, thus, 
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making it unclear nowadays which branch is, in fact, supposed to act as the enforcer 
of the Clause. 
This chapter has, thus, proposed a co-operation enforcement mechanism that requires 
the separate branches of the federal government to co-operate during the enforcement 
of the clause. This would remedy the lack of enforcement actions taken under the 
Guarantee Clause, while keeping the republican values in sight.  
The chapter has, lastly, identified four hidden fundamental important positions that the 
clause arguably occupies within the US Constitution, the federal system and on global 
scale. Whereas it is understood that an unforeseen threat to the republican values is 
not predicted to emerge in the foreseeable future within a state in the United States of 
America, it should not be forgotten that the current rule of law crisis of the European 
Union was not foreseen either, hence contributing to the lack of preparation by the 
European Union to handle the crisis. 
 [94] 
 
Chapter 3: Providing a uniform protection of the fundamental rights of 
individuals throughout the United States 
 
The constitutional value set out in the Fourteenth Amendment  
 
I. Introduction  
 
While Chapter 2 focused on the protection of the fundamental constitutional value of 
protecting the United States from a tyranny to emerge through the establishment and 
development of a novel federalist republican system of government, this Chapter will 
examine how the individuals have been afforded protection of certain of their 
fundamental rights. It will further focus on how the constitutional uncertainties 
surrounding the protection of the fundamental rights of the individuals in the United 
States of America have developed. 
 
Whilst for the Guarantee Clause, the constitutional uncertainties that also resulted in 
different methods of interpretation arose from the provisions of the federal 
Constitution, in the area of protection of fundamental rights of individuals the 
constitutional uncertainties were present on state level even before the drafting of the 
Constitution. Following the American Revolution, the previous colonies did not 
immediately adopt uniform constitutions that would have created a uniform manner of 
protecting these rights. However, as with the Guarantee Clause, diverging 
interpretations of the protection of these rights emerged. Therefore, it is argued that 
the constitutional uncertainties in this area arose from the constitutional protections 
provided by the states, not the federal government.  
 
This Chapter will, thus, commence with examining the state of the protection of the 
fundamental rights of individuals in the United States of America before the adoption 
of the Constitution. This will require the study of different state constitutions and bills 
of rights, and an analysis of the similarities and differences between them.  
 
Subsequently, the reasons for the lack of a Bill of Rights from the original federal 
Constitution will be examined. It will further have to be determined whether the so-
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called ‘dual federalist’416 structure of the United States afforded adequate protection 
of the fundamental rights of the individuals.  
 
As it will be demonstrated below, the lack of the Bill of Rights from the Constitution 
provided such a fundamental debate following the Constitutional Convention that it 
even threatened its ratification. Therefore, the Federalist and Anti-Federalist 
viewpoints of this debate will have to be investigated further. After an analysis of the 
federal Bill of Rights and whether these could be applied against the states, Barron v 
Baltimore,417 the first key decision of the Supreme Court in the area of fundamental 
rights will be examined further. 
 
Following the study of the status of slavery and its role in the Civil War, the 
constitutional consequences of the Civil War in the protection of the fundamental rights 
of individuals, especially the manumitted ex-slaves will be examined further.  
Subsequently, the chapter will examine how the constitutional uncertainties and the 
diverging methods of interpretation regarding the incorporation doctrine contributed 
towards the adoption of an approach that selectively incorporates provisions of the 
federal Bill of Rights against the states.  
 
II. Protection of fundamental rights in individual states 
 
In order to investigate the current state of play of the protection of fundamental rights 
in the United States, this thesis will adopt the living constitutional values method of 
interpretation of the Constitution, devised in Chapter 1. This will, therefore, first require 
the examination of the intents of the Framers.  
 
To examine the intents of the Framers, this work also sets out to understand how the 
fundamental rights came to be included in the Constitution. This, however, requires 
studying the protection of these rights before the adoption of the Constitution. During 
these times, the only protection afforded to the fundamental rights of citizens was in 
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the form of the colonial charters, declarations of rights, and the state constitutions 
adopted only after the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. Moreover, it was 
not only the nature of the documents, but their contents as well that diverged. Thus, 
the subsequent adoption of a uniform approach to the protection of fundamental rights 
would, unsurprisingly, prove challenging.   
 
In order to understand the differences between these documents, it is important to 
examine what their legal status was and where the ideal to enumerate fundamental 
rights in these originated from.  
 
II.1. The colonial charters  
 
The thirteen colonies that emerged as the states that subsequently formed part of the 
United States were recognised as colonies by royal charters. The royal charters were 
also issued for the protection of ‘property, power and immunities’ in Britain and were 
therefore mostly regarded as contracts.418  
 
In the colonies, however, these charters came to occupy a more essential function 
than a contract over the years. The contractual nature of the charters was apparent in 
the availability of remedies for breaches of the terms of the charter. However, the 
remedies that citizens of the colonies were also commencing to seek were against the 
arbitrary actions of their governors, for which they resorted on more and more 
occasions to the other protections afforded to them by the colonial charters.419 This 
would, thus, signify that these charters could be regarded as documents that were 
more than contracts – they also afforded protection to the citizens against their 
governors. This would suggest that these documents granted the citizens with certain 
rights to protect from these actions.  
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However, these documents were not static documents either: they were, in fact, 
frequently amended, allowing them to adopt to changes. The provisions contained in 
them, furthermore, were also left open-ended: they, therefore, allowed for an 
interpretation that incorporated changes to society, similar to the non-originalist 
constitutional interpretation method. Another key characteristic of these charter was 
the uneven allocation of powers between the colonies and Britain.420 Intriguingly, a 
common characteristic of the colonial charters was that they vested to the British 
settlers the privileges and immunities that had already been granted to them as British 
citizens under the British legal system and bestowed the same rights on their 
descendants.421 In these colonies the fundamental rights of these citizens would, thus, 
be guaranteed protection. Since the colonies did not have authority as independent 
states to adopt constitutions, the above characteristics of these would suggest that 
these charters could be elevated to the status of quasi-constitutions of these 
colonies.422 The subsequent adoption of the charters of Connecticut and Rhode Island 
as state constitutions after the adoption of the Declaration of Independence also 
supports the ideology that the charters were regarded as such.423 
 
It shall, however, also be highlighted here that differences were present in the colonial 
charters regarding the protection of fundamental rights. Some included only protection 
of the values that they regarded most fundamental, such as the freedom of religion 
included in the Royal Charter of Rhode Island.424 Some, on the other hand, provided 
a comprehensive list of fundamental rights, such as the Charter of Privileges of 
Pennsylvania.425 The charter of Georgia, opted for a different method and instead of 
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enumerating these rights, it catered for the guarantee of the same rights that British 
citizens possessed to those of Georgia.426 
 
A fundamental change in the approach of the governors towards the governance of 
the colonies also had an effect on their quasi-constitutional structure. Whilst the 
governors of the colonies initially aimed to represent the interests of the British King 
and Parliament, during the eighteenth century, they commenced to give priority to the 
interests of the citizens of the colonies over the interests of the monarchy or 
Parliament.427 This change could be argued to have been a result of the shift in the 
main concerns of the individuals as citizens of the colonies from religion to the ‘political 
and economic interests’ of the colonies and their citizens.428 Thus, it is argued that 
whilst these charters were initially set out to be mere contracts between Britain and 
the colonies, with the governors representing Britain, the changes in society over the 
years and the non-static nature of these documents allowed for these documents to 
become quasi-constitutions. The signs of these documents becoming quasi-
constitutions further suggests (with the benefit of hindsight) that the feeling of 
belonging to Britain would transform over time. This transformed approach to the self-
governance of the colonies also resulted in a general view that the colonies were ‘ruled 
by a foreign country’ as opposed to their ‘mother country.’429 This standpoint also 
ultimately resulted in the American Revolution, and the subsequent adoption of the 
Declaration of Independence on 4th July 1776.  
 
II.2. State constitutions 
 
After obtaining independence from the British Empire, the Congress of the colonies 
requested the colonies to adopt state constitutions, and the request was subsequently 
satisfied by eleven states. 430 The adopted constitutions were important milestones in 
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not only American, but global history, since these essentially became the first written 
constitutions, some of which also contained the first declarations of rights.431 On the 
other hand, whilst these unarguably amounted to the adoption of innovative political 
ideals of the era, ideologies similar to those included in the constitutions and 
declarations of rights had been formulated beforehand. 
 
One such ideology, which requires special attention, is the higher law approach, 
according to which there exists a natural law, higher than the laws of any government 
that grants protection of the ‘inalienable’ and ‘inherent’ rights to all individuals.432 This 
ideology further asserts that the enactment of laws by governments that include these 
rights does not amount to granting novel rights to individuals, it is merely a discovery 
of these rights and the declaration of their existence.433 Proponents of the natural law 
approach also claim that these ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ rights had been in existence long 
before the adoption of any laws containing them as these are ‘antecedent and 
superior’ to all governments.434 They further assert that the fulfilment and protection of 
these rights is the goal of a government, which may only be created by the consent of 
the governed individuals.435 The main aim of a constitution or a declaration of rights, 
therefore, is to guard these natural rights of individuals against violations by both 
individuals and the state under this ideology.436 This approach is also argued to have 
been disseminated especially during sermons in the United States, making explicit 
references to the ideologies of John Locke,437 although Cicero, Coke and Blackstone 
may also be mentioned as key advocates of this approach.438 
 
The living constitutional approach advocated for by this work thus also coincides with 
natural law. It is inferred that if it is the goal of a government to fulfil and protect these 
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rights and the powers of the government in the United States originate from the 
Constitution, the aim of the Constitution itself may be established as the fulfilment and 
protection of these rights. Since the living constitutional values may be regarded as 
rights of individuals (for instance, the protection against tyranny) that may be attained 
by the application of principles (for instance, the separation of powers), it is argued 
that the protection of values and not just rights should be regarded as the aims of the 
Constitution. 
 
It will be demonstrated below that the individual colonies and states had played an 
essential role in devising protective measures of certain fundamental rights of their 
citizens, as firsts in the world. It shall, however, also be highlighted that as the adoption 
of these legal documents occurred at state level and not in a uniform federal level, 
differences can be found between all legal documents and provisions on state level. 
 
II.2.1. States with no bills of rights 
 
The differences between the states with regard to the protection of fundamental rights 
become apparent as some states, such as New York, had decided against the 
adoption of a state bill of rights. It, however, did opt to enact a Constitution in 1777, 
which contained, for instance, in Article XLI, the right of its citizens to trial by jury.439 
Most importantly, despite not being enumerated in the state Constitution, the freedom 
of the press, ‘a “principal pillar” of free society,’ was afforded protection in New York.440 
This followed from the decision to acquit John Peter Zenger from seditious libel for 
printing materials, which were critical about the royal governor disregarding the then 
existing legal provisions.441  
  
It can further be shown that even though not contained in legal provisions enacted by 
the government, the state of New York respected the right to bail and the prohibition 
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against self-incrimination.442 Klein supports this position by illustrating that the 
protection of the latter can be identified in cases in front of the Privy Council, where 
the defendants had indeed, made self-incriminatory remarks. 443 Article XL of the New 
York Constitution further required its ‘able-bodied men’ to bear arms, while Article 
XXXVIII regarded freedom of religion as a natural right that had to be protected.444 
Moreover, it provided protection for its citizens from the quartering of soldiers in the 
Declaration of Rights that was adopted in 1787.445 
 
While it has been demonstrated that New York did provide certain protections of the 
fundamental rights of its citizens, New Jersey was less generous. With no bill of rights, 
the Charter of Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey, adopted in 1677, afforded 
protection to certain fundamental rights to its citizens.446 This charter, however, 
included the protection of merely two fundamental rights, the freedom of religion and 
the right to trial by jury.447 Despite the lack of a Bill of Rights in its subsequent 
Constitution adopted in 1776, Article XIX of the said Constitution continued to afford 
protection of the freedom of religion and so did the right to trial by jury under Article 
XXII.448 
 
Despite having been devised in 1669 by the Earl of Shaftesbury and John Locke 
himself, the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, which guaranteed some 
fundamental rights for its citizens, were never fully implemented in either states of 
Carolina.449 However, the Constitution of South Carolina, subsequently adopted in 
1778, provided protection to three fundamental rights: that of the freedom of religion 
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under Article XXXVIII, the right to trial by jury in Article XLI and the freedom of the 
press in XLIII.450  
 
It thus emerges that in states with no bill of rights, there was limited guarantee that the 
fundamental rights of the citizens would be afforded protection by their states. The 
only right that was afforded protection in all of the above states with no bill of rights 
was that of the right to trial by jury. This would, therefore, suggest that in the event of 
a dispute, it was important that the People would have the final say. It would, thus, 
mean that the power placed in the hands of the very few, one of the key principles of 
the modern republican ideal, may also be observed in these documents.  
 
Since the protection of fundamental rights was quite limited in states with no bills of 
rights, it would, therefore, be a logical deduction that where these bills of rights were 
adopted, the fundamental rights of the citizens would be granted a wide and effective 
protection. 
 
II.2.2. States with bills of rights 
 
From the previous Thirteen Colonies, only a few adopted constitutions following the 
request of Congress and before the adoption of the federal Constitution. In 1776, being 
the first Constitution ‘framed by an American Commonwealth’, New Hampshire 
adopted its first Constitution laying down important frames for government, such as 
the requirement of all legislation to pass through the two branches of legislature, the 
Council and the Assembly.451 A new, more advanced, Constitution replaced the above 
in 1783, which also included a Bill of Rights.452 The first part of the Constitution that 
contained the Bill of Rights, in Article 2, importantly emphasises the support for the 
natural law theory and claims that ‘all men have certain natural, essential, and inherent 
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rights.’453 Some of these rights were also – contrary to the natural law approach – 
enumerated in this Article: ‘ enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining 
happiness.’454 Further protection was afforded to the right of freedom of religion in 
Article 5, the right of revolution in Article 10, the prohibition of self-incrimination in 
Article 15, the right to a trial by jury, and the prohibition of double jeopardy in Article 
16.455  
 
Chapter I of the Constitution of Vermont, adopted in 1777, also constituted its Bill of 
Rights.456 Article I of this Constitution also proclaimed support for the natural law 
theory, by declaring that all men have ‘certain natural, inherent and unalienable 
rights.’457 More importantly, as the first state to promulgate such measure, this Article 
also banned slavery for men after the age of 21.458 Article III also guaranteed the 
protection of freedom of religion, Article X provided protection against self-
incrimination and the right to trial by jury, the latter also being guaranteed under Article 
XIII.459 Article XIV, importantly, guarantees the freedom of speech and press, whilst 
Article XV also guaranteed the right to bear arms to the citizens of Vermont.460 
 
In 1641, Massachusetts adopted a statute called the Body of Liberties, which was 
arguably ‘the first comprehensive bill of rights in the history of mankind.’461 Together 
with the Declaration of Rights of 1780, the citizens of Massachusetts were granted 
protection of several fundamental rights in these documents.  
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Articles 1 and 18 – 55 of the Body of Liberties, for instance, afforded protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizure, and against cruel and unusual punishments and 
the guarantee of procedural rights of a person accused of a criminal offence.462 
 
The first state to adopt a declaration of rights that was also termed as such of the 
thirteen original colonies was Virginia.463 Mason - one of the later Founding Fathers -  
was the ‘primary architect of the Declaration of Rights’ and enumerated several 
fundamental rights that the citizens of the state possessed, such as ‘the enjoyment of 
life, liberty and property and the pursuit of happiness’ in Article I, ‘the free exercise of 
religion’  in Article XV, and ‘the freedom of the press’ in Article XII. 464 The Declaration 
further established in Article I that ‘all men’ were free and possessed inherent rights 
that could not be breached and gave sovereign power to the people.465 Whereas the 
constitutional status of the colonial charters were questionable, the inclusion of the 
Declaration of Rights in the state constitution of Virginia, without a doubt, elevated the 
declaration to constitutional status.466 Whilst it may seem that the adoption of these 
bills of rights – even if not called so – guaranteed protection of the fundamental rights 
of its citizens, the next state to be examined, had demonstrated the contrary.  
 
Maryland, ‘the safe haven for Roman Catholics,’ despite enacting ‘the first American 
bill of rights’ in the form of the Act for the Liberties of the People in 1637/1638, it only 
formally adopted a Declaration of Rights and Constitution in 1776, following the 
adoption of the Declaration of Rights of Virginia.467 Resembling the colonial charters, 
Article III of the Declaration of Rights of Maryland provided the citizens of Maryland 
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with the ‘same Rights, Liberties, Immunities, Privileges and free Customs as any 
natural born English subject.’468 Article XXI further prohibited the imprisonment, 
disseizure or dispossession of property other ‘than according to the laws of’ 
Maryland.469 
 
The Constitution of North Carolina was more advanced than the Constitution of South 
Carolina in terms of the protection of fundamental rights, as it commenced with a 
Declaration of Rights.470 Article VII of this Declaration prohibited self-incrimination, 
provided the right to trial by jury under Article IX and the freedom of the press under 
Article XV.471 Article XVII provided protection of the right to bear arms, Article XVIII of 
the right of assembly, while Article XIX protected the freedom of religion.472 
 
William Penn, who became the Proprietor of Pennsylvania in 1681, was a key 
advocate of the natural law approach.473 Due to the laws that were proposed by Penn 
- following the natural law approach - effectively acting as a bill of rights in the state, 
Pennsylvania subsequently became identified with ‘having one of the freest societies 
in the world.’474 These laws, called the Frame of Government, stated, for instance, in 
Article XXXV Laws Agreed upon England, that the citizens of Pennsylvania were free 
to exercise their chosen form of religion, were also guaranteed freedom of speech, 
assembly and petition, were entitled to a speedy trial by jury in Article VIII of the Laws 
agreed upon England, and were protected against paying excessive bails and fines, 
some of which were also repeated in the Charter of Privileges enacted in 1701.475 
Interestingly, Article XXX of the Laws Agreed Upon England of the Frame of 
Government further declared that those spreading ‘false news,’ would ‘be accordingly 
severely punished, as enemies to the peace and concord of this province.’476 This, 
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therefore, indicates that attempting to protect individuals from such news in the name 
of the protection of ‘peace’ has been present in the United States since this era, and 
is thus, not a novel phenomenon. 
 
Whilst affording its citizens a wide range of protection of their fundamental rights, 
Pennsylvania did not seem to hold that the right of freedom of the press and speech 
were such fundamental rights that would deserve protection in its Charter of Privileges 
of 1701. It became ‘the first colony’ that prosecuted ‘a printer for seditious libel in 1692’ 
and its assembly seemed to hold that no right to freedom of press and speech existed 
by arresting several individuals criticising them.477 On the other hand, in Article XII of 
its subsequent Constitution of 1776 - which contained a Declaration of Rights 
resembling that of Virginia - the state legislature recognised the fundamental nature of 
these rights and expressly provided for their protection.478 
 
Thus, despite the request of the colonial Congress and before the adoption of the 
federal Constitution, it has been demonstrated above that not all states adopted a 
written constitution subsequently. Moreover, the ones that had done so, were not able 
to provide a comprehensive list of the fundamental rights of their citizens that were to 
be protected, even when they adopted declarations of rights. Furthermore, the 
protections that were guaranteed by these declarations differed widely and no uniform 
approach can be identified within all states.  
 
Whereas the above can be highlighted as key defects of the constitutional systems of 
the colonies and states that came to the form the United States of America, the 
supporters of the natural law theory would argue otherwise. Since they advocated the 
existence of inalienable rights of individuals that are present in their natural state, the 
existence of these declarations or the non-inclusion of a certain right might firstly be 
held to be irrelevant. Another approach adopted by the supporters of this viewpoint 
claims that only those fundamental rights can be enumerated in declarations of rights 
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that have been discovered by the people.479 Following this standpoint, it may thus be 
argued that since the citizens of distinct states formed distinct societies, they 
discovered different rights at different points in time. This, in effect, created differing 
legal provisions in the states. However, this also allowed for the distinct laws of each 
state to reflect the circumstances at their own states at the time and to progress as 
their societies did.  
 
If one is to adopt the approach that certain rights may not have been discovered by 
the citizens of a state at a certain time, but they may discover these at a later state 
clearly signals supports for the non-originalist interpretation method of the 
Constitution. If one was to only look for rights that existed at the time of the adoption 
of these laws, no progress would be able to be acknowledged in the future. However, 
if societies change and discover certain new values at some point, adopting the natural 
law and the living constitutional values approach would allow for the Constitution to 
adapt to these new circumstances. 
 
The above examination demonstrates that when the Framers of the Constitution of the 
United States convened in Philadelphia, they had to acknowledge the existence of 
these various legal documents that provided for an inconsistent protection of 
fundamental rights in the different states.480 
 
III. The Original Federal Constitution 
 
The Founding Fathers were bestowed with the task of having to create a novel federal 
system for and based on the already existing political and legal systems of the ex-
colonies. As demonstrated above, these distinct systems did not provide for the 
protection of the fundamental rights of individuals at all times. It is argued that some 
Founding Fathers, such as Jefferson, had adopted the social contract theory in their 
approach to their duties of creating the new federal system. 481 According to this theory, 
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the protection of the rights of the citizens could be best achieved by limiting some of 
their rights.482 It would, therefore, follow that when providing for the federal protection 
of these rights, some other federal provision could limit other rights of the individuals 
and may affect the rights protected by their states. This was necessary in the creation 
of a novel agreement for the governance of the society that the Constitution created.483  
 
It, however, seems that the main task that the Framers of the Constitution focused 
upon was the development of the organisation and functioning of the new system. The 
protection of the fundamental rights only came to the foreground of debates 
subsequently, upon the proposal of the Constitution having been sent to the states for 
ratification.  
 
III.1. The Constitution of the United States 
 
Whilst the Framers were given the task of creating a Constitution for the new federal 
system during the Philadelphia Convention and debated several essential matters for 
the functioning of such system, little reference can be found in the records of their 
debates about the inclusion of a bill of rights or the protection of the natural rights of 
individuals in the proposed Constitution. The Constitution does, however, contain 
certain provisions guaranteeing rights of individuals against the federal government, 
such as the same ‘privileges and immunities’ afforded to its citizens in all states under 
Article IV section 2. The guarantees formed to establish a republican federation, such 
as the principle of the separation of powers, is also argued to have sought to provide 
the citizens of the United States with protection against the arbitrary actions of the new 
federal government.484  
 
Certain fundamental rights that would later be included in the Bill of Rights can, 
however, be found in two proposals submitted to the Convention. The first one 
proposed by Pinckney included provisions such as the preservation of the freedom of 
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the press, the outlawing of religious tests or qualifications, and the quartering of 
soldiers in times of peace with the consent of the owner only.485 The second proposal 
submitted by Mason – the framer of the Bill of Rights of Virginia486 - argued for the 
inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the ‘preface’ of the Constitution.487 This proposal included 
fundamental rights such as the freedom of the press or the right to trial by jury in civil 
cases.488 Both proposals, on the other hand, were defeated during the Convention.489  
 
The defeat of these proposals can be attributed to various reasons. Firstly, it seems 
that there had been a general consensus amongst those opposing the proposals that 
the Bill of Rights of states provided ‘sufficient’ protection of the fundamental rights of 
the citizens of these states. 490 Secondly, the protection of these rights was regarded 
to be the task of state governments as opposed to the novel federal government. This 
can be ascribed to have been the accumulated effect of the general concern that this 
new government posed threats to the citizens and the higher sense of loyalty that 
citizens felt towards their state governments rather than the federal one.491 Thirdly, it 
has also been argued that the original federal Constitution did not contain a declaration 
of rights because the idea was suggested towards the end of the Convention and the 
delegates were keen to conclude their almost four-months-long discussions about the 
Constitution and return home.492 A fourth reason could be identified as the argument 
of some Framers that the Preamble of the Constitution sufficed as the declaration of 
the general rights of individuals.493 According to this point of view, since the clear 
constitutional status of the state bill of rights was debatable, following the traditions of 
the states, the federal constitution was not required to contain such declaration.494 
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Moreover, it may be argued that the Framers may have adopted the natural law 
approach by allowing amendments to be made to the Constitution in Article V, thus 
enabling the discovery of rights at any certain point in time in the future. This approach 
further supports a non-originalist method of interpretation of the Constitution in line 
with the natural law approach that would allow this document to adapt to changes in 
society in the future. A constitutional amendment could, however, demonstrate that 
the values of society have changed if these had been present in any earlier actions 
based on the non-originalist method of interpretation. 
 
Recognising all the above reasons, it may, thus, be argued that the Framers opted for 
the adoption of a more republican approach. They firstly recognised the existence and 
importance of state constitutions. They subsequently created a federal system, where 
the state constitutions were arguably placed on equal footing as the new federal 
Constitution in matters that the latter did not include. One such matter was the 
protection of fundamental rights, which could be found in various state constitutions 
and bills of rights. However, it is also important to emphasise that not all states adopted 
bills of rights and constitutions and, thus, the protection of fundamental rights within 
the states depended on other legal provisions adopted by the states or were not 
guaranteed at all.  
 
Thus, it is argued that the Framers of the Constitution adopted a view whereby they 
created not only a dual political, but a ‘dual constitutional’ structure as well. 495 This 
structure comprised of a federal and a state level, with distinct constitutions adopted 
at the different levels.     
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The aim of this system was also expected to amount to the dual protection of the 
fundamental rights of the citizens, which they would have been able to invoke under 
two separate constitutions, the federal and the state ones. Whilst it is recognised that 
some Framers argued that the declarations of rights in existence in various states 
afforded adequate protection of the fundamental rights of citizens, it is key to highlight 
that this approach fails to acknowledge that the protections that were provided to the 
citizens of various states differed based on the state they were the citizen of. If the 
protections of the fundamental rights were only provided for on state level, and in the 
declarations of rights of different states, no uniform protection of the fundamental rights 
of citizens was created within this new system. Moreover, citizens were only able to 
invoke these uniform, federal, rights against the federal government under this 
structure, and not against their state. Consequently, the protections offered by state 
constitutions could only be invoked against the states, not the federal government. 
Therefore, as the protection of the fundamental rights was not expressly declared and 
emphasised in the original federal Constitution, the Framers failed to attain the 
protection of fundamental rights in a uniform manner all across the states.  
 
As it has been demonstrated above, various opposing viewpoints surfaced to the 
proposed inclusion of a declaration of rights in the Constitution. The lack of this 
declaration of rights also rapidly became the main tool for advocating for the non-
DUAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
DUAL CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STATE GOVERNMENT 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION STATE CONSTITUTION 
Figure 1 The dual political structure resulting in a dual constitutional structure in the 
United States of America 
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ratification of the Constitution, and the delegates of the Convention were, indeed, 
frequently challenged about their failure to include this in the Constitution in the 
ensuing ratification debates.496 
 
III.2. The Federalist-Anti-Federalist Debate  
 
The adoption of the novel federal constitution, unsurprisingly, resulted in significant 
political debates that led to further debates about fundamental constitutional ideas. 
After the drafting of the Constitution, these emerged as two main political ideologies, 
which also influenced the ratification debates of the proposed Constitution.  
 
III.2.1. The Federalists 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, those supporting the adoption of the Constitution came to 
form the political group of The Federalists. Their main argument was for a powerful 
federal government to become the supervisor of state and local governments.497 
However, the powers of the federal government could not become limitless in such a 
system. Moreover, they also had to consider that federal and state level regulations 
had to co-exist in this novel system.  
 
Another key policy initially adopted by the Federalists was their opposition to the 
inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution.498 The reason for this viewpoint was 
manifold. Firstly, important members of the group, such as Hamilton and Madison, 
emphasised the non-existence of bill of rights in various states, and, therefore, claimed 
there was a lack of need for a federal bill of rights.499 They further argued that even 
the existence of these bills did not automatically guarantee adequate protection for the 
citizens.500 Madison even called the state bills of rights ‘parchment barriers.’501 Thus, 
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it may be deduced that they argued that the adoption of a bill of rights in the 
Constitution, would not guarantee the protection of these rights by the federal 
government. 
 
Secondly, some members of this group also seem to have adopted the natural law 
approach. Hamilton, for instance, contended that since people possess the sovereign 
power in the United States, a federal bill of rights would not grant any additional 
guarantees to them. 502 By becoming sovereign, the people of the United States, 
Hamilton argued, retained all the power in cases where no ‘reservations’ were placed 
in the original Constitution. 503 They could, therefore, not be required to ‘surrender’ 
anything.504 They, thus, argued – based on the natural law approach – that the people 
already possess those rights that would be enumerated in the bill of rights in their 
natural state. Including these rights in a bill of rights would have required their 
surrender from this natural state, which did not follow the ideology of the natural law 
theory. 
 
Thirdly, following from the above, Hamilton took this standpoint further and claimed 
that enumerating the fundamental rights of the people ‘would even be dangerous.’ 505  
He reasoned that such enumeration could allow for claims to be made for rights that 
were not initially intended to be established by the Framers.506 For instance, he argued 
that the freedom of the press could not be adequately protected by such bill of rights.507 
The reason he provided for this claim was that no definition of the concept could be 
provided, creating undesired uncertainty, which would lead to the ineffective protection 
of such right.508 It may, however, be highlighted that whilst he argued that the 
protection of a provision was not adequate in the federal constitution if no clear 
definition of it could be provided, many other provisions in the already accepted text 
of the Constitution at the Philadelphia Convention, such as commerce, remained 
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undefined. Thus, his opposition to the inclusion of rights that are not clearly defined 
seems to be in contravention of other main provisions of the Constitution and thus 
cannot be held to be validly supported.  
 
Fourthly, relying on the dual constitutional structure approach and addressing the 
constant conflict that emerged between the federal and state governments, the 
Federalists also claimed that the inclusion of a Bill of Rights was unnecessary and 
inadequate in the federal Constitution. They accordingly argued that under the dual 
constitutional structure, the states were more suited to protect the rights that would be 
included in a federal bill of rights, since state governments were the ones entrusted 
with the application of the rights excluded from the federal Constitution.509 Thus, the 
protection of these rights was seen as traditionally belonging to the states, the power 
over which could not be transferred to Congress. 
 
However, one key element missing from such an argument is that if the individual was 
placed in the focus, it would only provide them with protection of their rights against 
their state, not the federal government. Unless, based on the above constitutional 
structure, the argument is for the states to be able to claim on behalf of the individual 
that their rights have been breached on federal level. However, such a position would 
have defeated one of the main aims of the Constitution of creating a uniform system 
whereby individuals would have been afforded different levels of protection depending 
on which states they were the citizens of. 
 
Fifthly, Hamilton also suggested that, despite all the above, the Constitution itself could 
be considered a bill of rights of the federal system.510 His claim was based on the 
position that, – similar to the Constitution of New York, – the federal Constitution 
possessed ‘various provisions in favour of particular privileges and rights’ in its original 
form.511 He asserted that the most important of these ‘privileges and rights’ were ‘the 
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privilege of the writ of habeas corpus’,512 the prohibition of ‘bills of attainder or ex-post-
facto’ laws513 and of granting titles of nobility.514 
 
Whilst it has become apparent from the above that the Federalists were fundamentally 
opposed to the idea of a federal bill of rights in the Constitution, some members had 
expressed support for certain rights not included in the Constitution to come under 
federal protection through the Constitution. Madison, for instance, highlighted these 
as the ‘individual and minority rights’ that he believed were not afforded adequate 
protection by the states.515 This position, however, also indicates a firm belief and 
divide between state and federal rights, adopting a dual federalist approach with 
defined limits to each right. 
 
Another political grouping, however, also emerged that placed the key policy of the 
non-inclusion of a federal Bill of Rights in the Constitution under substantial scrutiny.  
 
III.2.2. The Anti-Federalists 
 
The opposition political group that had an influence over the ratification debates of the 
Constitution was the Anti-Federalists, who were fundamentally opposed to the 
adoption of the Constitution and aimed to call a second convention.516 One of their 
main criticisms of the proposed Constitution was that it created a federal government 
that possessed powers too great without allocating adequately wide powers to the 
states.  
 
Their other crucial continuous request was the greater protection of ‘individual rights’ 
in the federal system.517 DeWitt, however, argued that in order to attain this, a federal 
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Bill of Rights proved necessary. 518 He claimed that in such a bill the people would be 
able to enumerate their natural rights that they are willing to ‘surrender’ to create the 
novel, federal, society.519 This viewpoint, unsurprisingly, clearly contradicted the 
natural law approach of the Federalists. Whilst they claimed that a citizen should not 
have to surrender any of their rights under natural law in the novel federal system, the 
Anti-Federalists argued – seemingly in line with the social contract theory - that such 
surrender was necessary.  
 
Furthermore, whilst Hamilton was opposed to the inclusion of terms with no clear 
definition due to the uncertainty they would create,520 the Anti-Federalists supported 
the inclusion of such terms. DeWitt, for instance, claimed that the rights to be included 
in such a bill should be provided by general terms and ‘not with too much precision 
and accuracy’.521 Arguably, in favour of a non-originalist method of interpretation, he 
maintained that the advantage of this would be that rights could be implied to have 
been included in such bill of rights in the future.522 This approach would, thus, allow 
for the advancements of society to be adopted as part of the Constitution. These would 
be allowed either through the enactment of federal regulation or the interpretation of 
the Constitution at the Supreme Court, representing the views adopted at the time. 
 
As mentioned above, the two ideologies supported by the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists divided the opinions during the ratification debates. It may, therefore, be 
important to examine why the Constitution was ratified in its original form without a bill 
of rights. Based on the analysis of these, to those familiar with the Constitution, it may 
seem apparent that the Anti-Federalists had succeeded during the ratification debates, 
since a Bill of Rights now forms part of the Constitution of the United States.  
 
III.2.3. The Ratification Debates 
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As expected from the dominance of the above two political groupings during the 
ratification debates, the adoption of the Constitution was often in jeopardy. This would 
mostly be due to the extensive discussions around the omission of the bill of rights 
from it. It was therefore essential for the adoption of the Constitution for this position 
to be clarified and remedied. After several states voted for the adoption of the 
Constitution with subsequent amendments to be made, the ratification of the 
Constitution mainly depended on the actions of two states, Pennsylvania and 
Virginia.523  
 
III.2.3.1. The Pennsylvania Convention 
 
In a state that adopted a bill of rights, it was hardly surprising that the delegates to the 
Federal Convention had to face a serious questioning for the reason why a bill of rights 
was not proposed as part of the new federal constitution.524 Wilson, one of the 
delegates to the Federal Convention, presented many of the arguments that were 
previously presented in the thesis. For instance, he claimed that the omission of a bill 
of rights was due to the proposals for it being submitted during the late stages of the 
Convention, which were therefore not taken into full consideration.525 He subsequently 
turned to the Federalist arguments to justify the lack of a federal bill of rights. He firstly 
claimed that a bill of rights was ‘neither an essential nor a necessary instrument in 
framing a system of government’.526 This was, on the other hand, a courageous 
position to support in Pennsylvania, where a bill of rights occupied an important role 
in the constitutional system. By stating the above, he, effectively, asserted that the 
ideal that originated from the late Proprietor of Pennsylvania were unnecessary in his 
own state. 
 
Secondly, following the natural law theory adopted by the same late Proprietor, he 
argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary since the liberty of the citizens could be 
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present and protected without such bill, since these rights were present in the natural 
state of the citizens.527  He, thirdly, claimed, supporting the natural law standpoint, that 
a Bill of Rights was omitted from the Constitution because a list of ‘all the rights of the 
people’ would not only have been ‘impracticable’, but an imperfect list would have 
resulted in the omitted rights not being afforded protection.528 It is therefore argued 
that Wilson advocated for a non-originalist method of interpretation of the Constitution 
by acknowledging that the Constitution would have to be able to adapt to changes in 
society. 
 
Despite having been faced with strong opposition and having been presented 
debatable arguments, the Federalist majority voted for the ratification of the 
Constitution in this state. The Anti-Federalists, in response, published their proposed 
amendments nationwide, in which they argued for the protection of the fundamental 
rights of citizens.529 Moreover, supporting a dual federalist approach, they also called 
for an amendment to be adopted that all unenumerated rights in the Bill of Rights 
should be reserved to the states, thus ensuring that the powers of the newly created 
federal government would also become limited in this area.530 However, as for the 
Federalist arguments, the key one focusing on whether the federal government was 
to act contrary to the diverging state rights seemed to have gone unaddressed.  
  
III.2.3.2.The Virginia Convention 
 
After the ratification of the Constitution by the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, all 
eyes turned to Virginia. This was the state of Mason, who devised its Declaration of 
Rights, and joined the Anti-Federalists, as a key figure. On the other side stood James 
Madison, another delegate to the Federal Convention who joined the Federalists. In 
order to ensure the adoption of the Constitution and that the Anti-Federalists did not 
gain a political advantage that would result in the calling of a second convention, 
Madison devised a politically strategic move with Nicholas, which, in effect, resulted in 
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a complete change of the key policy of the Federalists on the omission of the Bill of 
Rights.531 He declared that such a Bill of Rights should be included in the Constitution, 
although not in the original text but as amendments to it. In order to further ensure the 
ratification of the original Constitution, Madison also made a promise to the Virginia 
Convention that he would personally formulate the proposal for an amendment to the 
Constitution to include a Bill of Rights, and enumerated all the rights that the Virginia 
Convention requested him to include.532 
 
With this fundamental change of position of Madison, who previously referred to bills 
of rights as ‘parchment barriers,’ 533 the Federalists subsequently won the debate, and 
the Constitution was ratified by the Virginia Ratifying Convention. On the other hand, 
Virginia joined the line of states that only voted for the ratification of the Constitution 
with proposed amendments.534 Rhode Island and New York, for instance, argued for 
the inclusion of certain fundamental rights, such as the freedom of religion in the new 
Constitution.535  North Carolina also argued for a Declaration of Rights to be added to 
the Constitution, that would have protected, for instance, the freedom of speech and 
the freedom of assembly.536 
 
IV. The Bill of Rights 
 
IV.1. The proposed amendments for the Bill of Rights 
 
During and after the ratification debates the citizens of the United States seemingly 
grew more concerned about the protection that they would be afforded against 
arbitrary actions of the federal government.537 Delivering on his promise to the ratifying 
convention in Virginia, Madison, the ‘father of the Bill of Rights,’ presented to the First 
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Congress his proposed amendments to the Constitution.538 From the seventeen 
amendments Madison submitted to Congress, many were adopted from the 
Declaration of Rights of Virginia, resembling some provisions of the Magna Carta and 
further included some proposals suggested by the ratifying conventions.539 It is, 
however, to be highlighted that Madison originally argued for the amendments to be 
made in the original text of the Constitution by adding the specific sections to specific 
articles in the original Constitution.540 However, ten of the proposed seventeen 
amendments by Madison were subsequently adopted as amendments and were 
added to the end of the original Constitution. Madison subsequently claimed, that this 
resulted in ‘great quiet’ in between the people for calling for a federal Bill of Rights.541 
 
IV.2. The Bill of Rights 
  
Even though the ‘American Magna Carta’542 comprises of ten amendments, an 
amendment is often found to include several rights guaranteed to the citizens of the 
Unites States against the federal government. The First Amendment, for example, 
contains a prohibition of the adoption of laws that would be in breach of either of four 
separate rights that can be found in the bill of rights and constitutions of most states 
of the United States of America. These are namely the ‘establishment’ and ‘exercise’ 
of religious freedom, ‘the freedom of speech or of the press’ or the right of peaceful 
assembly, and the right ‘to petition the Government for redress of grievances.’543  
 
The Second Amendment ensures the establishment and maintenance of the armed 
forces of a state in its preamble, and grants people the right ‘to keep and bear arms.’544 
Even though this right is often debated at current times, the provision to bear arms 
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could notably even be found in the bill of rights of several states, such as 
Massachusetts and New York, not as a right, but as a legal requirement.545 
 
Whilst the Third Amendment grants protection to the people of the United States from 
the quartering of soldiers in times of peace and war, similar to the provisions available 
in Massachusetts and New York, the Fourth provides protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizure, similarly to the protections in Massachusetts and Delaware.546  
 
The Fifth Amendment contains five procedural fundamental rights mostly aimed at the 
protection of a person accused of a crime, some of which could also be found in the 
laws of Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Georgia.547 The Fifth Amendment firstly 
guarantees a trial by grand jury for capital or ‘infamous crimes;’ secondly, prevents a 
person to be placed in double jeopardy for the same offence; thirdly, protects 
individuals self-incrimination; fourthly, prohibits the deprivation of ‘ life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law;’ and fifthly requires ‘just compensation’ to be 
provided when a ‘private property’ is nationalised.  
 
The Sixth Amendment also guarantees further protections for the accused person in 
criminal proceedings. These include the guarantee of ‘a speedy and public trial by an 
impartial jury’ in the state where the crime was committed, the right to be informed 
                                                          
545 Murrin (n 462) 73; Klein (n 440) 225 and 240. 
546 Murrin (n 462) 10 and 88; Klein (n 440) 238; Gaspare J Saladino, ‘Delaware: Armed in the Cause of 
Freedom’ in Patrick T Conley and John P Kaminski (eds), The Bill of Rights and the States: The Colonial 
and Revolutionary Origins of American Liberties (Madison House 1992) 294–295; Levy (n 422) 10. 
547 Christopher Collier, ‘Liberty, Justice, and No Bill of Rights: Protecting Natural Rights in a Common-
Law Commonwealth’ in Patrick T Conley and John P Kaminski (eds), The Bill of Rights and the States: 
The Colonial and Revolutionary Origins of American Liberties (Madison House 1992) 110–113; Conley 
(n 425) 132; Meyers (n 453) 168 – 171 and 175; H Nicholas Muller III, ‘Freedom and Unity: Vermont’s 
Search for Security of Property, Liberty, and Popular Government’ in Patrick T Conley and John P 
Kaminski (eds), The Bill of Rights and the States: The Colonial and Revolutionary Origins of American 
Liberties (Madison House 1992) 202; Levy (n 422) 7, 9 and 10; Klein (n 440) 236 – 237; Sheridan (n 
447) 267–268; Saladino (n 547) 294–295; Alexander (n 426) 309–314; Sheridan (n 447) 267–268; 
Saladino (n 547) 294–295; Alexander (n 426) 309–314; Michael E Stevens, ‘"Their Liberties, Properties 
and Priviledges”: Civil Liberties in Sourth Carolina 1663 – 1791’ in Patrick T Conley and John P 
Kaminski (eds), The Bill of Rights and the States: The Colonial and Revolutionary Origins of American 
Liberties (Madison House 1992) 412 and 420; Coleman (n 427) 453–454.  
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 3: Providing a uniform protection of the fundamental rights of individuals throughout 
the United States 
 
[122] 
 
about the charges against them, ‘to be confronted with the witnesses’, to obtain 
witnesses in their favour and the right to instruct a defence counsel.  
 
Whilst the Seventh Amendment only provides for a single guarantee of a civil law ‘trial 
by jury’ for cases arguing for more than ‘twenty dollars’, this could be found in most 
laws of the states that have provisions similar to the Fifth Amendment. The Eighth 
Amendment prohibits three separate breaches of rights. These are the prohibition of 
‘excessive bail’ and ‘fines’ – similar to the provisions of Delaware, Pennsylvania, South 
and North Carolina and Georgia548 - and the prohibition of the infliction of ‘cruel and 
unusual punishments’, parallel to the laws of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware 
and South Carolina.549  
 
As a resolution to avoid the criticism that the Bill of Rights does not enumerate all 
fundamental rights of the citizens of the United States, and following the proposal of 
the Anti-Federalists of the Virginia Convention, the Ninth Amendment provides a 
guarantee of the protection of rights not listed in the Constitution. This amendment 
further seems to signal that the Framers of the Constitution adopted the natural law 
approach: they were aware that not all rights could be enumerated in the Constitution 
as these may not have been discovered yet. Therefore, it is claimed, that the non-
originalist interpretative method of the Constitution would be the most appropriate to 
allow for new rights or values to be included in the Constitution, in line with the 
developments of society. Therefore, if one was to follow the originalist method 
interpretation, this may prove more challenging as it could only be the rights not 
enumerated at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights that would be 
acknowledged as those deemed to be protected under this amendment. 
 
The Tenth Amendment, similar to Article IV of the Declaration of Rights of 
Massachusetts, further grants powers ‘to the States respectively, or to the people’ 
when those are not delegated to the federal government in a constitutional 
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provision.550 Whilst this amendment aims to address a fundamental constitutional 
uncertainty over where the powers of the states commence and end, due to the 
unclear provisions that grant powers to the federal government, it becomes quite 
uncertain when the power of the states would stay with a state or be granted to the 
federal government. 
 
IV.3. The proposed Amendment number XIV by Madison: The origins of the 
incorporation doctrine 
 
Whilst it is argued that the Bill of Rights was originally proposed to serve as a 
protection against the federal government only, in the proposals submitted by 
Madison, his intention to also make some of the fundamental rights applicable against 
the states can be identified. From the seventeen amendments that he submitted, the 
amendment under the number XIV that he proposed stated:  
 
‘No State shall infringe the right of trial by Jury in criminal cases, nor the rights of 
conscience, nor the freedom of speech or of the press.’ 
 
This amendment, which Madison himself regarded as ‘the most valuable’ of all the 
amendments, was, however, voted against in the Senate. Lamentably, however, no 
records were kept from their secret debates of the Senate at the time, and 
consequently the reasons for the rejection of this provision remains unexplained.551 
The adoption of this amendment would have created an indisputable provision 
granting certain fundamental rights by the federal government applicable against the 
states, therefore, seemingly sowing the seeds of the idea of the incorporation doctrine. 
In opposition to the general viewpoint of the era that state governments acted as the 
protectors of fundamental rights, Madison predicted that a threat was going to emerge, 
whereby the fundamental rights he aimed to protect in his proposed amendment could 
be violated by the state governments.552 The solution that he proposed was the 
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guarantee of these fundamental rights by the federal government against state 
governments. 553 This solution also seems to follow the natural law theory, whereby he 
claimed that the four fundamental rights enumerated in the amendment were so 
inalienable in nature, that these had to be protected from interferences by both the 
federal and the state governments. On the other hand, this close-ended enumeration 
of the four fundamental rights could have easily resulted in the incorporation of only 
these four rights against the states. This could have also arguably halted the 
advancements of any future political or legal developments.   
 
As it has been demonstrated above, the federal Bill of Rights had caused various 
important debates even before its inception. Once adopted and added to the original 
Constitution, it had not brought the expected ‘great quiet.’554 Whilst it had brought 
under a uniform federal protection various fundamental rights of the citizens of various 
states, it had only provided this protection against the federal government. Whereas 
the threat of violation of rights by the federal government seemed to have been 
eliminated by the adoption of the Bill of Rights, another issue came to the foreground 
of debates.  
 
The citizens of various states could previously turn to their state governments 
confidently for violations of their fundamental rights either based upon their bills of 
rights, constitutions or colonial charters. However, with the federal Bill of Rights, they 
seemed to have been left with no recourse for violations of these federal rights by their 
state governments and vice versa. Thus, it is not surprising that when the states do 
not afford protection to these federal rights, the citizens turned to the federal Bill of 
Rights for protections against these violations by their states. They, however, have 
been faced with various challenges along the way, even up to nowadays. 
 
IV. 4. Barron v Baltimore,555 the rejection of the incorporation doctrine 
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Even before the decision in the first Supreme Court case arguing for the incorporation 
of a right included in the Bill of Rights, several key lawyers started supporting the 
ideology that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights should be held to be applicable 
against state governments. These included Justice Johnson arguing for the 
incorporation of the right to a trial by jury in civil cases under the Seventh Amendment 
in Bank of Columbia v Okley,556 and the prevention of double jeopardy under the Fifth 
Amendment in Houston v Moore.557 Rawle, for instance, consequently argued for the 
incorporation of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights against state governments.558 
 
Subsequently, Barron v Baltimore559 was the first leading case in the Supreme Court 
where the appellant attempted to argue that the Bill of Rights was applicable against 
not only the federal, but the state governments as well.560 In this case, the appellant, 
a wharf owner, brought action against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore for 
compensation for damages caused by the diversion of water in the harbour to his 
wharf.561 He argued that the rights that he had been granted under the Fifth 
Amendment clause guaranteeing ‘just compensation’ for the taking of his ‘private 
property […] for public use,’ should have been applicable against the individual 
states.562  
 
The Supreme Court, however, was not prepared to accept his argument. Chief Justice 
Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Court, asserted that the Constitution, and thus 
the clause of just compensation of the Fifth Amendment, was only applicable against 
the federal government and not the individual states.563  
 
In coming to this conclusion, his decision was based on two main arguments. He firstly 
claimed that no express language indicated the intent of the Framers of the Bill of 
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Rights for it to be incorporated against state governments.564 Whilst the Framers of 
the Constitution provided such language in Article I section 10 of the Constitution by 
using the words ‘No State shall,’ he argued that no such words were found in the Bill 
of Rights, and thus it could not be held to be incorporated against state 
governments.565 This originalist method of interpretation adopted by Chief Justice 
Marshall clearly demonstrates the limitations of this approach.  
 
It is, thus, important to highlight that in reaching his decision, Chief Justice Marshall 
only examined the words of the Bill of Rights without looking at their historical origins. 
Had he performed such investigation, he would have found that the most valuable 
amendment proposed by Madison contained the exact same words. Despite the 
amendment not being adopted by the Senate, this provision still demonstrated an 
indication that there had been supporters of the idea of incorporation even at the time 
of the framing of the Bill of Rights. 
 
His second argument for the rejection of the incorporation doctrine was based on the 
ideology of the ‘dual constitutional structure’ of the United States. Following this 
ideology, he held that the only rights granted to the citizens that were applicable 
against their states were those granted by the constitutions of their states.566 Under 
this system, if individuals wished to bring actions for the protection of any of their rights 
under the Bill of Rights, they could only do so if these rights were breached by the 
federal government. They might have been able to argue that the rights enumerated 
in the federal Bill of Rights were also afforded protection against their state 
governments, but they could only argue so based on the inclusion of these same rights 
in their state constitutions or state bills of rights, and not based on the federal Bill of 
Rights. If such provisions were unavailable in state level legislation, they were left with 
no course of action that would have protected their inalienable rights under the natural 
law theory. 
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Figure 2 Protection provided to a citizen in the dual federalist structure 
 
Whilst it is recognised that an advantage offered by this system was the double 
protection of certain fundamental rights of citizens on both state and federal level, it 
also resulted in several crucial problems. Firstly, while some rights were afforded dual 
protection, others were afforded protection only against one of these governments, or 
even afforded none at all if they were not included in these constitutions. Secondly, an 
underlying conflict had also been created in this system. What would happen if the two 
different levels of the structure enacted legislation on the same issues remained 
unanswered. This problem, however, did surface later when the response of the states 
in such instances was to declare the federal legislative measures void.567 Thus, it 
seemed that this underlying conflict could not be resolved without declaring one level 
supreme over the other. Chief Justice Marshall, however, was not willing to resolve 
this conflict in his decision. He thus decided to maintain this conflict by adopting a 
neutral position by declaring both levels of the structure to stand at the same level of 
priority.   
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It is interesting to highlight that the decision in the above case seemed to have 
disappeared from the limelight up until the end of the Civil War.568 On the other hand, 
an argument attacking this decision emerged soon afterwards in Holmes v 
Jennison.569 Van Ness, in this case, argued for the differentiation of the various 
provisions of the Bill of Rights as ‘limitations of power’ or ‘declarations of rights.’570 In 
his unsuccessful oral argument before the court, he claimed that those belonging to 
the latter category based on their inalienable nature could be violated by ‘no power,’ 
including the state governments.571  
 
Two further cases were argued in the Supreme Court of Georgia where certain 
provisions were, in effect, held to be incorporated against the state government. In 
Nunn v Georgia572 Chief Justice Lumpkin held the Second Amendment to be 
incorporated against the state government.573 In Campbell v Georgia574 he took a step 
further and argued that all the provisions of the Bill of Rights – by their inalienable 
nature – bound state governments as well.575 In order to support this standpoint, he 
adopted the natural law approach, that these rights are so inalienable in nature, that 
protection for these should be afforded against both the federal and state 
governments.576 
 
The above instances, as Amar highlights, however, did not constitute the majority 
viewpoint of the time and following the decision in Barron v Baltimore577 the ‘dual 
constitutional structure’ view of the United States prevailed for a long time as the tool 
for the protection of fundamental rights.578 The issue had further been pressed to the 
background when another crucial unresolved matter seemed to occupy the minds of 
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the citizens of the United States: slavery. This nature of the matter of slavery, uniquely, 
resulted in one of the greatest internal conflicts of the United States: the Civil War. 
 
V. The Civil War  
 
V.1. The Causes of the Civil War 
 
Several issues have been identified as the causes of the Civil War, however, two main 
unresolved constitutional problems can be highlighted as such.579 The first reason may 
be identified as the status and the emancipation of slaves, which will be discussed in 
detail below. The second reason revolved around the unanswered question of which 
level of the dual constitutional structure occupied a supreme position in the still 
somewhat novel federal system. Based on the ideal of state sovereignty, the Southern 
states commenced to support the position more widely that it was the state 
government that occupied a supreme position over the federal government.580 This, 
unsurprisingly, resulted in these states seceding from the United States. What is 
surprising, however, is that Madison had warned about this threat during the 
ratification debates of the federal Constitution,581 and it had remained ignored by the 
majority and unresolved up until this point.  
 
Whilst the latter is regarded as one of the causes of the Civil War, the diverging 
position on slavery has remained to be mostly referred to as its main cause. A more 
detailed examination of the constitutional status of slavery is, thus, required.  
  
America quickly came to be known as the land of the free after the foundation of the 
colonies, with several liberties afforded to its citizens, even though no clear definition 
of what liberty was ever emerged.582 It is, thus, challenging to reconcile this position 
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with how slavery could be in existence in a state that prided itself as the protector of 
liberties. 
 
Slavery had been present in various states since ancient times and had featured in 
many ideals as ‘an acceptable part of social order.’583 Slavery also emerged in the 
United States in the eighteenth century as the dominant system of labour in the 
Southern colonies.584 However, similarly to the divide between the states about their 
stance on the bill of rights, a difference of standpoint about slavery emerged in the 
states as well. This difference, however, was mostly based on geographic location and 
a divide between the North and the South emerged as a result. Slavery did not gain 
the widespread popularity it achieved in the South in the Northern colonies. Due to 
these differences in the states that formed from these colonies, after the adoption of 
the federal Constitution, the issue of slavery was maintained in the state level 
legislation of the dual constitutional structure and no uniform approach emerged.585  
 
With the subsequent spread of the ideologies of Enlightenment, capitalism and 
religious developments and with the increased intellectual activities of the class of 
‘educated gentlemen,’ the contradicting nature of slavery commenced to surface in 
political and legal debates, although mostly in Northern states.586 Three key 
approaches may therefore be identified that have supported the abolition of slavery 
due to its irreconcilable nature.  
 
Amar highlights the antagonism that if the United States was to protect the liberties of 
individuals that were in existence in their natural state based on the natural law theory, 
the involuntary servitude of individuals could not be reconciled with these ideals.587 It 
is therefore also peculiar from this angle that Virginia, the state that adopted the 
Declaration of Rights that later influenced the drafting of the Bill of Rights, was the 
‘principal slaveholding state’ in the United States in the nineteenth century.588  
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However, in parallel with the natural law approach becoming adopted by many, 
especially in most Northern states, calls for the abolition of slavery also gained further 
widespread support.589 The support for the abolition may be illustrated by the fact that 
in 1840 all black men were free in the Northern states.590 It is also to be emphasised 
that the dissemination of this approach may be claimed to have been further supported 
by the religious beliefs of the ‘evangelical Northeners.’591 According to this belief, 
people possessed ‘individual spiritual rights,’ and it was the ‘duty’ of a Christian to 
actively participate in the making of ‘social policy.’592 Thus, the deprivation of people 
of these rights was irreconcilable with such beliefs and those following these ideals 
believed that it was their duty to make things right. The existence of slavery, as Lincoln 
highlighted, was also irreconcilable with the ideology of popular sovereignty. This 
ideology was adopted by many Northerners, and claimed that ‘no man should govern 
another without’ the consent of that other.593 Thus, involuntary servitude of another 
should not exist in societies where this ideology was supported. 
 
Many Southerners, on the other hand, argued that religious beliefs should be separate 
from politics, and firmly believed that ‘slavery was no sin.’594 They also associated their 
right to own slaves as their most important liberty as they seem to have failed to adopt 
the determination of the word liberty from a natural law point of view, and merely 
identified their liberties with the ‘English liberties’ they enjoyed by tradition.’595 These 
would, accordingly, allow for slavery and protect it as one of the individual liberties of 
the slave-owners. This approach, however, only allowed for one segment of society – 
the slave-owners – to exercise their individual liberties. However, the natural law 
approach offered a more advanced view, affording protection to all individuals, and, 
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thus, allowing a better fulfilment of the provision of the Declaration of Independence 
that ‘all men are created equal.’596 
 
Whilst the issue of slavery emerged in religious, political and legal debates, its 
importance may also be emphasised by its emergence in popular literature. The view 
that there was increased interest of individuals in this issue is also supported by the 
fact that the second most widely sold book in 1852 was a book by Harriet Becher 
Stowe entitled Uncle Tom’s Cabin.597 This book had been fundamental in transforming 
the generally adopted viewpoint on slavery of several of its readers as it portrayed 
slaves as human beings.598 Lincoln even highlighted that this book, its increased 
popularity and transformation in the viewpoint of many, has been one of the main 
causes of the Civil War. 599 
 
In this climate, the ideal of the abolition of slavery commenced to attain wider 
acceptance. In Georgia, for instance, slavery was banned between 1735 and 1750 
and several acts of manumission were also enacted in other states.600 These included 
manumission of slaves, when they obtained a certain age, for instance, 28 years in 
Pennsylvania.601 Whilst other states did not abolish slavery, they allowed for the 
manumission of slaves in private wills, such as those of George Washington and John 
Randolph.602 It may, however, be intriguing to highlight that not all of the 277 slaves 
belonging to George Washington were manumitted as it was later held that he did not 
have authority to free all his slaves and therefore only less than a half of them could 
become free.603 
 
Despite not enacting a law on the abolition of slavery on federal level, there were 
instances when the issue of slavery was addressed in legislation at the federal level. 
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Such occasions were the enactment of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787, which 
prohibited slavery in the North West territories, and the prohibition of slave trade in 
The Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves of 1807.604 Whereas these two Acts had 
made steps towards the recognition of slavery as an irreconcilable system in the 
United States of America, a novel Act took a different approach.  
 
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 criminalised the assistance to escaped slaves, 
rendering any state legislation having not declared such actions criminal void.605 The 
Act further suspended the rights of detainees to habeas corpus, and the right to trial 
by jury.606 This Act raised concerns with many of the Northern states, since they widely 
felt that slavery had become protected at federal level with the adoption of this Act. 
The tensions between the North and South about the issue of slavery became even 
more apparent after the delivery of the decision of Chief Justice Taney in Dredd Scott 
v John F A Sandford.607 
 
In the case of Dredd Scott608 the appellant of African American descent relied on the 
natural law approach in his claim before the Supreme Court. He argued that upon 
ceasing to be a slave, he should have been granted the same privileges and 
immunities as other citizens of the United States.609 The appellant firstly claimed that 
by moving with his previous master to the state of Illinois, where slavery was abolished, 
and then back to Missouri, he had become a free citizen.610 He was, however, 
subsequently passed to Sandford, the executor of the estate of his previous master, 
as a slave.611 He argued that Sandford had assaulted him, his wife and his two 
children, who at the time were free citizens and not slaves, and, thus, should have 
been entitled to protection against such acts.612  
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Dredd Scott previously unsuccessfully argued for his freedom in a case at the 
Supreme Court of Missouri in 1852, that was rejected on grounds of non-application 
of extra-territoriality, holding that he should have applied for his freedom while living in 
a state where slavery was abolished (i.e. Illinois).613 When his case re-emerged in 
1854 in the United States Circuit Court of Missouri, it unarguably became a political 
issue seeking a determination on the issue of slavery from the judicial branch of the 
federal government.614 
 
Whilst it has been argued that if advancements in society took place that did not result 
in an amendment to the Constitution, it would be up to the Supreme Court to 
acknowledge that such advancements have take place. One method that the Justices 
could utilise to do so  is the non-originalist method of interpretation. 
 
Before the delivery of the opinion of the Court, the decision that was due to be 
delivered as the majority opinion of the Court seemed to only be supported by Justices 
from Southern states. In an astonishing request, which raises questions about the 
upholding of the value of the separation of powers at this instance, Justice Canton 
turned to the President Elect to persuade Justice Corier of Pennsylvania to join the 
majority opinion.615 It is even more startling to find that the President Elect, in return 
for the favour, was provided with the decision of the Court in advance, raising further 
questions of the upholding of the separation of powers in this case.616  
 
Whilst it would be less surprising to find that the Supreme Court adopted an originalist 
interpretative method in this decision, instead of the non-originalist method, the choice 
of deciding not to follow one of the key originalist method of interpretation – namely 
that of providing republican guarantees to the individuals through the separation of 
powers – left a very limited choice of interpretative methods for the Justices. 
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Moreover, this position also highlights that if it is a constant threat in a republican 
government that the elections may be improper, as discussed in Chapter 2 if it was 
the Supreme Court which would be able to guarantee that the fundamental 
constitutional values are upheld, the Court failed to demonstrate in this case that it 
would be able to take on these responsibilities.   
 
The interpretative method chosen by Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the majority 
opinion of the Court, distinguished individuals living in the United States from its 
citizens.617 He identified citizens as ‘the people of the United States,’ who were able 
to hold political citizenship rights, such as electing representatives to the federal 
government.618 Since those who were of African descent were not entitled to these 
political rights, he concluded they were not deemed to be citizens of the United 
States.619 He further explained this highly controversial decision by claiming that black 
men were merely ‘a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated 
by the dominant race.’620 Thus, he adopted the viewpoint of the majority of Southern 
states from the outset of his decision. Whilst he might have regarded slaves as 
individuals, they were definitely not entitled to the same privileges as his race, 
according to his viewpoint. 
 
Subsequently, he also relied on the dual constitutional structure of the United States 
to ensure that this viewpoint would be upheld at the federal level. Whereas he 
acknowledged that manumitted slaves could become citizens of a state, this did not 
automatically grant them rights to become citizens of the United States at federal 
level.621 Thus, people entitled to citizenship of the United States at federal level, were 
only those who were classed as citizens of the different states at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution.622 This position, thus, excluded manumitted slaves and 
the foreigners immigrating to the United States, who became naturalised citizens.623 
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Those who had been granted their freedom under state laws were thus, he argued, 
excluded from claims for such citizenship rights. 624 Subsequently, those who did not 
belong to a particular race could not hope to ever get these rights if this decision was 
to be followed. Due to these highly restricted criteria, the problem thus created became 
that emancipated slaves did not have any rights guaranteed, which were attached to 
citizenship, and were consequently not protected against violations of such rights. 
This, however, is in apparent contradiction of the natural law theory, the ideology 
widely supported by most Northern states. 
 
Chief Justice Taney, further claimed, relying on the dual federalist approach, that the 
rights granted to individuals under the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of religion, 
speech or press or the right to bear arms, were only enforceable at state level.625  
However, he extended this position by claiming that Congress did not have a legal 
authority to legislate in matters included in the Bill of Rights, since these would then 
interfere with the rights granted to the states under the dual constitutional structure.626 
While upholding the dual constitutional structure, it seems that Chief Justice Taney 
adopted the prior position of the states to resolve the question of supremacy by 
declaring federal acts void. Whereas he argued that Congress acted outside its 
powers when enacting the federal Bill of Rights, the idea also seemed to emerge that 
Chief Justice Taney was in support of states occupying a supreme position over the 
federal government. 
 
Chief Justice Taney also voiced his opinion about the role of the Supreme Court and 
the non-originalist interpretative method when he stated that he recognised that the 
opinion of the public might have been different at the time of the decision in the case. 
However, he held that a change in public opinion did not mean that the interpretation 
of the Constitution should be changed by the Supreme Court.627 He argued that this 
was not the task that was entrusted upon the Supreme Court, and therefore, the 
Constitution and any other related legal provisions had to be interpreted as they stood 
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at the time of their adoption.628 However, this is a highly controversial and regressive 
viewpoint. If this approach was adopted in all legal systems around the world, they 
would fall behind any advancements in society. Merely observing how much our lives 
have changed since the adoption of the Constitution demonstrates such controversy. 
How would the Founding Fathers respond if they were to draft the Constitution today? 
They would not be arguing over the same matters in the same environment and would 
have to develop a document that reflects the values no only of our current society, but 
to cater for generations to come as well. 
 
It may then be argued that the decision in Dredd Scott629 was important for two 
reasons. Firstly, it did not only affect Dredd Scott himself, but it also resulted in the 
elevation of slavery to a constitutional question. Secondly, the decision also ignited 
key constitutional debates. Whereas slavery remained a state issue up to the delivery 
of the above decision, it then seemed that slavery had become a federal matter and 
was even afforded protection against any acts for its abolition by the federal 
government.630 This position, however, only seemed to be compatible with ideologies 
supported by the Southern states and were in clear contradiction to those held by 
Northern states. Several arguments of Chief Justice Taney in his decision were also 
in clear contradiction to the various values held by citizens of many Northern states, 
such as the recognition of the basic humanity of slaves.631 
 
The nation thus became even more divided as a consequence of the above decision, 
where division peaked by the commencement of the Civil War. Even though the 
Northern states became victorious over the Southern States at the end of the Civil 
War, this did not lead to an automatic uniform position adopted immediately in their 
political and legal systems. 
 
V.2. Consequences of the Civil War 
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The victory of the North over the South did not instantly result in a complete overhaul 
of the then existing political and legal systems of the Southern states. Overall, the 
armed conflict was not a solution for the underlying political and legal conflicts, but 
was merely their result. In order to devise a resolution to these conflicts, the adoption 
of one side of the arguments that caused these conflicts was required uniformly over 
the whole of the United States of America. With their victory, the Northern states felt 
empowered and entitled to demand the adoption of the ideologies they supported, as 
opposed to those followed in Southern states.632 These, as discussed previously, 
could be claimed to have been the support of the natural law theory, popular 
sovereignty, and the abolition of slavery. With this abolition, however, the problems 
generated by the decision in Dredd Scott633 still remained: emancipated slaves did not 
become citizens of their states, and thus could not ask for the protection of their 
fundamental rights that were attached to state citizenship. 
 
The Reconstruction programme to create a truly united and uniform federal political 
and legal system was thus set.634 First, slavery had to be abolished. Second, 
emancipated slaves had to be guaranteed protection of their fundamental rights.635 
Third, it had to be established which level of the dual constitutional structure occupied 
a supreme position.636  To attain the latter goal, the decision of Dredd Scott637 had to 
be overruled. These solutions came in the form of three constitutional amendments, 
often referred to as the Civil War or Reconstruction Amendments. The first of these, 
the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery.638 The subsequent Fourteenth 
Amendment was aimed at providing a tool to invalidate the decision in Dredd Scott,639 
and solve the supremacy question of the dual constitutional structure.640 The Fifteenth 
Amendment completed the resolution of the remaining problems by granting voting 
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rights to the citizens of the United States regardless of their ‘race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.’641 
 
V.2.1. The first solution: the abolition of slavery 
 
The Thirteenth Amendment declared the abolition of slavery at federal level, therefore 
solving the issue of slavery and asserting support for the views of the Northern states. 
However, during the ratification process of the Thirteenth Amendment it was not only 
the Northern states that showed their support of this, but six ex-confederate Southern 
states also ratified this amendment.642 It is key to highlight that without their support, 
the Amendment would not have obtained the required three-fourth majority for its 
adoption.643  
 
The abolition of slavery, nevertheless, left the newly freed ex-slaves in a vulnerable 
position.644 According to most state laws and the decision in Dredd Scott,645 the 
freedmen were not granted citizenship rights.646 They were, therefore, further left with 
no protection of the fundamental rights that were granted to the citizens of states as 
individuals, unless those were explicitly conferred on them.647 This was exhibited in 
the adoption of the Black Codes, which aimed to bring back slavery to the states by 
the back door, and ensure that the newly freed people were not granted any 
fundamental rights.648 The further widespread ‘violence directed at blacks and white 
Unionists in the immediate post-war South’ was only a further demonstration of the 
failed goals of the Amendment.649 
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It would therefore seem that if the newly freed individuals were to be granted these 
fundamental rights based on the dual constitutional structure, the effective protection 
of these was only achievable by recognising the supremacy of the laws at federal level. 
Thus, the original position of the states acting as protectors of fundamental rights had 
effectively transformed, and it was then the states against whom individuals, especially 
freedmen, needed protection.  
 
It might have initially seemed that the first solution had been provided to obtain a 
uniform federal system for the protection of the fundamental rights of all individuals in 
the United States. However, as apparent from the above brief examination, no such 
system would be obtained until the other underlying problems of the system were 
resolved. The solution for these arrived shortly in the form of another constitutional 
amendment.  
 
V.2.2. The solution to the other conflicts: The Fourteenth Amendment 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment was aimed to offer a solution to the other remaining 
underlying problems of the era. It will therefore have to be fully evaluated whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment was the most effective solution for these problems.  
 
Before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress recognised that the 
freedmen were not granted citizenship rights and were, as a result, not guaranteed 
protection of their fundamental rights. Congress, however, also had to understand that 
the most effective solution to this problem was to declare the federal constitutional 
level supreme over the state level. As a solution, they first enacted the Civil Rights Act, 
which was aimed to provide protection to the newly freed men by recognising them as 
citizens of the United States and grant them with certain ‘basic rights’, such as being 
able ‘to own property’, ‘to sue and to be sued’ and ‘to enjoy the same legal protection 
as white citizens’.650 This Act, however, was vetoed by the Tennessean President 
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Johnson, who used this power for the first time.651. It was, on the other hand, 
subsequently passed by a three fourths majority in Congress over the veto of the 
President.652  
 
Since the status of the Civil Rights Act could, thus, be questionable at any point, 
Congress, thus, had to provide a more effective solution to these problems. 
 
The Thirty-Ninth Congress provided a platform for such ‘constitutional statemenship,’ 
as it took place during a time where the society of the United States was undergoing 
key transformations.653 The Fourteenth Amendment not only provided this opportunity 
for the members of Congress, but the Amendment was also expected to provide a tool 
to adapt to and enable the advancement of these changes. 
 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment consists of four separate clauses. The 
citizenship clause grants citizenship rights to ‘all persons born or naturalised in the 
United States’. The second clause prohibits states from enacting or enforcing any law 
that is in breach of ‘the privileges and immunities’ of the citizens. The third clause 
demands that if a person is deprived of their ‘life, liberty, or property’, it shall be 
performed with ‘due process of law’ and the fourth clause guarantees ‘equal protection 
of the laws’ to all persons.  
 
With the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, it is claimed that Congress aimed to 
provide a solution to the underlying conflicts that were still present after the adoption 
of the Thirteenth Amendment. These solutions were firstly, to afford protection of the 
fundamental rights to the freedmen, secondly, while doing so to grant them with the 
status of citizens. This resulted in the third solution, which was declaring the 
supremacy of the federal government over state governments in the dual constitutional 
and political structure. 
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Figure 3 Citizenship granted to individuals before and after the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
In light of the originalist approach, if one is to find what the intent of the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was, the study would have to commence at the Congressional 
records. 
 
As apparent from the speeches of many in the floor of Congress, the primary purpose 
of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to grant protection of fundamental 
rights to the newly freed black men.654 In order to achieve the above, Congress, 
however, first had to devise a system whereby these uniform rights would apply to all 
individuals. The first step in doing so was the conferring of federal citizenship to all 
individuals, including the freedmen with the citizenship clause. This clause, in effect, 
overrode the decision in Dredd Scott.655 Whilst previously federal citizenship 
depended on state citizenship, with the citizenship clause, the position was 
interchanged. Subsequently, it was the status of federal citizenship that occupied a 
primary position from which state citizenship derived.656 As Davis argued, this position, 
however, resulted in an ‘anomaly’ whereby the people ‘owed supreme allegiance to 
the Federal Government and subordinate allegiance to [… their] state.’657 
 
 
Citizenship until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 
Citizenship after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
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With the bestowal of federal citizenship, the assignment of uniform federal 
fundamental rights to citizens at state level was only a logical consequence.658 On the 
other hand, these uniform federal fundamental rights had already been devised in the 
form of the Bill of Rights, thus, all that was required was the incorporation of all its 
provisions against the states.659 This would have provided the most effective 
protection of the fundamental rights of not only the freedmen, but all citizens of the 
United States, and would have also created a uniform system of fundamental rights in 
the state level as well. 
 
Despite the adoption of the above viewpoint by many, some Congressmen failed to 
recognise this problem and argued that the protections provided by state constitutions 
were adequate.660 In order to demonstrate that this was not the case, Bingham, ‘the 
Madison of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,’661 relied on the decision in Barron 
v Baltimore.662 
 
As confirmed by the decision in this case, before the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the newly freed men were left in a position, where they could not claim 
that the provisions of the Bill of Rights should have protected them against the actions 
of the states where they resided.663 This was due to the Bill of Rights only providing 
protection against the federal government, and not the states. Bingham further 
demonstrated the inadequate protection of the rights contained in the federal Bill of 
Rights at state level through the decision in Livingston v Moore,664 where the 
appellants argued that the acts of Pennsylvania about the sale of lands previously 
belonging to an indebted ex-comptroller-general of the state were in breach of the 
Ninth Amendment, that was not afforded protection under the state laws.665 Bingham 
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subsequently highlighted, that similar to the decision in Barron v Baltimore,666 Justice 
Johnson held in this case that it was ‘settled’ that the Amendments to the Constitution 
that formed the Bill of Rights did ‘not extend to the States.’667 
 
In order to resolve the inadequate protection of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights 
at state level, Bingham argued for the incorporation of all the provision of the federal 
Bill of Rights against any actions of the states that would deprive individuals of 
these.668 He firstly claimed, following the ideology of Webster, that since the 
Constitution was addressed to the people, the Constitution should thus ensure the 
protection of the rights of the individual contained in it.669 By pledging alliance to the 
Constitution, he further asserted that government officials on both levels should be 
held to be accountable for their violations of any of the provision of the Bill of Rights.670   
 
Another problem that needed resolution was that Congress could not claim to hold any 
power to bring actions against the states for violations of the rights enumerated in the 
Bill of Rights against the citizens of the state in question. Bingham, thus, proposed 
that under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress would be granted the additional 
‘power to hold them [the states] to answer […] for the violation of their oaths and of 
the rights of their fellow men.’671 
 
It is therefore recognised that the Thirty Ninth Congress intended to find and apply the 
most effective solution to the underlying problems of the era and create a united 
federal state that afforded uniform protection of the rights of its citizens. The way the 
solution was applied, however, leads to a crucial questioning of the ultimate 
constitutional validity of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
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Firstly, the ex-Confederate states were denied representation in the Thirty Ninth 
Congress.672 Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment that was mostly aimed to apply 
to Southern states was proposed by a Congress in which they could not participate. It 
is thus, hardly surprising, that this formed their first objection against the 
Amendment.673 Secondly, it is also interesting to mention that the required two-thirds 
majority in the Senate for the Fourteenth Amendment could only be achieved by 
expelling a member.674 Curiously, this decision was taken by one vote majority, which 
majority vote was a member of the Senate who changed his vote overnight.675 Thirdly, 
it would also follow from the first objection that if a state was not offered representation 
in Congress, it would not receive any proposed legal measures by that institution for 
ratification.  
 
Events, however, took an interesting turn when the Amendment was sent for 
ratification to the eleven ex-Confederate states, not represented at the Congress at 
the time, as well.676 Out of these eleven states, only Tennessee ratified the 
Amendment and the representatives of the state immediately regained their seats in 
Congress, therefore seemingly setting a precedent for the re-admission of ex-
confederate states.677  
 
The Southern states, however, committed a great mistake when receiving the 
proposals for the ratification of the amendment. They engaged in a game of ‘masterly 
inactivity,’ whereby they did not vote on the ratification of the amendment.678  This 
delay may be explained by the expectations of these states that their supporters would 
occupy the seats of Congressmen after the upcoming elections, who would not vote 
for the ratification of this amendment.679 This resulted in the non-adoption of the 
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Amendment and the representatives of the Northern states saw this as a warning sign 
that their solution to the problems of the era would not be adopted. They, therefore, 
had to opt for more radical measures if they wanted to pass the Amendment: they 
declared that the usual process of Article V for constitutional amendments no longer 
applied.680  
 
Congress firstly declared the ten states that refused to ratify the Amendment 
unrepublican under the Guarantee Clause.681 Yet, interestingly, the only change in the 
constitutions of these states since the period before the Civil War had been the 
abolition of slavery.682 In effect, these had been the same governments that were 
required merely a few years previously to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment and were 
regarded republican then.683  
 
Congress, secondly, devised a radical measure through the Military Reconstruction 
Act 1867 and divided these ten states into five military districts.684 Under this Act, the 
military supervision of the Southern states would be lifted once they adopt a republican 
constitution, and subsequently ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, gaining readmission 
to the Congress.685  The citizens of Southern states, however, attempted to use the 
strategy of inactivity in the polls once more to rebel against the imposition of Northern 
values on them. The then Fortieth Congress was prepared to go even further to 
address this issue. They enacted the Fourth Military Reconstruction Act stating that a 
simple majority decision for ratification of the Amendment by those present at the polls 
would suffice.686   
 
The Fourteenth Amendment, after having played a key role in the constitutional 
development of the solutions for the various problems that were present in the era, 
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served as the main political campaigning tool for Republicans in 1866. Similar to the 
history of the ratification of this Amendment, its subsequent development followed an 
akin path. 
 
With the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, granting voting rights to citizens of the 
United States regardless of ‘race, color or previous condition of servitude,’ the Civil 
War Amendments had run their full course. It seemed as if the federal government, 
and especially Congress, had obtained the applications of the solutions to the 
previously underlying constitutional problems of the United States. Slaves had been 
emancipated, granted citizenship status, and guaranteed protection of their 
fundamental rights. 
 
VI. The Incorporation Doctrine at the Supreme Court 
 
Whilst the Thirty Ninth Congress expected that it would be the Congress in the future 
that would continue to perform the task of ensuring the resolution of the various 
problems that had previously existed, it will be demonstrated below that Congress had, 
subsequently, lost these powers. It was, in fact, the federal judiciary that continued 
with this role, thus limiting the powers of Congress.687 This new role that was bestowed 
upon the Supreme Court of the United States provided new challenges for individuals 
that argued for the incorporation of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Justices, following the originalist method of interpretation, would have to analyse the 
development and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment from a historical angle in 
order to be able to continue the work of the Congress. They would also have to 
examine the claims under the Fourteenth Amendment arguing for the incorporation of 
a fundamental right against states from two angles. They firstly had to identify what 
the rights protected by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment were. In explaining the 
above, they also had to examine the method by which these rights were held to be 
covered by the Amendment. They, secondly, had to establish who these rights were 
applicable against: the federal government, the states and/or other individuals. 
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Whether the Supreme Court has, however, performed their above task successfully 
still remains open to questions. After the initial rejection of the incorporation doctrine, 
their position has transformed over the years, however, it still has not resulted in the 
incorporation of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states.  
 
VI.I. The rejection of the incorporation doctrine by the Supreme Court 
 
The first opportunity was provided to the Supreme Court soon after the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to interpret this newly adopted Amendment in the Slaughter 
House Cases.688 The appellants in this case brought action against the state of 
Louisiana for having enacted an Act that effectively granted monopoly to a single 
company to ‘have and maintain slaughter-houses’ as ‘a police regulation for the health 
and comfort of the people’.689  
 
The appellants attempted to claim that their rights granted under the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated by this Act. They 
specifically argued that the ‘privileges and immunities’ that were conferred upon them 
included their right to ‘use […] their own property, and to labor in such their honest and 
necessary business.’690  They further argued that the above rights constituted their 
‘privileges and immunities’ under the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that these 
could be identified as: 
  
the personal and civil rights which usage, tradition, the habits of society, written 
law, and the common sentiments of people have recognised as forming the 
basis of the institutions of the country.691 
 
When arguing for the above, they recognised that one of the unresolved problems of 
the era remained whether the federal government and Constitution were supreme over 
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the states. The appellants, however, decided to take a different approach from that of 
the Thirty Ninth Congress. They argued that the Fourteenth Amendment, in effect, 
made the state governments and constitutions irrelevant in the protection of the 
fundamental rights included in the Bill of Rights.692 They, therefore, essentially 
attempted to claim that with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the dual 
constitutional structure of the United States was abolished, and their rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment thus became incorporated against states. 
 
This argument, however, was rejected by the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, 
delivered by Justice Miller, who held that the dual constitutional structure of the United 
States was still in existence.693 He maintained the structure remained intact by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and both levels occupied equal hierarchical ranking, while 
remaining thoroughly distinct.694 He claimed that holding otherwise would ‘radically 
change[s] the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to 
each other and of both these governments to the people.’695 In support of their 
argument, and adopting an originalist method of interpretation, he argued that the 
Supreme Court Justices could find no such intended result by either the Thirty Ninth 
Congress or during the ratifying conventions.696 
 
He subsequently established that the rights that the appellants claimed that were 
protected under the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
could only be protected by their state government instead of the federal one. 697  He 
therefore argued that their claim against their state for the breach of their privileges 
and immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment could not succeed.698 
 
It is not disputed that Justice Miller followed the arguments of the Thirty Ninth 
Congress in part, as he did not reject the existence of the dual constitutional structure. 
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It is, nevertheless, claimed that despite adopting an originalist method of interpretation, 
he failed to adopt the method devised in the Fourteenth Amendment as advocated for 
by Congress, which argued for the transformation of the dual constitutional system 
and the supremacy of the federal laws in this system. Since this has also been argued 
to have been one of the solutions to the underlying problems of the era immediately 
after the Civil War, it seems that the Supreme Court Justices were not prepared to 
accept and apply this solution. 
 
 
 
 
Since Justice Miller established that the privileges and immunities clause did not 
provide protection of the rights claimed by the appellants, he subsequently and 
unsurprisingly rejected the claim that the Act enacted by Louisiana constituted a 
deprivation of property without due process of law. He based the above decision on 
FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP 
 
STATE CITIZENSHIP 
 
Constitution of the 
United States 
State Constitution 
Federal 
Government 
State 
Government 
grants individuals with 
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to 
Figure 4 The protections and powers granted by the federal and state constitutions in the dual 
constitutional structure according to Justice Miller 
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the argument that this clause, in the majority opinion of the Justices, was no more than 
the repetition of the already existing provision about the due process of law 
requirement in the Constitution under the Fifth Amendment.699 
 
It shall, however, also be highlighted that Justice Miller delivered the majority opinion 
of the Court, and the minority opinions did indicate that some Justices of the Supreme 
Court were prepared to adopt and continue to perform the task previously carried out 
by Congress. For instance, Justice Field, in his dissenting opinion, effectively adopted 
the arguments of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment that the federal 
citizenship and laws took priority over state legislation in the dual constitutional 
structure.700 He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment afforded protection of the 
‘common rights’ of ‘the citizens of the United States’ under the privileges and 
immunities clause, and claimed that these rights were incorporated at the state level 
and were therefore enforceable against the states.701   
 
Justice Bradley, in his dissenting opinion, joined Justice Field in adopting the approach 
that is argued in this thesis to have been advocated for by the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. He maintained that the dual constitutional structure still 
persisted in the United States, but citizenship of the United States had become 
supreme to state citizenship.702 He consequently argued that all citizens of the United 
States should be entitled to the ‘privileges and immunities’ under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 703 These ‘privileges and immunities’ he also identified as those that are 
granted to ‘citizens of any free government.’ 704 Based on the above argument, he 
further claimed that these rights should be held to be applicable against both the 
federal government and state governments.705  
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Justice Bradley further claimed that the rights of the appellants under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were also violated, since the creation of a 
monopoly was a deprivation of liberty and property of ‘a large class of citizens,’ without 
due process of law.706 In arguing for the above, he further asserted that the Louisiana 
Act deprived the appellants of their right to adopt ‘a lawful employment’ or follow ‘a 
lawful employment previously adopted.’707 
 
Even though, as demonstrated above, the above dissenting opinions formed a strong 
opposition to the majority decision, and adopted the approach advocated for by the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the decision in the Slaughter House Cases708 
ensured that the dual constitutional structure of the United States as it existed before 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was maintained. In doing so, the Supreme 
Court rejected any claims that, through the privileges and immunities clause, the 
Fourteenth Amendment granted any privilege and immunity that would be applicable 
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against a state. The above decision therefore made the privileges and immunities 
clause a ‘dead letter’ clause that, according to the majority decision in the case, served 
no purpose.709 As a consequence, it also seemed that the newly freed men would not 
be able to argue for the protection of their rights against state governments, further 
elevating the problem that the Fourteenth Amendment was set out to resolve.710    
 
The original dual constitutional structure was also maintained following the decision in 
United States v Cruikshank,711 in which the appellants were convicted for ‘banding and 
conspiring together to deprive their victims of various constitutional rights’ during the 
Colfax Massacre.712 Chief Justice Waite, while expressing his support for the original 
dual structure further developed this ideal by claiming that a citizen was entitled to 
different citizenship rights under the different constitutional structures, which ‘were 
established for different purposes’.713 He asserted that the powers granted to the 
federal government were found in the Constitution of the United States, and all other 
powers were ‘reserved to the States or the people’.714 This structure, he claimed, 
amounted for the ‘whole’ system, ‘with a complete government,’ where the federal and 
the state level were placed on equal footing.715 
 
In line with his argument about this constitutional structure, Chief Justice Waite 
subsequently, held that the rights that were set out to be protected under the First and 
Second Amendments, claimed to have been breached in this case by the state, were 
only enforceable against the federal government, and not the states.716 In reaching his 
decision, Chief Justice Waite argued that these amendments were not incorporated at 
state level because the rights they guaranteed had been previously under the 
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protection of the states and they should continue to be so.717 Thus, a situation 
according to this viewpoint could not arise where it would the states in breach of these 
rights. 
 
The decision further set out that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not grant any additional rights for cases against individuals.718 Chief Justice Waite 
emphasised that this clause acted as a mere guarantee against any arbitrary action of 
the state government, which would have breached ‘the fundamental rights which 
belong to every citizen as a member of society.’719 It may therefore be argued that he 
demonstrated an inclination to incorporate certain fundamental rights against the 
states under the due process clause. However, he was not willing to extend this 
protection against individuals. 
 
VI.2. Developing a test for incorporation under the due process clause 
 
Since it seemed that the rights granted under the Fourteenth Amendment could not 
be held to have been incorporated against states under the privileges and immunities 
clause, citizens of the United States could only argue that they were conferred 
additional rights over their rights guaranteed at state level through the due process 
clause of the Amendment. The appellant in Hurtado v California,720 subsequently, 
claimed that his rights to a grand jury under the Fifth Amendment – that he claimed 
had become applicable against his state, California, by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment – were breached during his trial for murder of first degree.721 
 
Justice Matthews, while delivering the opinion of the Court to determine the above, 
firstly attempted to provide a definition for due process of law as a ‘process of law’ that 
was ‘not […] forbidden.’722 He, however, also stated that such process had to be shown 
to be a ‘settled usage’ both in England and in the United States. 723 He subsequently 
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held that in order to determine whether the provision was in breach of the due process 
of law, they had to establish whether the provision was ‘in conflict with any of’ the 
provision of the Constitution of the United States.724  
 
He then asserted that if it was held not to be in such conflict, it had to be examined 
whether any of the ‘settled usages and modes of proceedings’ that existed in ‘England 
before the emigration of our ancestors’ and which had been in usage since then in the 
United States were breached.725 It was also confirmed by Justice Matthews that a 
‘legal proceeding’ that was intended for ‘the general public good, which regard[ed] and 
preserve[d] the[se] principles of liberty and justice’ also amounted to due process of 
law.726 It may, thus, be argued that Justice Matthews opted for an approach of 
selective incorporation. Using this method allowed the Supreme Court Justices to 
decide whether the rights would qualify to be incorporated under his test of 
interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This facilitated 
the assessment of each right granted under the Bill of Rights to be examined 
separately, on a case-by-case basis. Whereas this could require the extensive scrutiny 
of each right, the protection that the newly freed men could have benefited from with 
the total incorporation of the Bill of Rights, was far in the future. 
 
It is also argued that such a method of incorporation is in line with the living 
constitutional values method of interpretation of the Constitution. It first commences 
with establishing what values the Framers of this Amendment could have regarded 
fundamental under this provision. Intriguingly, in order to determine the above Justice 
Matthews argued for the original purpose of these values to be examined even as 
back as the laws of England, not only to those of the Constitution. Thus, it is argued 
that he even extended the scope of the original fundamental values to those in Britain 
before the foundation of the United States. 
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Justice Matthews subsequently had to examine whether the right in question, that to 
trial by grand jury under the Fifth Amendment amounted to due process under the 
selective incorporation test he devised. Afterwards, he would have to determine 
whether it was intended to be made applicable against states under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.727 Justice Matthews, when performing this 
examination concluded that this right did not constitute due process and was therefore 
not granted to the citizens of the United States against their states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.728 He further argued that if this had been the intent of the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would have been able to find ‘express 
declarations to that effect’ in the Amendment, which they failed to do so.729 This 
position, however, seems to contradict his earlier claims that establishing whether 
something constituted due process could be derived from ‘settled usages and modes 
of proceedings’730 and would not necessarily require enumeration in the Constitution. 
 
The clear transformation of the point of view of the Supreme Court, however, only 
occurred in the later case of Twining v New Jersey.731 The appellant directors of a 
company in this case were found guilty of producing ‘false papers’ of the company to 
a representative of the State Banking Department with the ‘intent to deceive him as to 
the condition of the company.’ 732 They subsequently argued that their right of 
‘exemption from compulsory self-incrimination’ under the Fifth Amendment had been 
violated by their state.733 They held that this right should be held enforceable against 
their state under the Fourteenth Amendment, either under the privileges and 
immunities or the due process clause.734 
 
Justice Moody, in upholding the decision in the Slaughter House Cases735 held that 
the right claimed under the Fifth Amendment could not be held to be enforceable 
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against states under the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.736 He further emphasised, in support of the original dual constitutional 
structure ideal, that the rights contained in the federal Bill of Rights could not be 
enforceable against the States under the privileges and immunities clause.737 This, he 
reasoned, was because those were rights contained in the federal Constitution that 
were only enforceable against the federal government.738 
 
Whereas Justice Moody rejected the argument of incorporation of the fundamental 
rights of individuals under the privileges and immunities clause, he held that under the 
due process clause, certain provisions of the first eight Amendments might be argued 
to be applicable against states.739 On the other hand, his approach to selective 
incorporation claimed that the rights that were to be incorporated at state level under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment depended on their nature and 
not on their inclusion in the Bill of Rights.740 He emphasised that no clear definition of 
‘due process of law’ was provided by the Supreme Court, despite the analysis of such 
in Hurtado v California.741 He, thus, identified a three-step process to determine 
whether a right that was enumerated in the Bill of Rights could be considered ‘due 
process of law.’742 He argued, relying on the decision of Justice Matthews in Hurtado 
v California,743 that firstly, it had to be examined whether the right was ‘settled usage 
both in England and’ in the United States.744 Secondly, he affirmed that the 
confirmation of the right as ‘settled usage’ did not guarantee the right the automatic 
status as ‘due process of law.’745 He thirdly confirmed, adopting a non-originalist 
method of interpretation, that if the right was such an ‘immutable principle of justice’ 
that it had to be protected against ‘arbitrary’ government action in a free government, 
it should be considered to amount to ‘due process of law.’746 Therefore, as it has been 
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illustrated above, despite Justice Moody claiming that no clear definition of due 
process of law had been provided previously by the Supreme Court, he relied quite 
heavily on the opinion of Justice Matthews in Hurtado v California.747 It is claimed that 
the living constitutional values method of interpretation surfaced in this decision. Whilst 
relying on originalist methods of interpretation to establish original intent, the approach 
of Justice Matthews also took into consideration the advancements in society. 
 
After concluding that the exemption from self-incrimination contained in the Fifth 
Amendment did not constitute due process of law, Justice Harlan, in his dissenting 
opinion, claimed that the privileges, immunities and rights, granted both under the 
privileges and immunities and the due process clauses, should be held to be 
applicable against states.748 He, therefore, argued that the right to ‘immunity from self-
incrimination’ should be applicable against states.749 
 
Whilst it seemed that with the passage of time, the Justices of the Supreme Court 
recognised that the application of the solutions provided by the Thirty Ninth Congress 
should be guaranteed, they were not willing to hold any provisions of the Bill of Rights 
to be incorporated against states for a long time. Furthermore, they did not opt to 
overrule the Slaughter House Cases,750 but, instead, devised a way to circumvent it 
through the due process clause. 
  
VI.3. The first provision of the Bill of Right incorporated 
 
The Supreme Court finally seemed prepared to hold a right to be incorporated against 
the states only in 1925 in the decision of Gitlow v New York.751 The appellant in this 
case was convicted for criminal anarchy, and he claimed that his right of free speech 
under the First Amendment was breached by the state court of New York.752 Justice 
Sanford held in this case that it was assumed by the Court that the guarantee of free 
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speech was one of the ‘fundamental personal rights and “liberties”’ that was 
incorporated against states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.753 It is, however, lamentable that he did not engage in a further 
discussion as to the reasons why this right was assumed to have been incorporated 
against states under the due process clause. Nevertheless, he dedicated his opinion 
to the question whether the protection of right of free speech was, in effect, violated 
by the state court, which he held that it was not.754 It is, however, interesting to highlight 
that little attention was devoted to the importance of the incorporation of this provision 
and this position even remained unchallenged by the state of New York.755 
 
It is unfortunate that this case became the first decision in which the Supreme Court 
held a right under the Bill of Rights to be applicable against states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This is due to the lack of extensive reasoning for the decision of the Court 
to incorporate this right under the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other hand, this 
case became the starting point of the actual incorporation of rights contained in the 
Bill of Rights under the selective incorporation method, which claims that the 
incorporation of the rights included in the Bill of Rights should be assessed on a right-
by-right basis.756 
 
VI.4. Redefining the test of selective incorporation 
 
Whilst certain provisions of the Bill of Rights could be held to be incorporated against 
the states, which rights would be incorporated had to be decided on a case-by-case 
basis. This approach clearly demonstrates a living constitutional values method of 
interpretation of the Supreme Court, which would allow to grant rights to individuals to 
be protected against state actions as society progresses on a case-by-case basis. 
This would also allow for the Constitution to adapt to any changes without the need 
for any constitutional amendments. 
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The following case with main influence on the incorporation doctrine followed in 1937. 
Justice Cardozo in Palko v Connecticut757 rejected the argument of the appellant that 
his protection from double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment was breached by the 
state of Connecticut when he was placed on trial for the same offence and convicted 
for murder in the first degree.758  In arguing the above, he further rejected the approach 
adopted by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment that the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated all provisions of the Bill of Rights against 
states.759  
 
Nonetheless, he did not reject the application of the ideologies of the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment completely, as he adopted a new approach to selective 
incorporation still under the due process clause based on a test of ‘a scheme of 
ordered liberty.’760 This test argued that for a right included in the Bill of Rights to be 
held to be incorporated against states under this approach it had to “violate a principle 
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.”761 This approach is claimed to support the living constitutional values 
method of interpretation that would take into consideration both original intent (i.e. 
traditions) and possible transformed values (i.e. conscience of the people).  
 
Justice Cardozo subsequently held that the double jeopardy the plaintiff was subject 
to did not ‘violate those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the 
base of all our civil and political institutions’ under this test.762 Therefore, this right 
enumerated in the Fifth Amendment, had not been incorporated against states.763  
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The above approach of selective incorporation has also been termed as the 
fundamental fairness test and has been followed by the Supreme Court ever since.764 
This test, adopting a non-originalist method of interpretation, requires the Justices of 
the Supreme Court to determine on a right by right basis whether the right is part of 
the ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice’ that form the pillars of the ‘civil and 
political institutions’ of the United States.765 It is, however, important to highlight that 
the test of fundamental fairness does not base the decision on a standard or a 
definition found in the Constitution itself, but applies a subjective standard applied by 
the Justices at the time when the case is decided.766 The advantage of this approach 
may arguably be that with the lack of a clear definition, as argued previously, the 
advancement of the understanding of current concepts in society may be allowed. 
Furthermore, this also allows the Justices to assess what is fundamentally fair outside 
the scope of the Bill of Rights.767  
 
On the other hand, it should be emphasised that this is a subjective determination by 
the Justices of the Supreme Court.768 They will be the ones deciding whether such 
rights satisfy the fundamental fairness test. This subjective determination of whether 
a right under the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable against the states and the lack 
of a clear and objective standard has also provided significant uncertainty to the states 
in their subsequent actions.769  
 
Based on the above, it may be established that Justice Cardozo in Palko v 
Connecticut,770 rejected the total incorporation approach of the Bill of Rights that was 
the intended purpose of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. He nevertheless 
                                                          
764 ‘Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View’ (1992) 105 Harvard 
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devised a novel approach to selective incorporation based on fundamental fairness 
that came to be adopted by subsequent Supreme Court decisions as well. 
 
VI.5. Total incorporation resurfaces  
 
The appellant in the subsequent case of Adamson v California,771 who was convicted 
of murder in the first degree claimed that his right to be immune from self-incrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment, was breached by the state court of California.772 In 
attempting to claim so, he argued that his right under the Fifth Amendment was 
incorporated under the privileges and immunities and the due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.773  
 
Justice Reed, in delivering the opinion of the Court, held that it was ‘settled law’ that 
such right was not applicable against states under the privileges and immunities 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.774 Relying on the decisions in Barron v 
Baltimore,775 the Slaughter House Cases776 and Twining v New Jersey,777 he further 
affirmed that the original dual constitutional structure of the United States granted 
different rights against the federal and state governments.778 After further rejecting the 
argument of total incorporation based on the decision in Palko v Connecticut,779 and 
applying the fundamental fairness approach devised by Justice Cardozo in the above 
case,780 he further held that the right claimed under the Fifth Amendment was not 
applicable against states under the due process clause either.781  
 
Justice Frankfurter, concurring with the decision, further argued that despite one 
Justice arguing for the total incorporation approach, the Supreme Court had until then 
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adopted the selective incorporation approach.782 He, however, argued that instead of 
the subjective test applied by the Justices through the fundamental fairness test of the 
selective incorporation approach, a more suitable test should be followed.783 He 
therefore claimed that what constituted due process should be determined using the 
selective incorporation approach, based on a test whether it was part of the minimum 
benchmarks that were ‘of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.’784 Whilst 
this test would seemingly differ from that of the fundamental fairness, it is claimed that 
it still applied the living constitutional values interpretative method of the Constitution.  
 
The crucial influence of this decision, however, can be found in the dissent of Justice 
Black, with whom Justice Douglas concurred. His dissenting opinion stated that he 
firstly recognised that the Bill of Rights was adopted to protect people against the 
federal government, which argument was also adopted in Barron v Baltimore.785 On 
the other hand, he further emphasised that the decisions should have devoted 
particular attention to the historical evidence from the Congress debates about the 
drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment.786 These records, he argued, provided 
evidence that all provisions of the Bill of Rights should be held to be incorporated 
against states under the Fourteenth Amendment.787 It therefore seems that he became 
the first person to recognise and expressly argue for the application of the solutions 
devised by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment mentioned above, relying on a 
very clear originalist method of interpretation of the Constitution. 
 
Justice Black, with his dissenting opinion, became ‘the architect of the incorporation 
theory’ arguing for the approach referred to as total incorporation to be adopted for 
these purposes.788 Even though this approach has been mentioned in decisions since, 
                                                          
782 ibid 62 and 65. 
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the Supreme Court has failed to adopt this ‘closed-ended’ approach in its decisions.789 
This opinion, however, has been a pioneer in commentators attempting to re-discover 
the original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.790 
 
Justice Murphy, with whom Justice Rutledge concurred, in his dissenting opinion 
formulated a different approach to incorporation, which is also referred to as the ‘ultra-
incorporationist’ approach.791 In advocating for this approach he claimed that the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should not only afford protection to 
citizens of their rights under the Bill of Rights against states, but also of their 
‘fundamental rights’ that were not included in the latter.792 This ultra-incorporationist 
approach would have amalgamated the total incorporation approach of Justice Black 
and the fundamental fairness approach devised by Justice Cardozo in Palko v 
Connecticut.793 This approach would have also arguably adopted the natural law 
ideology because it conferred protection on those rights that were left outside the 
remits of the written declarations of rights. However, as it will be demonstrated below, 
applying such an approach would have required a significant departure from the 
selective incorporation approach adopted in previous cases.  
 
VI.6. The era of successful selective incorporation claims 
 
The Supreme Court subsequently commenced to successfully hold the provisions of 
the Bill of Rights enforceable against states in the respective cases. The appellant, for 
instance, in Mapp v Ohio794 claimed that her right of protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizure under the Fourth Amendment was violated, when her property 
was searched without a valid search warrant by state officials.795 Justice Clark after 
analysing the previous decisions of the Supreme Court about the incorporation of the 
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Fourth Amendment through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
held that the right claimed was, in effect, enforceable against the states.796 He based 
his decision on the non-originalist argument that the enforcement of the protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizure was ‘necessary in the true administration 
of justice.’797 This seems to imply that he also adopted the fundamental fairness 
method of the selective incorporation approach.798   
 
Justice Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker, on the other hand, strongly disagreed with 
the opinion of the majority, and argued that the Court should not have overruled the 
decision in previous cases that held the Fourth Amendment inapplicable against 
states.799 
 
Another case where the Supreme Court was willing to incorporate a provision of the 
Bill of Rights, even if it had to overrule previous decisions, was Malloy v Hogan.800 The 
appellant claimed in this case that his ‘privilege against self-incrimination’ under the 
Fifth Amendment was applicable against states under the Fourteenth Amendment.801 
Justice Brennan, overturning previous decisions of the Court, ruled for the appellant 
and decided that the claimed right was, in fact, incorporated against states under the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.802 In doing so, it may be argued 
that he also adopted the living constitutional values method of interpretation as he 
claimed: 
 
It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a 
claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution depending on whether 
the claim was asserted in a state or federal court. 803 
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This decision, in effect, became another pioneer following Gitlow v New York,804 that 
successfully incorporated a provision of the Bill of Rights under the selective 
incorporation approach. 
 
VI.7. Justice Black supports selective incorporation 
 
The decision in Duncan v Louisiana805 became important for two main reasons. Firstly, 
it incorporated a further provision of the Bill of Rights, and, secondly, Justice Black 
departing from his previous approach, lastly expressed his support of the selective 
incorporation approach. 
  
The appellant in Duncan v Louisiana806 argued that his right to trial by jury under the 
Sixth Amendment had been violated by the state court when he was convicted of 
battery without such trial.807 Justice White held that the right to trial by jury under the 
Sixth Amendment had, in fact, been violated by the state of Louisiana under due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.808 In reaching his decision he adopted 
the fundamental fairness test of selective incorporation about the incorporation of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment against the states.809 He further held that the rights 
protected under these amendments should be held to be incorporated against 
states.810 
 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas concurred, argued 
that if his approach of total incorporation was not to be adopted by the Supreme Court, 
he was willing to support the approach of selective incorporation.811 Moreover, he 
rejected the fundamental fairness test to incorporation because of its subjective 
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nature, and vouched for the selective incorporation approach, which as he claimed, 
had already incorporated most provisions of the Bill of Rights.812  
 
VI.8. Slaughter House Cases still valid law 
 
Recently, the petitioners in McDonald v City of Chicago813 argued that their right to 
bear arms under the Second Amendment was breached by a regulation of Chicago, 
which required a registration certificate to be held if a person was to keep arms.814 
Another interesting feature of this case was that the appellants argued that their above 
right was incorporated against their state based on the privileges and immunities 
clause.815  
 
Justice Alito, when delivering the opinion of the Court, refused to overrule the decision 
in the Slaughter House Cases816 and held that the only clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment where a provision of the Bill of Rights could be made applicable against 
states was the due process clause.817 He further identified five characteristics of the 
approach adopted by the Supreme Court when considering the incorporation 
doctrine.818 First, he explained, the Court considered the due process clause distinctly 
from the privileges and immunities clause. 819 The approach under the latter has been 
that the privileges and immunities protected under the clause had not been 
incorporated against the states. On the other hand, under the due process clause the 
Supreme Court had adopted a selective incorporation approach, whereby they 
incorporated only certain rights protected by the Bill of Rights. Secondly, he argued 
that only those rights were incorporated under the due process clause that were “of 
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such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law.”820 
Thirdly, he stated that the Court seemed to have used the criteria whether “a civilised 
system could be imagined that would not accord the particular protection” to decide if 
a provision of the Bill of Rights was incorporated against states.821 Fourthly, the Court 
assessed certain rights as having been incorporated under the due process clause, 
but also held that some were not.822 Lastly, Justice Alito highlighted that even if a 
provision of the Bill of Rights had been held incorporated under the due process 
clause, the remedies for the breach of the right differed between the state and the 
federal government.823 
 
Justice Alito further emphasised that even though the Court failed to adopt the total 
incorporation theory of Justice Black, it was in effect moving towards this approach by 
fully incorporating most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, under the selective 
incorporation approach, whilst overruling previous decisions.824 He also argued that, 
in doing so, the Court abandoned three of the above identified approaches and the 
focus rested upon whether the right in question was ‘fundamental to our system of 
ordered liberty and system of justice,’ he highlight this was effectively the test devised 
by Justice Cardozo in Palko v Connecticut.825 
 
After examining the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment, Justice Alito 
held, by adopting the fundamental fairness approach, - that this right was ‘among 
those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.’826 He thus held 
that it was enforceable against states.827 
 
Whilst it may seem that the Supreme Court still adopts the fundamental fairness 
approach of selective incorporation, it has effectively arrived at the position where only 
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a few of the provisions of the Bill of Rights remain unincorporated. These are the 
prohibition on the quartering of soldiers clause of the Third Amendment, the guarantee 
of a grand jury under the Fifth Amendment and to that of a civil jury trial for civil cases 
of more than twenty dollars under the Seventh Amendment and the protection against 
excessive bails and fines under the Eight Amendment.828 It may therefore be argued 
that the Supreme Court, despite its initial rejection to apply the solutions that the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment proposed for the underlying constitutional and 
political problems, has, over the years, changed its approach. By selectively 
incorporating most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it has been recognised that 
the Supreme Court might ultimately adopt the total incorporation approach, as 
arguably intended by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other hand, 
when and whether this will happen remains to be seen. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
As demonstrated above, the protection of the fundamental rights of citizens in the 
United States of America has amounted to one of the greatest constitutional 
uncertainties. Through the varying protections afforded to citizens in the colonial 
charters, and subsequently state constitutions and bills of rights, it was established 
that it was highly challenging to subsequently devise a novel federal system that would 
be able to integrate all provisions of these om a uniform manner.  
 
The reason for the lack of a Bill of Rights in the original Constitution that would have 
provided for a uniform protection of the fundamental rights of the citizens of the United 
States was, therefore, examined further. Debates surrounding the relationship 
between the federal and state government, thus, also surfaced and it was argued that 
since it was the state governments that were to provide the protection of these rights 
to the citizens, and not the federal government, under the original approach of the dual 
federalist structure, the need for a federal Bill of Rights did not arise.  
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However, the issue of the lack of the Bill of Rights, as it was argued above, occupied 
a key position during the ratification debates and in the Federalist - Anti-Federalist 
debate. Despite the Federalists arguing that the inclusion of the Bill of Rights was 
redundant in the Constitution, it was demonstrated that it was Madison, a Federalist, 
who did, in fact, argue for the need to include such a Bill in the Constitution during the 
Virginia Ratifying Convention.829 
 
The Chapter subsequently examined how the Bill of Rights was adopted as 
amendments to the original Constitution, and provided an overview of the protections 
that it guaranteed. It has also devoted special attention to the proposed amendment 
number XIV by Madison, which would have made some provisions of the Bill of Rights 
applicable against state governments, sowing the seeds of the later selective 
incorporation approach.830 
 
After examining how the incorporation doctrine was rejected due to the dual 
constitutional structure of the United States by the Supreme Court in Barron v 
Baltimore,831 the Chapter set out to examine the two main constitutional causes of the 
Civil War. It discussed in further detail the irreconcilable status of slavery with the 
natural law ideology and how a great division existed about this issue between most 
of the Northern and Southern states. Such a state of affairs crucially highlighted that if 
a constitutional uncertainty remains unresolved when it is at the limelight, it may lead 
to disastrous consequences. 
 
The chapter subsequently analysed the Civil War or Reconstruction Amendments from 
a problem-solution approach and examined the intentions of the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment with the adoption of that Amendment further. Based on a 
historical analysis, it was established that the Civil War Amendments provided the 
application of the three solutions to the underlying constitutional problems of the 
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United States: the abolishing of slavery, the protection of the fundamental rights of the 
freedmen and the declaration of the supremacy of the federal level in the dual 
constitutional structure.832 It was also argued that the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment may be observed to have devised the Amendment to provide for total 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states.  
 
The focus then turned to the federal Supreme Court and how it continued the work of 
the Congress in applying the solutions the latter devised as the Civil War 
Amendments. It has been demonstrated that the Supreme Court, however, had initially 
rejected this approach and was only prepared to incorporate the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights under the selective incorporation approach, while assuming an active role in 
the further development of the incorporation doctrine.  
 
The Supreme Court firstly argued that no incorporation was possible under the 
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter 
House Cases,833 which approach has been widely adopted by the Supreme Court 
since. It, therefore held that the only way of incorporation of fundamental rights against 
the states was under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.834 Even 
though this chapter argued that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment may be 
held to be total incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states, it has been 
demonstrated that, apart from featuring in dissenting opinions, this approach has not 
been adopted by the Supreme Court so far. The decisions of the Court under this 
clause are rather based on the selective incorporation approach, which requires the 
analysis of each case ‘clause by clause and right by right’ and if a provision is 
considered fundamentally fair, it may then be held to have been incorporated against 
the states.835 This approach, it has been claimed, also falls in line with the living 
constitutional values approach advocated for by this work, as it would allow the 
examination of each provision from the angle of what value it was set out to protect. It 
                                                          
832 Tribe (n 171) 549. 
833 The Slaughter House Cases (n 688). 
834 ibid 80 - 81. 
835 Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (n 543) 139 and 219; Brennan Jr (n 553) 545. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 3: Providing a uniform protection of the fundamental rights of individuals throughout 
the United States 
 
[172] 
 
would, secondly, allow for such values to be interpreted in light of the developments 
of each era, thus, allowing the Constitution to become a living instrument. 
 
Amar has also proposed another approach to the incorporation doctrine, which he 
called the ‘refined incorporation’ approach, under which he claimed that every privilege 
and immunity of the original Constitution should be held to have been incorporated 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.836 He further established that these privileges and 
immunities may be identified on a case by case basis where it has to be established 
whether a clause is ‘a private right of the citizen’ or that of the state or the people as a 
whole.837 He subsequently proposed that those rights that can be regarded as private 
rights, should be held to have been incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment.838 
So far, this approach has not, however, been presented in the decision of the Supreme 
Court.  
 
It is, therefore, argued that even though the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
set out as the purpose of the Amendment the total incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
against the states, this approach has been rejected in the decisions of the Supreme 
Court so far. On the other hand, this chapter also claims that by selectively holding 
that separate guarantees of the Bill of Rights incorporated under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against the states, the Supreme Court is, 
effectively, heading towards the acceptance of the total incorporation approach once 
all provisions of the Bill of Rights become incorporated against the states.   
 
Another key lesson that this chapter has demonstrated is that once a constitutional 
uncertainty arises as a problem in the underlying constitutional structure of a state, it 
should not be ignored. The delay in handling such an issue could lead not only to the 
escalation of the further problems it generates, but could also result in dire 
consequences, such as the Civil War in the United States, for all actors in a state, from 
individuals with no fixed abode, to executives of states.  
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Chapter 4: Creating and subsequently protecting a uniform national market in 
the United States: Part I 
 
The constitutional value set out in the Dormant Commerce Clause  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Whilst the United States of America often provides a point of comparison with the 
European Union for the regulation of its national market, it is important to highlight that 
the Constitution of the United States of America does not include a provision for the 
creation of such a national market. The only provision of the Constitution alluding to 
this is Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution. The Commerce Clause states 
that ‘[Congress shall have power …] To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.’839  
The chapter explains the constitutional uncertainties that have arisen in the 
interpretation of this clause since its drafting, and how these have been managed by 
the United States. The chapter also aims to demonstrate that even though no express 
provision about the creation of a national market exists in the Constitution, such may 
be identified as one of the purposes for the adoption and the subsequent application 
of the Commerce Clause. It will, thus, also argue that this purpose may also be 
regarded the constitutional value worthy of protection under the living constitutional 
values approach. 
The chapter is divided into three parts based on key milestones in the interpretation of 
this clause. Firstly, the reasons for the adoption of the Commerce Clause are 
examined in line with the originalist and living constitutional values method of 
constitutional interpretation. The chapter explores how the economic situation of the 
states and their commercial relationship with each other were vital in the drafting and 
adoption of the Constitution, and specifically this clause. Particular attention is placed 
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on the text of the Commerce Clause. Since no definitions of the various terms of the 
Clause have been provided, an examination of the definitions prior to and during the 
adoption of the Constitution will also be required to effectively analyse the 
constitutional uncertainties this position has created.  
Secondly, the chapter analyses the most influential decisions of the Supreme Court 
about the negative aspects of the Commerce Clause. It discusses the relationship 
between the interpretation of the Constitution and the development of the negative 
side of the Commerce Clause. Furthermore, it examines how this aspect of the 
Commerce Clause aims to resolve the constant conflict created by the Constitution by 
setting out the extent to which the rights of the states are limited to regulate in the 
same area as Congress. Particularly, an emphasis is placed on whether the ideology 
of the creation of a national market has influenced the main judgments of the Supreme 
Court and which methods of constitutional interpretation the Supreme Court has 
adopted since the ratification of the Constitution. 
Lastly, the chapter assesses the modern interpretation of the negative or Dormant 
Commerce Clause, and the development of the current two-tier test. It argues that 
even though there is a strict scrutiny on state laws under the modern test, a new trend 
of cases, characterised into four separate groups, seems to be emerging in the 
Supreme Court, which seems to regard the protection of state powers more significant 
than that of the creation and protection of the uniform federal market. 
 
II. Interstate commerce after the American Revolution 
 
It is reasonable to assume that during the creation of an effective national market in a 
novel legal system would require laying down legal uncertainties. However, this 
section illustrates the challenges faced by the Founding Fathers when they had to 
decide on the extent at which terms of the Constitution should be defined and clarified 
in this area.  
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II. 1. Interstate commerce 
 
Instead of a reference to a national market, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
of the United States of America, on its face, grants Congress with the authority to 
‘regulate […] commerce among the states.’840 In order to fully understand the meaning 
of this expression at the time of the adoption of the Constitution in light of the originalist 
interpretative method of the Constitution, the interpretation of ‘commerce’ and ‘among 
the states’ in the era after the American Revolution, and particularly during the 
eighteenth century, is analysed separately. 
 
II.1.a. ‘Commerce’ 
 
As with many terms included in the Constitution by the Framers, no uniform 
interpretation of ‘commerce’ can be identified at the time of its drafting and adoption. 
Thus, if one is to adopt an originalist method of interpretation of the Constitution, they 
would be faced with quite an obstacle to determine what commerce meant at the time 
of the drafting and adoption of the Constitution. The various understandings of 
commerce, as illustrated by various commentators, can be categorised into three 
different groups based on the range of activities ‘commerce’ was associated with. 
 
II.1.a.i. Commerce as intercourse 
 
The first group of commentators claim that ‘commerce’ referred to a broader range of 
activities in the eighteenth century than economic activities as it may be understood 
nowadays.841 Commerce was understood as ‘intercourse’ with sound ‘social 
connotations.’842  Samuel Johnson defined commerce as the ‘interaction and 
exchange between persons,’ including all economic and non-economic activity related 
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to commerce.843 The term, thus, included manufacturing, selling, importing, and/or 
exporting goods. Such meanings of commerce can be identified in a dictionary written 
in the same time as the Constitution that defined commerce as “intercourse; exchange 
of one thing for another” and a “common or familiar intercourse.”844 Various other 
textual references from the era also associate ‘commerce’ with interactions, such as 
“free and easy commerce of social life,” focusing on what Balkin highlights as the 
interaction between people rather than the exchange of goods.845 Amar, however, also 
identified references that referred to ‘commerce’ as interactions wider than those 
between people. For instance, he highlights that references can be found from the era 
that refer to “domestic animals which have the greatest Commerce with mankind” and 
“our Lord’s commerce with his disciples.”846 
A wider understanding of commerce was also used by the economists of the era, such 
as Tench Coxe or Adam Smith, who claimed that ‘commerce’ included not only ‘trading 
goods but also manufacturing, mining, grazing, agriculture, fisheries, banking, 
insurance, and corporations.’847 Nelson and Pushaw further argued that commerce at 
the time could, in effect, be identified with any ‘gainful activity.’848 
If such a broad interpretation of commerce was to be associated with the Commerce 
Clause, the newly created federal government of the United States of America would 
have held unlimited powers over any interactions of the federal government with other 
nations. Moreover, the federal government would have possessed the same powers 
to regulat any interactions between the states. However, such an interpretation would 
have rendered several provisions of the original Constitution and the subsequent 
Amendments to it unnecessary. For instance, the Tenth Amendment states that any 
power not granted to the federal government is to remain with the states or the 
people.849 Thus, if the federal government was to regulate all interactions of the states 
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or the people, the latter two would have been left with no powers at all over 
themselves. This interpretation would have contravened many of the ideals supported 
by the Founding Fathers in their entirety, discussed further in the earlier chapters, 
including the creation of a republican government as opposed to a despotic one. 
Regardless of the broad use of ‘commerce’ at the age, it is still contended that the 
Founding Fathers could have not supported an interpretation that would have created 
the opportunity to create a despotic government regulating all matters. 
It is thus claimed that the interpretation of commerce in its widest sense may be utilised 
by those adopting the originalist method of interpretation to argue that Congress was 
granted with unlimited powers over the states in this area 
 
II.1.a.ii. Commerce as manufacturing, agriculture and commerce 
 
A second group of scholars argues that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, 
commerce encompassed a somewhat narrower extent of activities. Tushnet argues 
that these activities were still, however, a wider definition of commerce than it is 
generally understood nowadays, and included the three main economic activities of 
the states: ‘manufacturing, agriculture and commerce.’850 To support his viewpoint, he 
argues that commerce was used in this sense in various ‘newspapers and legislative 
debates’ in the era.851 Nelson and Pushaw also demonstrated through the definitions 
of commerce in various English dictionaries at the time and other sources, such as 
writings of Daniel Defoe or Adam Smith, that commerce included not only the general 
‘buying and selling of goods,’ but also the activities that produced these goods, such 
as manufacture and agriculture.852  
If this interpretation of commerce would be adopted when interpreting the Commerce 
Clause from an originalist perspective, it is argued that it would provide a more suitable 
interpretation than the one offered by the first group of commentators. This 
interpretation would, however, still involve a wide array of activities that would have 
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previously belonged to the states to regulate. Therefore, whilst this interpretation 
would be the most suitable to argue for the extensive powers of the federal government 
to regulate commerce, this would also become a point of contention between the 
federal and state governments. 
 
II.1.a.iii. Commerce as trade 
 
If a more definite line of division between federal and state powers to regulate 
commerce is to be sought based on the interpretation of commerce at the era, the 
most suitable method of interpretation, it is argued, would be the third group of 
commentators. 
Noyes, Nelson and Pushaw highlighted that a third interpretation of commerce existed 
at the Founding era. This interpretation particularly restricted the understanding of 
commerce to activities that would normally be regarded as ‘trade’ or an ‘exchange of 
merchandise between different places.’853 Such an exchange of merchandise would 
only take place, according to Barnett, if the merchandise was ‘produced by agriculture 
and manufacturing.’854  
Cooke supports an even narrower understanding of commerce by claiming that it was 
essentially understood as ‘transportation […] of persons or property.’855 He thus 
identified interstate commerce as such transportation ‘between points in different 
States.’856 It is fundamental to highlight, however, that if commerce is to include only 
transportation and the trade of merchandise, the production of such cannot be held to 
be included in the definition of commerce.857 
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As illustrated above, the interpretation of commerce at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution was not uniform and it is argued that it could have been foreseen that the 
understanding of commerce could subsequently become one of the main areas of 
dispute about the Commerce Clause. One of the fundamental reasons for these 
disputes would emerge as the dispute over which part of the newly devised 
constitutional system of the United States would have power to regulate these 
activities: the federal government or the states. 
 
II.2. Commerce among the states 
 
To determine the extent to which Congress would regulate interstate commerce, and 
consequently restrict the states in the exercise of these powers, it is necessary to 
further study the meaning of ‘among’ at the time of the adoption of the Constitution 
and immediately preceding it in line with the originalist method of interpretation.  
Nelson and Pushaw argued that ‘among’ was understood as ‘the mingling of’ or 
‘associated with’ at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.858 The meaning of 
‘among the states,’ it is argued, may therefore be interpreted as including activities 
that involved more than one state. This could therefore also imply a certain out-of-
state element, usually the import or export of an article of commerce from or to another 
state. However, if one is to adopt a wider interpretation of commerce, this would 
include all activities of a state with another.  
As it will be demonstrated below, due to the development of the states during this era, 
interstate commerce was, however, less common than the more practical and easily 
accessible commerce within the boundaries of a state.859 This may therefore explain 
why this part of the provision would not subsequently provide such an area of debate 
as the interpretation of ‘commerce’ would. 
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II. 2. Interstate commerce before the Constitutional Convention 
 
The political and economic independence of the previous colonies from Britain 
unsurprisingly created new challenges. 
One of the responses of Britain to this newly gained independence of the old colonies 
was the imposition of various measures restricting the ability of the latter to engage in 
trade with Britain and ‘its colonies in the West Indies’.860 In order to strengthen their 
own economic performance, the states turned to concentrate on the development of 
their local economies and commerce.861 The manufacture and agricultural production 
mainly focused on serving those ‘in the immediate vicinity’ and for producing goods 
for home-consumption. 862 The interstate commerce that existed before and at the time 
of the adoption of the Constitution seems to have been limited, and consisted mostly 
in the transportation of goods between states by means of ‘vessels, […] stage 
coaches, wagons and pack-horses.’863 However, many legislators in the states at the 
time believed that the out-of-state flow of commerce could have harmed their 
economy, which effectively resulted in many states enacting laws that clearly placed 
the economic actors situated within their boundaries in a more favourable position over 
those operating out of the state boundaries.864 
The situation did not change with the adoption of the Articles of Confederation either. 
The draft Articles proposed by Dickinson contained a measure prohibiting 
discrimination of out-of-state citizens, especially ‘in matters of trade’ and these citizens 
were also to be granted the same ‘Rights, Liberties, Priviledges [sic] Exemptions & 
Immunities in Trade, Navigation & Commerce’ as those living in a state.865 The 
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committee in charge of the drafting of the Articles, however, disagreed with these 
proposals and transformed these into affirmative powers possessed by Congress, 
whereby it could impose ‘duties and imposts on foreign commerce.’866 It thus became 
apparent that whilst Congress was given several powers under this document, the 
various states remained reluctant to grant the power to Congress to address the 
restrictive measures of Britain, which would have allowed it to use a collective national 
voice and regulate interstate trade.867 The measures enacted by states discriminating 
against each other through duties imposed on interstate trade within the Confederation 
thus remained. 868  
It is also interesting to note that whilst the proposed Articles referred to trade, the ones 
adopted used the term commerce. This could thus imply that the terms either allowed 
for the interchangeable use of trade and commerce or that the adopted Articles 
intended for an extended interpretation of trade. However, it is important to highlight 
that these terms were utilised to refer to foreign commerce only, not for the regulation 
of commerce between the states. Nevertheless, it is argued that the regulation of 
foreign commerce could give indications as to the interpretation of commerce by those 
drafting the Articles. It is, thus, highlighted that their intentions were to impose ‘duties 
and imposts on foreign commerce,’869 which would imply that they accepted that 
commerce included navigation, the main form of foreign commerce at the era, 
especially with Britain. 
With the economy gradually weakening, the adoption of local protectionist measures, 
such as discriminatory trade duties, undeniably escalated in states with a dominant 
position in a particular area of trade.870 In the meantime, the states with a less 
influential position adopted measures that allowed the free flow of commerce into and 
out of their states.871 One such instance was the establishment of free ports in 
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Connecticut, Delaware and New Jersey, whilst in New York a law enacted in 1785 
imposed the same duties on goods imported from Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode 
Island and Pennsylvania as those from Britain.872 This measure effectively resulted in 
a trade war between the above states.873  
Whilst these conflicts may have resulted in harm to the economies of various states, 
they also prompted a debate about the solution of these conflicts in the newly created 
union of states. One such solution was proposed by the reformists of the era, such as 
Madison, who claimed that Congress should be given powers to enact ‘a uniform trade 
policy’ in order to repair the ‘leak’ in the ‘vessel’ of the Confederacy.874 This statement 
was clearly in support of the ideal of creating a uniform system of interstate commerce 
to protect the interest of the nation as a whole. This reformist idea, however, would 
have required to grant powers to Congress that had clearly belonged to the states 
previously and this ideology, unsurprisingly, was not welcomed by all states.875 To 
discuss the various options available to solve these problems, an interstate conference 
was called in Annapolis, which ultimately resulted in the call for the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia to alter the Articles of Confederation.876  
 
II. 3. Interstate commerce and the Constitutional Convention 
 
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention arrived at Philadelphia in the times of 
this ‘economic chaos,’877 which was dominated by discriminatory commercial 
measures between the states within the union. Understandably, many of the delegates 
therefore aimed to devise a solution to this problem, and several proposals were 
presented to the Convention that aimed at tackling this particular issue. The main 
solution also included addressing a fundamental feature of the novel system: to what 
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extent could Congress regulate interstate commerce, and, as a result, take these 
regulatory powers away from the states? 
The new ideal by the reformists claiming that Congress should be granted with powers 
to enact uniform trade policies had already been present in the proposals submitted 
to the Convention. Whilst the proposals of Hamilton and Randolph did not explicitly 
mention commerce, these suggested a more open-ended interpretation of the powers 
of the ‘Legislature of the United States.’878 Hamilton even argued – in line with a later 
non-originalist method of interpretation - for the ‘Legislature’ to be able ‘to pass all laws 
[…] which they shall judge necessary to the common defence and general welfare of 
the Union.’879 This would have, however, resulted in a legislature with almost unlimited 
powers as it would have required a further determination of what the latter reference 
to ‘the common defence and general welfare of the Union’880 entailed. This statement 
could have, clearly, been interpreted in the widest sense, including any activity of the 
Union, which would have - similarly to the widest interpretation of commerce - 
contravened fundamental underlying principles, guiding the creation of this novel 
federal system. 
Randolph also suggested to impose some limitations on the power of the ‘Legislature,’ 
but he did not propose such an open-ended and seemingly limitless power as 
Hamilton.881 He imagined that the legislature would enact laws in cases where ‘the 
separate states are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be 
interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation […].’882 Whilst somewhat limited in 
his interpretation, the proposals of Randolph would have also created wide powers for 
the legislature and would have allowed for the non-originalist method of interpretation 
of the Constitution to flourish: it would have been able to adapt to all current states of 
society as the ‘harmony of the United States’ would clearly depend on the state of play 
at each ear. The support of both Hamilton and Randolph of a uniform regulatory 
system, if deemed necessary, however, is apparent in their approaches. 
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Pinckney and Paterson, on the other hand, offered a more limited solution in its extent, 
expressly aiming to target the issues present in the area of interstate commerce. 
Pinckney proposed for Congress to have ‘the exclusive power, of regulating the trade 
of the several states as well with foreign nations as with each other - of levying duties 
upon imports and exports.’883 The proposal of Paterson, similarly to that of Pinckney, 
argued for Congress to be able ‘to pass acts for the regulation of trade as well with 
foreign nations as with each other.’884 The solution presented to the Convention 
through these plans was the transfer of regulatory authority to Congress in the area of 
interstate commerce, and the consequent creation of a uniform system of interstate 
commerce. Interestingly, however, most of the proposals that specifically addressed 
this area did not refer to interstate ‘commerce,’ but ‘trade.’885 This could indicate that 
whilst the proposed novel system was to transfer regulatory powers to the federal 
legislature over this area, what activities would be regulated by this institution was to 
be quite restrictive and only encompass activities that were discussed above under 
the first and second interpretation of commerce discussed in the beginning of this 
chapter at the time.  
Nonetheless, Nelson and Pushaw also identified support for the uniform regulation of 
commerce in a wider sense during the Convention.886 In the opening speeches, for 
instance, Randolph claimed that a transfer of regulatory power over commerce to the 
federal government would boost not only ‘trade, but also "navigation," "agriculture," 
"manufactures," and "great national works."887 What these works are, it is claimed, 
could be defined differently at each era subsequently according to a non-originalist 
method of interpretation. Adopting an originalist interpretation method of these works, 
it is argued, could entail only works that were deemed “great” at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution. Pinckney also seemed to support a wider understanding 
of commerce, as he referred to the ‘commercial interests’ of the United States not only 
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as "trade," but "fisheries," and crops such as "[w]heat," "tob[acco]," and "[r]ice & 
[i]ndigo."888  
Another question, however, arose from this transfer of power to Congress, as it did not 
clarify whether the states were intended to be limited in their actions in the area of 
interstate commerce. It will therefore be first examined whether the Framers of the 
Constitution intended an exclusive power to be granted to Congress in this area. It will 
subsequently be explored whether it was the intention of the Framers to limit the states 
in this area if such power was granted to Congress. 
 
II.3.1. Exclusive grant of power to Congress 
 
Whilst creating a novel federalist system, the Framers also created a new nation that 
was to become an ‘indestructible union composed of indestructible states.’889 Such a 
system, however, required certain areas that were of concern to the federal nation to 
be addressed uniformly by the federal government.890 Interstate commerce emerged 
as one such area during the debates at the Convention. In an era governed by 
protectionist and discriminatory commercial measures imposed by the various states, 
the ‘nearly universal’891 solution that developed during the debates was the creation 
of a ‘centrally regulated’892 ‘uniform system’893 regulating interstate commerce.  
The support that this solution received from the delegates firstly demonstrated that 
almost all of them recognised that there was a fundamental hindrance to the regulatory 
power over interstate commerce in the then existing system under the Articles of 
Confederation.894 Since in that system the states were the ones who had power to 
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regulate commerce with other states, the Congress of the Confederation was unable 
to respond to any discriminatory regulatory measures, which affected more than one 
state or interstate commerce as a whole. Secondly, this common understanding, 
however, also served as an indicator that the delegates might not have considered it 
necessary to state the ‘obvious’ reasons for the creation of this uniform system.895 
Various commentators, such as Denning or Eule, have, however, subsequently 
attempted to identify these ‘obvious’ reasons as the guarantee of the ‘interstate 
commercial harmony’896 and also the strengthening of the ‘national unity.’897 
The method of creating this uniform system of interstate commerce also indicated that 
the Framers were in general agreement about the solution to the problem of regulating 
this area: they unanimously adopted Article I section 8 of the Constitution of the United 
States, which granted regulatory power over this area to Congress.898 The so-called 
Commerce Clause, the third clause of this section, as subsequently ratified, states that 
‘[Congress shall have power …] To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.’899  
Whereas it was clear that Congress was granted regulatory powers over the area of 
interstate commerce, it was, however, still unclear whether this grant of power was an 
exclusive grant of power to Congress, and whether this resulted in states losing their 
regulatory authority over the same area. The delegates were faced with the above 
fundamental question even before discussing the regulation of interstate commerce or 
the supremacy clause.900 Abel argues that the majority of the delegates, in effect, 
seemed to have supported the idea that when state acts would regulate an area, where 
the regulatory power had been granted to the federal government in the Constitution, 
the state acts could be held unconstitutional.901 This, they claimed, would ensure that 
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the state and federal laws would be ‘complementary’ to each other.902 This position, 
however, leaves it up to the interpretative method of the Constitution adopted what 
areas Congress is held to have power to regulate. Thus, whilst the federal and state 
laws were proposed to be complementing each other, the regulation of an activity 
belonging to commerce was already set out to pose a challenge due to the various 
interpretations of commerce since firstly, it was undefined what activities commerce 
included and, secondly, it was unclear what the extent of the powers of Congress was. 
Thus, the laws regulating these activities that depended on the interpretation of 
commerce by the individual states and the federal government separately, would 
always remain in a position of conflict in case of different approaches adopted by either 
government. 
Some delegates, nevertheless, considered that the opportunity may arise where state 
and federal laws may overlap, and it would subsequently have to be decided which 
laws were to prevail. For such instances, Randolph proposed that the federal 
government should have rights to invalidate state laws contrary to ‘the articles of the 
Union,’903 which position was extended to include ‘any treaties subsisting under the 
authority of the union.’904 Even though defeated conclusively, Pinckney even proposed 
for this provision to be broadened to include ‘all laws which to them [the federal 
government] shall appear improper.’905 Various other statements of the delegates at 
the Convention, as highlighted by Abel, also demonstrate that the delegates widely 
supported the ideal that when the federal government was entrusted with the powers 
over one area, that was to exclude the states from regulating in the same subject 
matter.906  
It may thus be deduced from the above examination that Congress was granted with 
exclusive regulatory powers over the area of interstate commerce. On the other hand, 
it still remained unclear how this affected the regulatory powers of the states in the 
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area that previously belonged to them: whether these would be withdrawn or whether 
they were still allowed to regulate certain areas of interstate commerce.  
 
II.3.2 Limitations on state powers  
 
As highlighted by Abel, the regulation of interstate commerce was discussed on nine 
occasions during the Convention.907 Even though this seems to be a limited 
opportunity to discuss whether the solution to the discriminatory state commercial 
measures was the deprivation of the states of their legislative rights in this area, this 
question, in effect, constituted one of the key issues addressed by the delegates about 
interstate commerce. As Abel identified, the Commerce Clause, according to the 
uniform position of the delegates, was to become a preventative national measure 
against the discriminatory and protectionist state regulations.908 Conversely, the 
delegates did not seem to adopt a uniform measure as a means to achieve this goal.  
In order to target the national measures against other states, the question inevitably 
arose over the extent of the powers of Congress and, thus, the limitations of state 
powers in this area. 
One group of delegates supported the ideology that states should be allowed to retain 
those powers over commerce that concerned activities that were ‘purely local in 
character.’909 Sherman, for instance, argued that the states would ‘never give up all 
power over trade.’910 This view also seems to have been supported by Bedford, who 
argued that the states, at least, should retain their ‘independent power to encourage 
local industries by bounties and similar devices.’911  
The opposing view, that states should be deprived of all their powers over commerce, 
seems to have been indirectly supported by another group of delegates. For example, 
Madison – supported by others, such as Langdon and Pinckney - provided his 
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viewpoint in the last days of the Convention, stating that he “was more and more 
convinced that the regulation of Commerce was in its nature indivisible and ought to 
be wholly under one authority.”912 Moreover, this position of Madison can also be 
identified in a letter included in the Records of the Federal Convention, that stated that 
there was a general consensus between the delegates of the Convention, that claimed 
that the states were incompetent to regulate in the areas of foreign and interstate 
commerce because of the discriminatory measures that the states imposed in these 
areas.913  
It is the view adopted by several commentators that the majority of the delegates 
supported the ideology of the latter group, and the position that by granting Congress 
the authority to regulate interstate commerce, states were effectively deprived of their 
powers to regulate the same area.914 Such a strong federal government that was to 
be created with this novel system would have, however, required a very clear transfer 
of powers from the states over all areas of commerce related to interstate commerce. 
Whether a novel system was more equipped for this task than the previous one would 
only be proven with the passage of time. However, the necessity and the purpose of 
the creation of this novel system cannot be ignored when such an examination is 
made.  
It will thus have to be investigated further whether the deprivation of states from their 
rights to regulate interstate commerce remained the position after the Constitution was 
sent for ratification to the states. 
 
II. 4. Ratification of the Constitution and the Federalist – Anti-Federalist debate 
 
II.4.1 Ratification debates 
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It is essential to highlight that during the period of the ratification debates in some 
states, the ratification of the Constitution also resulted in the repeal of some of the 
discriminatory measures enacted by the states. This illustrates that despite the states 
giving up their powers to regulate these areas, the importance of the creation of a 
national market was deemed more crucial than the loss of their powers. 
For instance, in Virginia, the import duties imposed on ‘liquor, wine, flour, sugar and 
coffee’915 was repealed before the state ratified the Constitution.916 The revocation of 
this act was called for by those engaged in the trade of these, who argued that this 
import duty was “inconsistent with the spirit of the Union.”917 
Furthermore, in North Carolina, for example, Davie highlighted that ‘the general 
objects of the Union’ were ‘to promote the commerce, agriculture and manufactures, 
of America.’918 This signalled clear support for the creation of a uniform national 
market.  
The main discussions about the regulatory powers of Congress and the states over 
the area of interstate commerce at the time of the ratification debates can be mostly 
identified in the discussions of those who belonged to one of the two main political 
groupings at the time.  
 
II.4.1.a. The Federalist – Anti-Federalist debate 
 
The adoption of the novel federal Constitution, unsurprisingly, resulted in significant 
political debates that also influenced certain constitutional ideas. After the drafting of 
the Constitution, two main political ideologies emerged, which also influenced the 
ratification debates of the proposed Constitution. 
  
                                                          
915 An Act for ascertaining certain Taxes and Duties, and for establishing a permanent Revenue (1781). 
916 Denning (n 865) 60–61. 
917 ibid 61. 
918 Randy E Barnett, ‘The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause’ (2001) 68 The University of 
Chicago Law Review 101, 121. 
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II.4.1.a.i The Federalists 
 
As already discussed in the previous chapters, those supporting the adoption of the 
Constitution came to form the political group of ‘The Federalists’, who argued for a 
powerful federal government to become the supervisor of state and local 
governments.919  
Interstate commerce was viewed by the Federalists as a reasonably important 
fundamental keystone of the novel federalist system. Hamilton emphasised on various 
occasions in the Federalist Papers that commerce had been a motive for numerous 
wars up until the creation of the United States.920 He further elaborated upon the 
causes of these wars. For instance, after having obtained their independence from 
Britain, Hamilton also recognised that the various states had attempted to 
unsuccessfully address the restrictive measures of Britain by themselves.921 He further 
identified that the states became even more disunited by engaging in a commercial 
war between each other, thereby restricting interstate commerce.922 He claimed that 
this war resulted from the common situation where neighbouring states ‘are natural 
enemies of each other’ based on a ‘secret jealousy’ towards each other.923  
He thus claimed that in the novel ‘commercial republic’ of the United States of America, 
the peaceful method to terminate this situation was for the states to organise 
themselves in a ‘confederate republic.’924 In such a system, the commercial interests 
of all the states, including those of manufacture and agriculture, would be represented 
collectively by a united government.925 Accordingly, Hamilton claimed that it had 
become a widely adopted position that for the advancement of trade and ‘the 
relationship between the Northern and Southern economies’, the regulation of 
                                                          
919 Eileen Hunt Botting, ‘Protofeminist Responses to the Federalist-Antifederalist Debate’, The 
Federalist Papers (Yale University Press 2009) 533.  
920 Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, The Federalist Papers (Yale University Press 2009) No 6 
26 and No 7 33-34.  
921 ibid No 22 107 – 108.  
922 ibid No 32 155 – 156. 
923 ibid No 6 31. 
924 ibid No 6 28. 
925 ibid No 11 54 and No 12 73-74; Nelson and Pushaw (n 847) 41. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 4: Creating and subsequently protecting a uniform national market in the United 
States: Part I 
 
[192] 
 
interstate commerce should be placed in the hands of ‘a federal superintenden[t].’926 
Madison was also in support of the ‘new power’927 that the Constitution created in the 
area of commerce as he considered one of the functions of the newly created union 
to act as the ‘guardian of commerce.’928  
Therefore, it appears that the Federalists were strongly espousing the ideal that the 
regulation of interstate commerce should be placed in the hands of Congress. The 
viewpoint of Madison and Hamilton, on the other hand, seem to have diverged on 
whether this resulted in the transfer of power from the states to the federal government 
in this area. 
To determine whether interstate commerce was intended to be an exclusive regulatory 
area under the commerce clause, one may turn to Hamilton, who defined three ways 
in which the ‘sovereignty’ of the states in certain areas could be ‘exclusively delegated 
to the United States.’929 Firstly, where delegation of powers occurred through ‘express 
terms’ in the Constitution.930 Secondly, where the federal government was given 
express authority in an area and the states were forbidden from regulating ‘the like’ 
area.931 The third instance, he claimed, was where the federal government was given 
powers in an area and the exercise of ‘a similar authority in the States would be 
absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.’932  
                                                          
926 Hamilton and Madison (n 920) No 11 54 and No 22 107; Nelson and Pushaw (n 847) 41. 
927 Hamilton and Madison (n 920) No 45 238.  
928 ibid No 14 67. 
929 ibid No 32 155-156. 
930 ibid No 32 156. 
931 ibid. 
932 ibid. 
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Interestingly, whilst he elaborated upon what limitations would be placed on the states 
to act in an area in the second and third categories, he did not discuss how the powers 
of the states would be limited in the first category when setting out these categories.  
Consequently, he classified the Commerce Clause under the first category, where 
Congress was granted with the powers of ‘exclusive legislation’ over the area of 
interstate commerce.933 On the other hand, he did not necessarily regard the grant of 
this exclusive authority a limitation on the states in the same area. He thus argued that 
when it was the intention of the Framers to deprive the states of their powers in an 
area, where they were considered to be the improper guardians of the same powers, 
a ‘negative clause’ was drafted by the Framers.934 It may therefore be asserted that 
Hamilton did not support the ideal that states should be deprived of their authority 
completely to regulate interstate commerce as no ‘negative clause’ can be found in 
the Constitution that would expressly state the above.935   
It is intriguing to highlight that even Hamilton relied on the textualist interpretation of 
the Constitution this early on following the drafting of the Constitution. Madison was, 
however, in support of a different method to attain the uniform regulation of interstate 
                                                          
933 ibid. 
934 ibid No 32 158. 
935 ibid. 
3) Exercise of similar powers to 
those of the federal government 
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GOVERNMENT 
Figure 6 Three methods of exclusive delegation of authority by the States to the Federal 
Government according to Hamilton 
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commerce. Relying on a non-textualist method of interpretation, he claimed that the 
Commerce Clause was, in fact, intended as a ‘negative and preventive’ measure to 
eliminate the discriminatory protectionist laws enacted by the states.936 It is thus 
argued that he claimed that the Commerce Clause also served as a limitation on state 
authority in the area of interstate commerce, relying on the intent of the Framers 
instead of text.937 
It consequently appears that the Federalists have adopted a wider understanding of 
the term ‘commerce,’ which included the areas of manufacture and agriculture. This 
also signified that the reach of the federal government would be in the middle line, 
between the two interpretations of commerce at the extreme discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter. The Federalists further understood the part ‘among the 
States’ of the Commerce Clause to refer to activities ‘between the states.’938 They 
appeared to be in support of the viewpoint that to provide a solution to the 
discriminatory protectionist measures imposed by the states after the Revolution, the 
power over interstate commerce had to be transferred to the federal government. On 
the other hand, they seem to have disagreed about the means to achieve such a 
system and have argued for different means to attain the same end relying on two 
different approaches about the interpretation of the Constitution immediately following 
its drafting.  
 
II.4.1.a.ii The Anti-Federalists 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the opposing political group that had an influence over the 
ratification debates of the Constitution was ‘The Anti-Federalists,’ who were 
fundamentally opposed to the adoption of the Constitution and aimed to call for a 
second Convention.939 One of their main criticisms of the proposed Constitution was 
                                                          
936 Letter of February 13, 1829, to J. C. Cabell, Farrand (n 68) vol 3 478 - as referred to from Abel (n 
878) 469. See also Tribe (n 171) 1044–45; Mehmet Konar-Steenberg, ‘One Nation or One Market? 
Liberals, Conservatives, and the Misunderstanding of HP Hood & Sons v Dumond’ (2009) 11 University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 957, 962. 
937 Eule (n 861) 431; McGinley (n 877) 413. 
938 Nelson and Pushaw (n 847) 44 – 46. 
939 Irving Brant, The Bill of Rights: Its Origin and Meaning (Bobbs-Merril 1965) 39. 
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that it created a federal government that possessed powers too great without 
allocating adequately wide powers to the states.940  
The extent and severity of the problems posed by the discriminatory measures can be 
clearly derived from the fact that disagreements were surprisingly almost non-existent 
between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists in the area of interstate commerce.941 
Those who were strongly opposed to the idea of a centralised power in the hands of 
the federal government, it is thus argued, also considered it necessary for the federal 
government to be entrusted with the creation of a uniform system of interstate 
commerce.  
Nonetheless, the method of obtaining this uniform system was still unclear: Congress 
was granted the exclusive authority to regulate interstate commerce based on the text 
of this clause, however it was still not determined what was to happen to the 
discriminatory measures enacted by the states. 
 
III. The development of the application of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause 
 
The search for a solution to the above question has been on-going since the adoption 
of the Constitution. The Commerce Clause has thus unsurprisingly become one of the 
most litigated areas of the federal Constitution, with disagreements about its meaning 
and the appropriate method of interpretation of this constitutional provision continuing 
up to date.  
Whilst searching for the above solution, the interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
has also developed a double - an affirmative and a negative – understanding. This 
dual understanding of the Commerce Clause has developed around the two main 
questions posed previously. The affirmative understanding involves the authority of 
Congress and the limitations of these powers of Congress. The negative aspect 
examines the Commerce Clause from the angle about which the Constitution 
                                                          
940 Wiecek (n 51) 68. 
941 Nelson and Pushaw (n 847) 36; Friedman and Deacon (n 860) 1894. 
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remained silent: whether the grant of power to Congress limits the authority of the 
states to regulate in this area. This dual understanding of the Commerce Clause 
creates the constant conflict between the state and federal powers, since the 
extension of the limitations of the powers of the states will inevitably restrict the powers 
of the federal government and vice versa.  
In the following, the chapter will investigate the interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
through the main judgments of the Supreme Court in this area and how these provided 
a solution to the two main fundamental questions that originate from the interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause. It will also place a special emphasis on the development of 
the definition of interstate commerce by analysing the understanding of ‘commerce’ 
and ‘among the states,’ where possible, in the judgments. 
 
III. 1. The first answer: dual federalism 
 
The first main case of the Supreme Court that required the interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause was Gibbons v Ogden.942 This case concerned the operation of 
steamboats in the interstate route between New York and Elizabethtown.943 Gibbons 
operated his steamboats with a licence granted under federal laws on this route, which 
had been stopped from navigating the waters of New York.944 Ogden, when filing for 
the injunction to request the above, claimed that Gibbons violated the license 
requirement imposed by the state of New York for intrastate navigation that had 
created exclusive rights for him to navigate the waters of New York from 1808 until 
1838.945 Gibbons, in response claimed that the New York law was contrary to – among 
others - the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution.946  
Before declaring whether this state law contravened the federal Commerce Clause, 
Chief Justice Marshall started by firstly defining interstate commerce. He thus first held 
                                                          
942 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
943 ibid 2–4. 
944 ibid. 
945 ibid 4–8. 
946 ibid 186. 
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that commerce was to be defined widely and should be identified as ‘intercourse’.947 
This ‘organic conception of commerce,’948 he held, clearly included navigation.949 It is 
also interesting to highlight that the future Chief Justice Marshall also advocated for 
the same interpretation of commerce during the ratifying convention of the Constitution 
in Virginia.950 
Chief Justice Marshall, in his decision in this case, subsequently adopted the view that 
‘commerce among the states’ was to be understood as ‘intercourse’ that was to do 
‘with the states,’ that ‘intermingled with’ the states and that ‘concern[ed] more States 
than one.’951 This viewpoint seems to be in direct support of the first ideology about 
the wide definition of commerce in the times of the adoption of the Constitution. 
Consequently, this would also allow for the federal government to regulate areas that 
would have belonged to the states previously. 
On the other hand, if one is to follow the ideology that the Framers of the Constitution 
only wished for the economic areas of commerce to be included in the Commerce 
Clause, it may be argued that Chief Justice Marshall, in effect, extended the definition 
of commerce to areas that might not have been intended to be included in the 
Constitution by the Framers.952 
After having established that the regulation of interstate navigation falls under the 
Commerce Clause, Chief Justice Marshall held – adopting the approach of Federalists 
- that Congress had been given exclusive powers to regulate interstate commerce.953 
He consequently held - following the approach advocated for by Madison - that while 
Congress was granted with exclusive powers over interstate commerce, states were 
still able to exercise their regulatory power in areas that concerned ‘their own purely 
internal affairs, whether of trading or police.’954 Such subject matters, in the opinion of 
Chief Justice Marshall, included “inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of 
                                                          
947 ibid 189 – 190 and 193-194. 
948 Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite (Quadrangle Books 
1964) 42. 
949 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100) 193 - 194. 
950 Barnett (n 918) 123. 
951 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
952 Tushnet (n 83) 162–163.  
953 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100) 199 - 200; Corwin (n 101) 484. 
954 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100) 209 - 210.  
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every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and 
those which respect turnpike roads, [and] ferries.”955  
Thus, states were still able to regulate commerce, but only those activities that 
concerned the so-called ‘police power[s]’ of the state.956 A particular characteristic of 
these activities was that they could still be held constitutional even if they had 
‘considerable influence on commerce’ as the power to regulate these belonged to the 
states and not the federal government.957 
The above approach adopted by Chief Justice Marshall demonstrated the initial 
support for the ideal of the ‘dual federalist’ system of the United States.958 Adopting 
this ideology, it may be argued that two separate spheres of regulatory power exist in 
the area of commerce based on the subject matter of the regulation. Correspondingly, 
the regulatory power over interstate commerce was granted to Congress and that over 
intrastate commerce – or as Chief Justice Marshall characterised these as ‘police 
powers’959 - was still possessed by the states.  
 
 
 
                                                          
955 ibid 209–210. 
956 Corwin (n 101) 480. 
957 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 462.  
958 Corwin (n 101) 481. 
959 ibid 480. 
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Figure 7 Chief Justice Marshall's dual constitutional approach to the Commerce Clause 
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An implication of this model addresses the negative understanding of the Commerce 
Clause. If Congress was to have exclusive powers over interstate commerce, the 
states, adopting the Madisonian approach, were implied not to possess any regulatory 
power in this area. This provides the Supreme Court with the ability to hold state 
regulations unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in this dual federalist model. 
In order to do so, the Supreme Court would rely on the subject matter of the regulation 
and decide which government was to regulate such activity. A further aspect of this 
approach is that it would be the Supreme Court who would be able to determine the 
limits of the powers of the states in regulating interstate commerce, and, as a 
consequence, would possess the power to extend or limit their regulatory powers.960 
This gave the power to the Supreme Court to rule on the interpretation of commerce, 
and specifically, interstate commerce at the time when the cases were decided. 
Moreover, through this interpretation, the Supreme Court was also able to define the 
line between federal and state powers based on the circumstances present when the 
case is decided. 
Furthermore, many ensuing cases involved the interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
from this negative understanding. One such case was Willson v Black Bird Creek,961 
where Chief Justice Marshall characterised this negative understanding as the 
‘dormant’ aspect of the Commerce Clause.962 This case concerned a state law that 
allowed for the building of a dam on Black Bird Creek that was argued to be 
unconstitutional under the ‘dormant state’ of the Commerce Clause as it ‘interfered 
with interstate navigation.’963 Chief Justice Marshall subsequently held that the state 
law in question was not unconstitutional as no act by Congress was passed that would 
have regulated the activity performed by the builders of the Black Bird Creek.964 He 
thus seemed to adopt the approach that the state law was merely the exercise of the 
police powers of the state that was to be regulated by the state, as opposed to the 
federal government. This exercise of powers further resulted in the improvement of 
                                                          
960 Frankfurter (n 948) 18. 
961 Willson v Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co (1829) 27 US (2 Pet) 245. 
962 ibid 252; Frankfurter (n 948) 28; Friedman and Deacon (n 860) 1920.  
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‘the health of the local inhabitants,’ as argued by the plaintiffs, the regulatory power 
over which, based on this decision, clearly belonged to the state.965 
Whilst an emphasis has been placed upon it, the above cases did not result in the 
adoption of the expression ‘Dormant Commerce Clause’ for the negative aspects of 
the Commerce Clause immediately. Since the successor of Chief Justice Marshall did 
not agree with the formulation of this dual federalist approach to the Commerce 
Clause, the majority of constitutional scholars and Supreme Court judges originate the 
term Dormant Commerce Clause from the decision in Gibbons v Ogden.966 Moreover, 
most of the succeeding challenges under the Commerce Clause argued in front of the 
Supreme Court for an extensive time concerned the interpretation of this negative 
aspect. The successor of Chief Justice Marshall, Chief Justice Taney, was thus 
entrusted with the task of engaging in the further interpretation of the negative aspect 
of the Commerce Clause.  
 
III. 2. The concurrent authority approach 
 
Whilst Chief Justice Marshall adopted the view that the states did not possess powers 
to regulate interstate commerce as that power had been exclusively granted to 
Congress under the Commerce Clause, this standpoint appeared to be unacceptable 
for his successor, Chief Justice Taney.  
He, instead, formulated a novel position, which claimed that the regulatory powers of 
the states under the Commerce Clause were not limited in all instances. According to 
his approach, the states had regulatory powers over interstate commerce, when 
Congress had not legislated in the same area that the states had done so. This 
approach would consequently result in the Supreme Court being deprived of its tasks 
- as understood by Chief Justice Marshall - of determining the limits of the powers of 
the states in such instances.967 Such limits of these powers were to be subsequently 
                                                          
965 Russell Chapin, ‘Chadha, Garcia and the Dormant Commerce Clause Limitation on State Authority 
to Regulate’ (1991) 23 The Urban Lawyer 163, 165. 
966 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
967 Denning (n 893) 432; Arthur Lang, ‘The Marshall Doctrine, The Taney Doctrine and Calhounian 
Federalism’ (2012) 10 The Dartmouth Law Journal 76, 79; McGinley (n 877) 413. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 4: Creating and subsequently protecting a uniform national market in the United 
States: Part I 
 
[201] 
 
determined by Congress, not the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Taney, thus, 
established an ideology - strongly in opposition to the ideology developed by Chief 
Justice Marshall - of ‘concurrent authority’ over interstate commerce between 
Congress and the states in The Licence Cases,968 upholding the laws of 
‘Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire to regulate the sale of liquor’ 
including those imported into the states.969 
Following this approach, the states were able to exercise regulatory powers that would 
have been held unconstitutional under the dual federalist theory. However, the 
‘concurrent authority’ approach recognised that the states had, before and since the 
adoption of the Constitution, been enacting legislations that had regulated the area of 
interstate commerce.970 Chief Justice Taney refused to invalidate these laws based 
on the distinction established by Gibbons v Ogden971 between commerce and police 
powers, since he claimed that the above characterisation based on the subject matter 
of the regulation was ‘untenable.’972  
Under the dual federalist approach, states would not have been recognised as holding 
any regulatory powers over interstate commerce as that was claimed to be an area, 
the regulation of which had been exclusively granted to Congress. The concurrent 
authority approach, on the other hand, claimed that the states were allowed to regulate 
the same areas as Congress in the limited instances where Congress was silent, i.e. 
it had not legislated, in the subject matter in question. This viewpoint also seemingly 
rejects the ideology that the grant of regulatory powers to Congress under the 
Commerce Clause was exclusive, since states could still regulate the same area. 
Accordingly, states were allowed to retain their regulatory authority over a wider area 
of commerce than under the previous dual federalist approach. 
Chief Justice Taney also devised an additional way to restrict the powers of Congress, 
which, curiously, focussed on a method that he declared to be ‘untenable:’ the subject 
                                                          
968 The Licence Cases (1847) 46 US 504, 579. 
969 ibid; Denning (n 893) 434; Friedman and Deacon (n 860) 1930. 
970 Frankfurter (n 948) 51; Denning (n 893) 432. 
971 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
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matter in question. For instance, in The Passenger Cases973 he argued that the 
‘intercourse of persons’ could still be regulated by the states, since such acts did not 
constitute commerce.974 
This novel standpoint also addressed the question whether the Commerce Clause 
posed a limitation on the regulatory powers of the states in interstate commerce. Chief 
Justice Taney claimed that such a limitation might only exist when Congress had 
enacted a legislation about the same subject matter that the states had done so.975 It 
is interesting to highlight that this determination adopted the approach previously 
developed by Chief Justice Marshall, whose decision in Gibbons v Ogden976 Chief 
Justice Taney was so strongly opposed to.977 What was important, still, according to 
him, was the subject matter of the regulation. On the other hand, he did not adopt the 
approach fully as in The Licence Cases978 he held that a state regulation could only 
be held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause if the subject matter of both the 
state and federal regulations was a ‘truly national concern.’979 Unsurprisingly, he failed 
to identify what regulations would constitute a ‘truly national concern’ in the four key 
Dormant Commerce Clause cases presented to the Supreme Court while he served 
as its Chief Justice.980 On the other hand, it would seem that with acknowledging that 
certain subject matters were of ‘truly national concern,’981 he, in effect, recognised that 
a uniform national system was required to regulate such matters. 
It may also be argued that the non-existence of a clear definition of what would 
constitute the above concern, allowed the non-originalist method of interpretation to 
flourish in this area. This expression could, thus, become a dynamic concept, capable 
of adapting to the changes in society and economics.982 Justice Holmes, for instance, 
in Towne v Eisner claimed, in support of such an ideology, that:  
                                                          
973 The Passenger Cases (1849) 7 How 283, 474 and 493.  
974 ibid. 
975 Frankfurter (n 948) 50. 
976 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
977 McGinley (n 877) 413. 
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979 McGinley (n 877) 413. 
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981 McGinley (n 877) 413. 
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a word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the 
circumstances and the time in which it is used.983 
It is nonetheless accepted that this would have not guaranteed legal certainty for cases 
arguing for the invalidation of state measures under the Commerce Clause. It would 
have, however, guaranteed for the protection of the fundamental values the 
Constitution was set out to embody and protect, such as the creation of a uniform 
approach towards interstate commerce and to protect the individuals from the 
detrimental consequences of diverging approaches to this area. 
It may, consequently, be established that the model of the dual federalist approach 
seemed to have been partly rejected by the Supreme Court with the inception of the 
concurrent authority approach. Traces of the dual federalist approach could still be 
identified in the concurrent authority approach as, for instance, the characterisation of 
a regulation based on its subject matter was still utilised by the Court.984 Another trace 
of the dual federalist approach present in this novel approach was that Congress and 
the states still possessed exclusive regulatory powers. Congress regulated subject 
matters of ‘truly national concern’985 that it assumed the exclusive regulatory power 
over when it enacted federal law about these. Until that point, the regulatory power 
over the subject matter of the regulation was an exclusive one of the states.  
The concurrent authority approach, however, also created a novel problem as it 
became obvious that in certain subject matters both Congress and the states would 
wish to regulate and it therefore posed a challenge to decide which of them possessed 
regulatory powers over the subject matter in question with a test that lacked clear 
definition. 
 
III. 3. The novel national – local test 
 
                                                          
983 Towne v Eisner (1918) 245 US 418, 438. 
984 Tribe (n 171) 1046–1047. 
985 McGinley (n 877) 413. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 4: Creating and subsequently protecting a uniform national market in the United 
States: Part I 
 
[204] 
 
The change that determined the method the Supreme Court applied in the 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause for the subsequent decades arrived in a case 
once again about navigation laws. In Cooley v Board of Wardens of the Port of 
Philadelphia986 Cooley, the owner of two vessels was required to pay a fine for 
contravening a state pilotage law of Pennsylvania, which regulation, he argued, was 
invalid under the Commerce Clause.987 
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Curtis firstly held that it was ‘settled’ that 
the understanding of commerce encompassed navigation.988 How ‘settled’ this 
understanding of commerce was, however, is questionable, since, for instance, the 
previous two approaches developed by the Supreme Court relied on two different 
understandings of commerce. Justice Curtis consequently argued that the regulation 
of the activities in the case of pilots:  
offering and rendering their services, of the responsibilities which shall rest 
upon them, of the powers they shall possess, of the compensation they may 
demand, and of the penalties by which their rights and duties may be 
enforced,989 
 
amounted to regulation about navigation and thus of commerce. It is thus apparent 
that in the area of navigation, Justice Curtis adopted the approach that argued for the 
wider understanding of commerce. This would, however, result in a wide range of 
powers granted to Congress in this area. 
Justice Curtis subsequently claimed that it had not been addressed by the Court 
clearly beforehand whether Congress had been given exclusive authority to regulate 
interstate commerce that deprived states of all their authority.990 He thus formulated 
the viewpoint that this was not the case and the grant of power to Congress under the 
Commerce Clause did not ‘expressly exclude the States from exercising an authority 
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over its subject-matter.’991 He consequently declared that the states were still allowed 
to regulate the areas in interstate commerce that were ‘imperatively demanding […] 
diversity’ and could therefore only be adequately addressed by ‘local’ state 
regulation.992 Consequently, Congress was to regulate only those ‘national’ areas of 
interstate commerce that required ‘exclusive legislation by Congress.’993 
This novel approach of ‘selective exclusiveness’994 seemingly rejects the interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause under the dual federalist approach as formulated by Chief 
Justice Marshall. Whilst he argued that both Congress and the states had exclusive 
powers to regulate the areas that they possessed based on a distinction characterised 
by the subject matter of the regulation, the selective exclusiveness approach made 
this dependent on the ‘nature’ of the subject matter. If the regulation concerned a 
subject matter of ‘local’ nature that required diverse application by the different states, 
the exclusive power to regulate remained with the states. If the regulation, however, 
concerned a subject matter that was of ‘national’ nature, requiring a uniform regulation 
by Congress, the exclusive powers above this area were granted to Congress.  
On the other hand, as highlighted, this test still retained the characteristics of the dual 
federalist approach by claiming that both Congress and the states still possessed 
exclusive powers over the different areas of interstate commerce. It is thus argued that 
this approach was not a complete rejection of the dual federalist approach, but an 
alteration of it.  
This standpoint thus addressed both the fundamental questions that originate from the 
Commerce Clause. Firstly, it claimed that Congress was granted exclusive powers, 
however, the extent of these was limited to areas of interstate commerce that were of 
‘national’ nature. It also addressed the second question, arguing that the powers of 
the states were limited in the areas of interstate commerce as they could not regulate 
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areas of ‘national’ concern. On the other hand, they had powers to regulate areas of 
interstate commerce of ‘local’ concern, which Congress could not interfere with.  
Another key characteristic of this approach is that it fails to clearly identify what matters 
of ‘local’ and ‘national’ nature were.995 To determine the above, Justice Curtis in this 
case used a more technical approach, similar to the one adopted by Chief Justice 
Taney previously: he argued that what should be examined is whether a federal 
regulation had been enacted about a similar subject matter.996 This, he held, would 
show how Congress regarded the nature of the subject matter. It may thus be argued 
that three situations could arise based on this approach:  
(1) If Congress had enacted a regulation claiming that it was to regulate the subject 
matter, that was of ‘national’ nature;  
(2) if Congress had enacted a regulation claiming that it is for the states to regulate 
a certain area, that was of ‘local’ nature and  
(3) if Congress had not legislated in the area, it was to be held of ‘local’ nature.997  
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This part of his judgment, in effect, blended the previously adopted approaches to the 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause. The first category was already present under 
the dual federalist approach and the third category was an alteration of the concurrent 
authority approach.  
The novel approach was, in fact, the second category, which allowed Congress to 
transfer its exclusive authority to the states in an area that it was assigned to regulate. 
This interpretation would have not existed under the dual federalist approach, and it 
may also be argued that this approach developed due to the recognition by Congress 
that states should possess regulatory powers over certain matters that might have 
been delegated to Congress in the Constitution. On the other hand, this raises further 
questions. If Congress is able to delegate its exclusive powers to the states, would it 
not act unconstitutionally as these powers had been granted exclusively for them for 
a uniform interpretation to be applied to interstate commerce? Or would Congress 
simply exercise its powers as it was ‘necessary and proper’ under Article I section 
8?998 These questions, however, remained unanswered in this case. 
If one is to follow the dual federalist approach, such transfer of powers may, in fact, be 
regarded unconstitutional, if it is found that Congress is supposed to regulate the area 
exclusively. However, Congress could argue that since it possesses exclusive powers 
to regulate this area, it would be able to transfer its power to regulate, as part of the 
authority granted to it. Congress could further argue that such a transfer was 
‘necessary and proper’ under Article I section 8, thus allowing for an interpretation of 
this Clause that could adapt to changes in society.999 Moreover, the states would also 
find themselves in an advantageous position in this category, if they were able to 
regulate these areas and would be able to adopt distinct laws, unique to each state. 
Justice Curtis subsequently found that section 4 of the Act of Congress 7th August, 
1789 in question belonged to the second category, since it was, in effect, a grant of 
power to states to regulate ‘all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of 
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the United States’ until Congress withdrew this authority.1000 He thus held that the 
regulation of Pennsylvania was not unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause as 
its ‘nature’ had previously been declared by an act of Congress to be an area of ‘local’ 
concern, which could ‘be the best provided for’ by state regulation.1001 
A characteristic of this novel approach that may be emphasised is that Justice Curtis, 
similar to the previous decisions, recognised that certain areas of interstate commerce 
that were of national nature required a uniform regulatory system. He, however, also 
recognised that the creation of such a market would not be the most suitable option 
for all areas of commerce. Where those local concerns were considered more 
important than national ones, he claimed that the local regulation would be a more 
suitable approach. 
The new national-local test that he devised also provided a novel method for 
determining the limits of the regulatory powers of both Congress and the state in areas 
of interstate commerce. It also constituted a reconciliation attempt of the previous 
interpretations of the Commerce Clause: it retained characteristics of the dual 
federalist and concurrent authority approaches.1002 A ‘new era’ thus commenced 
where the Supreme Court, by utilising this new test, could make the ‘indefiniteness’ of 
the Commerce Clause ‘in some way manageable.’1003 This new era, however, also 
required the Supreme Court to take into consideration the two fundamental questions 
that arose after the adoption of the Constitution and especially regarding the 
Commerce Clause. 
 
III. 4. A narrower definition of commerce  
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A main feature of the cases following Cooley v Board of Wardens of the Port of 
Philadelphia1004 was the interpretation of the understanding of commerce and how this 
affected the extent of the regulatory powers of Congress and the states.  
Whilst in Cooley v Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia1005 it was claimed that 
the definition of commerce encompassed navigation, the concept of commerce as a 
whole was not clearly defined by Justice Curtis. This enabled the Supreme Court to 
create novel, more restrictive interpretations of the concept of commerce, and thus 
limit the powers of Congress to regulate this area.  
Kidd v Pearson1006 was such an instance. The interpretation of the definition of 
commerce adopted in this case stated that manufacture was inherently different from 
commerce.1007 Therefore, any state law regulating manufacture could not be held 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, since that area was not classed as 
commerce.1008  
Whilst devising this interpretation, Justice Lamar adopted the test formulated by Chief 
Justice Marshall, which claimed that the determinant in the test was whether the states 
had regulatory powers over an area of interstate commerce. On the other hand, he 
argued that it had to be determined whether the subject matter of the regulation could 
be classified as commerce, which had to be determined based on its ‘functions.’1009 
He consequently held that manufacture could not be categorised as commerce since 
its function, he argued, was ‘the fashioning of raw materials into a change of form for 
use.’1010 He distinguished this from the functions of commerce, which he held, involved 
‘the buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto.’1011 
Justice Lamar, further adopting the narrowest interpretation of the definition of 
commerce, which was classed under the third group in the beginning of this chapter, 
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argued that the definition of commerce did not only exclude manufacture but 
‘agriculture, horticulture, stockraising, domestic fisheries, mining – in short every 
branch of human industry’ could not be classified as commerce either.1012 Accordingly, 
if the state law was to regulate any of these activities, it did not regulate commerce 
and thus could not be held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. 
By restricting the definition of commerce, Justice Lamar also restricted the regulatory 
powers of Congress in interstate commerce, as it could no longer legislate in areas 
that it might have been allowed to do so under the previous decisions. 
Correspondingly, this restriction also resulted in the increase of the activities that the 
states were allowed to regulate. This regulatory power of the states further expanded 
in various following cases and was held to include activities such as ‘ginning,’ ‘the 
manufacture of oleomargarine’ or mining.1013 Moreover, once it was established that 
the function of the subject matter was the production of an article of commerce, the 
nature of the subject matter was no longer significant. 
This position, therefore, not only adopted a restricted definition of commerce, but at 
the same time also created a transformed interpretation of the dual federalist approach 
to the Commerce Clause. Under this new approach, the regulatory powers of the 
states not only increased, but they were also allowed to exercise their regulatory 
powers in areas that could have been held to belong exclusively to Congress under 
the previous approaches. It could, however, also be claimed that this was a return to 
the position before the adoption of the Constitution, when these areas would have 
been regulated by the states, not a uniform federal government. 
Congress was, on the other hand, still held to be able to exercise its exclusive 
regulatory powers over interstate commerce, but only over activities that were included 
in the narrow definition of commerce and that were interstate in nature. In order to 
determine what this concept included, Justice Lamar identified commerce as ‘the 
buying and selling and the transportation incidental’ to the production of an article of 
commerce.1014 Such a restrictive interpretation of commerce would have arguably 
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excluded activities held to be included in the definition of commerce previously, such 
as navigation in Gibbons v Ogden.1015 The contention stands unless one would argue 
that the navigation in that case was incidental to the production of an article of 
commerce. However, this would be a highly unlikely interpretation of the activities 
involved in the above case, since the operation of the steamboat was the main area 
of business concerned in the case.  
Justice Lamar subsequently devised a test for the interpretation of when the powers 
of Congress over interstate commerce commenced. He held that such regulatory 
powers of Congress began to take effect from the time when the article of commerce 
was ‘shipped, or entered with a common carrier for transportation to another State, or 
have been started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey.’1016 He 
thus created two further conditions for the regulation of interstate commerce to come 
into effect. Firstly, the article of commerce must be a final product. Secondly, it would 
have to be transported from one state to another. It is, however, argued that the 
crossing of state boundaries was not required for the regulatory powers to exist, the 
mere aim of setting out to be transported to another state was sufficient. 
Therefore, even though the Commerce Clause initially granted regulatory powers over 
a wide range of activities to Congress, which is argued to have been implemented in 
the early decisions of the Supreme Court to assist in the creation of a uniform national 
market, the extent of these activities soon commenced to be restricted by the Supreme 
Court. This was based on the reasoning that states should be granted regulatory 
powers over certain areas as their interests should be placed above those of creating 
a uniform national and uniform market. Furthermore, these restrictions also became 
apparent in the interpretation of the definition of the ‘commerce’ and ‘among the states’ 
components of the Commerce Clause.  
It is also argued that the diverging methods of interpretation of this Clause could 
develop due to two fundamental reasons: firstly, the lack of clear definition of what 
interstate commerce was, and, secondly, the climate of the era had transformed since 
the adoption of the Constitution and the approach of the Supreme Court, it is claimed, 
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in line with a non-originalist method of interpretation, had transformed as well. As a 
result, the powers of the states seemed to increase, while the powers of Congress 
began to be restricted by the Supreme Court. However, the living constitutional values 
approach advocated for by this approach would argue that the creation of a uniform 
national market and the protection of the citizens from the potential detrimental effects 
of the diverging approaches to interstate commerce were not fully objected to by the 
Supreme Court at this era. The Justices, merely, recognised that the interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause had to adapt to the changes in society, which at the time called 
for the restriction of the powers of the federal government in this era and allowing more 
control to the states.  
 
III. 5. The direct-indirect burden test 
 
The creation of the federalist system prompted the political, constitutional, and most 
importantly, the economic transformation of the United States.1017 For instance, with 
the creation of interstate railways, it was becoming less problematic to produce ‘goods 
that could be advertised and sold nationwide.’1018 With such developments in interstate 
transportation, commerce - in its widest definition - began to transform. Particularly, 
the production, transportation and trade interstate became more regular. 
This changing economic climate, however, required a uniform system of interstate 
commerce even more so than in 1787, where the flow of commerce would not have 
been restricted by discriminatory measures imposed by states on out-of-state 
commerce. On the other hand, following the national-local test of Cooley,1019 the 
complete elimination of discriminatory measures would have required the Supreme 
Court to hold all areas of interstate commerce of ‘national’ nature. This would have 
necessitated a vast extension of the regulatory powers of Congress, and the reduction 
of the areas the regulatory powers over which were still held to belong to the states. 
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This position would also raise questions regarding the Tenth Amendment, which sets 
out that areas not delegated to the federal government still remain with the states.1020 
Based on the developments in technology, many cases from this era were inevitably 
brought as challenges to the regulation of activities related to the new railways. 
The first group of cases that asked for the invalidation of state regulations under the 
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause were those that applied the test devised in 
Cooley,1021 focusing on the nature of the subject matter. In Smith v Alabama1022 the 
Supreme Court found the state regulation that required train operators to ‘be licensed 
by a state board of examiners’ to be of local concern, and thus constitutional under the 
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause.1023 On the other hand, in Wabash, St Louis 
& Pacific Railway Co v Illinois1024 the application of the national-local test resulted in 
holding the state regulation about ‘the intrastate rates’ that railway operators could be 
allowed to charge for out-of-state articles of commerce unconstitutional under the 
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause.1025 Therefore, while following this approach 
resulted in the extension of the regulatory powers of the states in the area of licensing, 
contravening the ideal that uniform legislation was required by Congress exclusively 
in all areas of interstate commerce, they also reduced the regulatory powers of the 
states in the areas of import and export duties. 
The second group of cases of this era devised a novel test, where the focus was 
placed on the interpretation of what constituted commerce ‘among the states,’ contrary 
to the previous focus placed upon ‘commerce.’ However, this test further adopted an 
approach that examined the effects of the subject matter, rather than its nature.  
This method determined that if the state regulation was ‘only indirectly, incidentally, 
and remotely’ affecting interstate commerce, it was not unconstitutional under the 
negative Commerce Clause.1026 Acts with such effect were held to be, for instance, 
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the restriction of ‘train speed within city limits’ and the requirements to have a specific 
number of ‘brakemen on freight trains of over 25 cars’ in the area of railway 
regulations.1027 Moreover, the similar test was also utilised when holding state laws 
about the quarantine of cattle or state blue sky laws constitutional.1028  
Consequently, under this approach, the regulations that posed such a ‘substantial’ 
burden on interstate commerce that these were deemed to be a ‘direct burden,’ were 
held to be invalid under the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause, as the 
regulatory powers over such activities belonged exclusively to Congress.1029 Such 
direct burden was found in Seaboard Air Line Railway v Blackwell,1030 where under 
the state regulation an interstate train would have been required to come to a halt ‘124 
times within 123 miles.’1031  
Whereas it may seem that the Supreme Court upheld the distinction between the two 
distinct and exclusive regulatory powers over interstate commerce, the limits of these 
powers became highly blurred during this period. Whilst applying the Cooley1032 test 
utilised the nature of the subject matter of the regulation, the direct-indirect test 
prioritised examining the effects of the regulation over its subject matter. Such an 
examination, however, relied on ‘subjective, and eminently manipulable distinctions,’ 
and effectively resulted in state regulations about the same subject matter being held 
constitutional in one case and unconstitutional in another.1033  
It has been argued previously that the lack of a clear definition of a concept, such as 
‘a republican government’ or ‘commerce,’ may prove beneficial in situations where it 
serves for the harmonisation of the laws with the advancements of society and the 
economy. One method of achieving this has been highlighted as the non-originalist 
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method that would allow for the advancements to be integrated into the decisions of 
the Supreme Court. 
The legal uncertainty that this approach of the Supreme Court had, however, created 
to the negative aspects of the Commerce Clause in 1927 could thus be summarised 
by Powell as ‘the states […] [were allowed to] regulate interstate commerce, but not 
too much.’1034 The contradictory judgments about the same subject matter using 
different methods to interpret the same provision and the above statement clearly 
demonstrate that the lack of a clear standard created high legal uncertainty, which 
increasingly made the need for a reform in this area more apparent.  
 
IV. The modern approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause 
 
Towards the middle of the twentieth century, it became apparent for the Supreme 
Court that the direct-indirect approach previously adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Commerce Clause cases about its negative aspect would be unsuitable for the 
challenges argued in front of the modern Supreme Court.1035 An important element 
that contributed toward this change was the various opinions of Chief Justice Stone, 
who was the main critic of the direct-indirect test.1036 Therefore, as expected, another 
approach emerged in this era about the interpretation of the negative aspect of the 
Commerce Clause, which effectively transformed into the current modern 
approach.1037  
A challenge to a state regulation under the now so-called Dormant Commerce Clause 
will have to satisfy a novel ‘two-tiered standard’ in order to be held unconstitutional:1038 
First, it will have to be deemed non-discriminatory under the first anti-discrimination 
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tier. Second, it will have to satisfy a novel balancing test. In the following, the 
development of each of these tiers will be considered separately. 
 
IV.1. The first tier test: the anti-discrimination principle 
 
Modern cases addressing the Dormant Commerce Clause, somewhat surprisingly, 
and contrary to previous decisions, do not concentrate on the interpretation of either 
‘commerce’ or ‘among the states.’ These cases have developed a novel test that 
focuses on an entirely different approach to the Commerce Clause: discrimination in 
the area of commerce between the states.  
Even though it has been argued above that discriminatory and protectionist measures 
constituted one of the reasons that led to the call for the creation of a uniform system 
for the regulation of interstate commerce, Larsen highlights that these measures have 
failed to take centre-stage in decisions about the interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause until after the New Deal.1039  
It is, however, argued that this method would, in fact, coincide with that of the living 
constitutional values approach. According to this approach, it may be established that 
since the values that the Framers wished to protect were the creation of a uniform 
national market and the protection of the citizens from the detrimental effects of for 
instance, potential trade wars. With the developments in society, it may be argued that 
this fundamental value has, in fact, transformed into one that calls for the protection 
from non-discrimination between the states in the area of interstate commerce. 
Thus, in line with the modern approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause, state 
regulations challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause have to be first 
examined based on their discriminatory nature. If a regulation is found to be 
discriminatory under this tier, it is subsequently held unconstitutional under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, without it having to be examined further under 
the second tier.  
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As with many times before in the case of commerce, for the purposes of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis, the Supreme Court has opted for the adoption of a ‘fairly 
broad’ interpretation of ‘discrimination,’1040 which is now defined as ‘any disparity in 
the treatment of in-state and out-of-state interests – whether business, users, or 
products -.’1041 Larsen emphasised that such unequal treatment is commonly identified 
in constitutional law in three manners in a state regulation, which classification may 
also be adopted for cases discussing the Dormant Commerce Clause.1042 
 
1.1. Facial discrimination: per se invalid 
 
Firstly, Larsen categorises a state regulation as ‘facially discriminatory’ if it 
discriminates ‘on its face.’1043 Such a regulation was identified in Dean Milk Co v City 
of Madison,1044 where the state law in question required the milk sold locally to have 
been processed within five miles of the City.1045 Even though this law was silent on the 
out-of-state interests, Justice Clark declared that it, in fact, ‘erect[ed] an economic 
barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the state.’1046 
He thus still found the law to be facially discriminatory and thus unconstitutional.1047 
Despite the act showing clear discriminatory characteristics, it was, surprisingly, still 
examined under the second tier test of the modern approach. 1048  
This requirement for the examination of facially discriminatory laws under the second 
tier test was, however, held to be unnecessary following the decision in Philadelphia 
v New Jersey.1049 This case concerned a state regulation that prohibited the 
importation of out-of-state waste claiming that the state did not have enough space to 
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allocate to such waste.1050 Furthermore, New Jersey claimed that ‘the improper 
disposal’ of the out-of-state waste would pose high risks to ‘the public health, safety, 
and welfare.’1051 The state regulation was held to be facially discriminatory, and thus 
unconstitutional, as the only reason for the prohibition of the importation of out-of-state 
waste was clearly its origin.1052 The Supreme Court in this decision, however, created 
an exception to this category. It held that a state regulation, that is facially 
discriminatory, is prohibited under the Dormant Commerce Clause, unless ‘there is 
some reason, apart from the[ir] origin [of articles of commerce], to treat them 
differently.’1053 What would constitute such reasons, however, was not defined 
subsequently by Justice Stewart. 
Baldwin v G A F Seelig Inc1054 also involved a state regulation about dairy, asking for 
a minimum price to be paid for ‘milk purchases’ by dealers to producers.1055 This, in 
effect, the Supreme Court held, resulted in an advantageous position for in-state milk 
producers.1056 In reaching its decision, the Court declared the state law invalid under 
the Dormant Commerce Clause as it added extra costs on out-of-state dairy farmers 
and was therefore also discriminatory in effect.1057 Another state regulation that was 
held to be unconstitutional based on its facially discriminatory nature was found in 
Chemical Waste Management, Inc v Hunt,1058 in which the regulation in question 
imposed an additional fee expressly on ‘hazardous waste’ originating out-of-state 
disposed of in the state of Alabama.1059  
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Commerce Clause’ (1986) 3 Const. Comment. 395, 397. and ibid 397. 
1054 Baldwin, Commissioner of Agriculture & Markets, et al v GAF Seelig Inc (1949) 294 US 511. 
1055 ibid 519. 
1056 ibid 522 - 524; Richard B Collins, ‘Economic Union as a Constitutional Value’ (1988) 63 New York 
University Law Review 43, 97. 
1057 Collins (n 1056) 97. 
1058 Chemical Waste Management, Inc v Hunt (1992) 504 US 334. 
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In Maine v Taylor1060 the Supreme Court, however, created another exception to this 
general rule. They held a facially discriminatory state law prohibiting the importation of 
baitfish from other states constitutional, reasoning that allowing such imports would 
contaminate the rivers of the state with ‘parasites and alien fish species.’1061 To justify 
the departure from the per se rule of invalidity, they examined the state law in question 
under the second-tier test, which will be analysed later. 
 
1.2. Discrimination in effect 
 
The second type of state regulation identified by Larsen that may not be upheld based 
on the grounds that the Act in question is contrary to the fundamental value of non-
discrimination, is when the regulation is found to be ‘discriminatory in effect.’1062 Such 
discriminatory effect was held to exist when two separate regulations enacted by 
Massachusetts were ‘operating together’ in West Lynn Creamery, Inc v Healy,1063 
which were held to have created a disparate treatment of in- and out-of-state 
interests.1064 The two acts in questions created a system where a monthly premium 
was paid by ‘every dealer in milk products’ to a fund that subsequently distributed 
these to in-state dairy dealers.1065 The Supreme Court, however, held the state law 
invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause and argued that this was because its 
discriminatory effects ‘artificially encourag[ed] in-state production even when the same 
goods could be produced at lower cost in other States.’1066 In reaching this decision, 
the Supreme Court also argued that the examination of the state law under the first 
tier had to occur on a “case-by-case analysis of purposes and effects” of the laws.1067  
                                                          
1060 Maine v Taylor (1986) 477 US 131. 
1061 ibid as referred to from Bradford Mank, ‘The Supreme Court’s New Public-Private Distinction under 
the Dormant Commerce Clause: Avoiding the Traditional versus Nontraditional Classification Trap’ 
(2009) 37 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 1, 11. 
1062 Larsen (n 892) 854. 
1063 West Lynn Creamery, Inc v Healy (1994) 512 US 186. 
1064 Larsen (n 892) 855 – 856. 
1065 ibid 855. 
1066 West Lynn Creamery, Inc v Healy (n 1063) 193; Konar-Steenberg (n 936) 968.  
1067 Christopher R Drahozal, ‘Preserving the American Common Market: State and Local Governments 
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The discriminatory effect may, however, be present in one state regulation on its own, 
such as in C & A Carbone, Inc v Town of Clarkstown.1068 The state regulation in this 
case required the waste of the city of Clarkstown ‘to be processed at the local transfer 
station prior to leaving town,’ which in its effects deprived waste haulers from the 
opportunity to choose a different place to process their waste other than the state 
appointed private station.1069 This deprivation of free choice was thus held to be 
disparate treatment of the out-of-state actors of interstate commerce and was “a 
protectionist effect” and the act was therefore held unconstitutional.1070 
 
1.3. Purposeful discrimination 
 
The third approach identified by Larsen may also be argued to coincide with that of 
the living constitutional approach where the constitutional value of non-discrimination 
is protected. Following this approach, Larsen claims that a state regulation may show 
signs of ‘purposeful discrimination’ when the purpose behind the statute is to create 
an unequal treatment for in- and out-of-state interests.1071 As finding such a purpose 
requires the examination of ‘motives, objectives and end of the legislative body,’ this 
type of discrimination is discovered less commonly than the other two types of 
discrimination.1072 A fundamental decision where the test to identify such 
discrimination was developed was Kassel v Consolidated Freightways Corp,1073 which 
concerned a regulation enacted by Iowa banning double-tractor trailers longer than 
sixty-five feet from their roads.1074 Firstly, the Court analysed whether the ‘safety 
objectives’ of the act were valid, but found these ‘illusory,’ without ‘any persuasive 
evidence’ for the necessity of these.1075 The Court subsequently investigated whether 
the act ‘disproportionately burdened out-of-state interests,’ and held that it indeed did 
                                                          
1068 C & A Carbone, Inc v Town of Clarkstown (1994) 511 US 383. 
1069 Larsen (n 892) 856. 
1070 ibid. 
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1074 Larsen (n 892) 859. 
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so.1076 It lastly examined various statements of the Governor of Iowa and found that 
his support was based on protectionist and discriminatory reasons to benefit the 
interests of the citizens of Iowa over those coming out of the state.1077  
 
It is, thus, argued that the approach of the Supreme Court may be categorised as one 
following the living constitutional values approach. They not only relied on originalist 
methods to identify the drafters of the Act in question, but had also integrated the 
transformed views on non-discrimination as a value that required protection. They 
further recognised that a novel test for the discriminatory measures was also 
necessary. 
 
It may also be argued that in order for a state regulation to be held invalid under the 
first tier test of the modern approach, it will also have to satisfy another component 
identified by McGreal.1078 He argued that it will also have to be established that the 
actors concerned by the state regulation in- and out-of-state are in fact ‘compet[ing] 
with one another.’1079 For instance, in Parker v Brown,1080 this component was not 
satisfied: the producers of raisins were held not to be in competition with the 
‘distributors and consumers,’ and thus the state regulation was held not to be 
discriminatory.1081 
It may therefore be argued that if discrimination of any of the above three types is 
identified in the state regulation, it will be held invalid under the first tier test of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause and will not have to be examined under the second tier 
test of the modern approach. On the other hand, it will be demonstrated below that 
this has not always been followed by the Supreme Court. 
                                                          
1076 Larsen (n 892) 860.  
1077 ibid. See also Tribe (n 171) 1072 – 1073. 
1078 Paul E McGreal, ‘The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (1998) 39 William and 
Mary Law Review 1191, 1195. 
1079 ibid. This position was also previously identified by Regan (n 1035) 1096. 
1080 Parker v Brown (1943) 317 US 341. 
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1.4. A uniform national market 
 
The emergence of this scrutiny of a state regulation from a discriminatory or 
protectionist perspective has also re-initiated the debate on whether it was the 
intention of the Framers to create an area of free trade within the United States with 
the adoption of the Commerce Clause. Such is argued to occupy a key fundamental 
value that the provision was set out to protect under the living constitutional values 
approach.  
 
As one may expect, however, no uniform approach has been accepted about this 
ideology, but two fundamentally contrasting positions may be identified in the 
judgments of the Supreme Court and in academic commentaries. 
 
1.4.a. Political justifications 
 
The first position, embraced by Tribe, Regan, Kitch and Balkin, argues that the 
purpose of the Commerce Clause was - based on the ‘political theory of union’1082 - 
aimed at the promotion of the ‘national connection and social cohesion.’1083 Thus, a 
discriminatory or protectionist measure, following this viewpoint, should be held invalid 
if it posed a threat – as Hamilton stated during the Constitutional Convention - to the 
‘general welfare of the Union.’1084 This threat may be identified in hostile and retaliatory 
measures by states against each other.1085 
                                                          
1082 Tribe (n 171) 1057. 
1083 Balkin (n 841) 17; Regan (n 1035) 1114. – also making a reference to Kitch. 
1084 Abel (n 878) 433. 
1085 John Baker and Mehmet Konar-Steenberg, ‘“Drawn from Local Knowledge... And Conformed to 
Local Wants”: Zoning and Incremental Reform of Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine’ (2006) 38 
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Another political justification for the development of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
can be identified in McCulloch v Maryland,1086 where it was held by Justice Stone that 
when a law enacted by a state placed substantial burdens on out-of-state interests, 
that had to be reviewed by the judiciary as the interests of those out-of-state could not 
be adequately represented in the state legislation.1087 The same justification 
reappeared in the subsequent case of H P Hood & Sons v Du Mond,1088 in which the 
Supreme Court argued that as out-of-state interests are not represented politically 
within a state, it is for the Justices to guarantee that these are also taken into 
consideration and are not harmed by any actions of the state.1089  
 
1.4.b. Economic justifications 
 
The other position claims that the purpose of the adoption of the Commerce Clause 
was the creation of an area of free trade or a common market.1090 Such was the 
standpoint adopted in Commonwealth Edison Co v Montana,1091 where it was 
expressly held by the Supreme Court that the creation of such a market was ‘the very 
purpose of the Commerce Clause.’1092 Justice Cardozo famously characterised this 
approach as ‘the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together’ in Baldwin 
v G A F Seelig Inc.1093 The same approach also seems to have been adopted in H P 
Hood & Sons v Du Mond,1094 where it was held that the ‘economic unit’ of the United 
States of America ‘is the Nation.’1095 This unit was held not only to serve to advance 
the ideal of the free market for ‘every framer and every craftsman,’ but also to protect 
                                                          
1086 McCulloch v Maryland (1819) 17 US (4 Wheat) 316. 
1087 ibid 429–430. 
1088 H P Hood & (and) Sons, Inc v Du Mond, Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets (n 873). 
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1091 Commonwealth Edison Co v Montana (1981) 101 SCt 2946. 
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416. 
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consumers from exploitation through the free competition that is offered within the 
nation.1096  
According to Justice Jackson, to ensure that the above was maintained ‘home 
embargoes […] customs duties or regulations’ were meant to be abolished since the 
drafting of the Constitution.1097 This approach can also be identified in Philadelphia v 
New Jersey,1098 where it was held that facially discriminatory measures represented 
‘the evils of economic isolation’ that could have a negative effect on the national area 
of free trade.1099 By holding that the ‘states are not separable economic units,’ the 
Supreme Court also seemed to have adopted the above approach.1100 
Another justification for the development of the first tier test can be identified in the 
claims of those who called for the elimination of protectionist measures and thus, 
indirectly, argue for a free national market. Such was the approach of Justice Scalia 
in New Energy Co of Indiana v Limbach,1101 who held that the discriminatory measure 
could only be held valid if it was found not to relate to ‘economic protectionism.’1102 
Whilst not expressly stated in the Constitution, the adoption of the ideal of a national 
market within the United States, as rightly argued by Williams, may be the preferable 
justification constitutionally not only for the anti-discrimination principle, but for the 
Dormant Commerce Clause as a whole.1103 In reaching this conclusion, he effectively 
blended the above two contrasting opinions into the second one. He thus argued that 
an area of free trade within the Union firstly ‘promote[s] political union,’ which in effect 
makes the first position of political theory part of the second standpoint of the common 
market.1104 He also claimed that an area of free trade would ‘reduce the likelihood of 
interstate retaliation.’1105 Such retaliatory actions were not only demonstrated to have 
occurred before the Constitutional Convention, but it has also been established above 
                                                          
1096 Tribe (n 171) 1058. 
1097 H P Hood & (and) Sons, Inc v Du Mond, Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets (n 873). 539. 
1098 Philadelphia v New Jersey (n 1049). 
1099 ibid 624; Felmly (n 963) 478. 
1100 Philadelphia v New Jersey (n 1049); Lang (n 967) 81. 
1101 New Energy Co of Indiana v Limbach (1988) 486 US 269. 
1102 ibid 274.   
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that these trade wars had played a fundamental role in the demand for the creation of 
a uniform regulation of interstate commerce. It may also be argued that discriminatory 
or protectionist measures could be classified as such retaliatory actions, and 
accordingly the creation of a national market, may provide a preventative measure 
against these. Furthermore, Williams argued that a national market would ‘foster 
economic wealth,’ which could be argued to form part of both the above contrasting 
standpoints.1106 
The adoption of the novel first tier test for the Commerce Clause, is, hence, argued to 
be justifiable based on the premise that the Commerce Clause was set out to create 
a unified national market. This test would, further, concur with that of the living 
constitutional values approach that the premise of the Commerce Clause highlighted 
was, in fact, the fundamental value this provision set out to protect.  
Therefore, if a state regulation is held to be discriminatory, it will be held invalid, without 
having to examine it under the next, second tier test. If a state regulation is, however, 
found to be non-discriminatory, it will have to satisfy the second tier of the modern 
approach test, to be upheld as a valid exercise of the regulatory powers of a state 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
 
IV.2. The Pike balancing test 
 
The second tier test originated from the ideology developed by Justice Stone in three 
cases about the specifications of modes of transportation. Justice Stone first 
presented his understanding of the Dormant Commerce Clause in his dissenting 
opinion in DiSanto v Pennsylvania.1107 He rejected the then applied direct-indirect test 
for being ‘too mechanical, too uncertain in its application and too remote from 
actualities, to be of value.’1108 He thus proposed that a state regulation should be firstly 
examined taking into account ‘all the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of 
                                                          
1106 ibid. 
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the regulation, its function, the character of the business involved and the actual effect 
on the flow of commerce.’1109  
He further argued that a state law should subsequently only be upheld under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause if, firstly, ‘the interests’ concerned in the state regulation 
are ‘peculiarly local’ and, secondly, if the regulation is held not to encroach upon the 
‘national interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce across state lines.’1110 This 
approach, therefore, seemed to adopt the previous national-local test, but in an 
amended form. Justice Stone claimed that it should be the interests in the regulation, 
and not the subject matter or the nature of the activities regulated that determine 
whether a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause occurred. Moreover, this 
approach seemingly adopted the viewpoint demonstrated above, in accordance with 
the view that the Commerce Clause was created to ensure a uniform national market. 
This non-originalist interpretation method of the constitutional provision is further 
argued to be in line with the living constitutional values approach, where the creation 
and protection of a uniform national market constitutes a fundamental constitutional 
value. 
The above method of Justice Stone was adopted soon after a decade in South 
Carolina State Highway Department v Barnwell Brothers.1111 The state regulation 
concerned in this case was a seemingly non-discriminatory restriction imposed on ‘the 
size and weight of trucks’ using the state roads, which was upheld until Congress 
legislated in the area.1112 On the other hand, Justice Stone argued that even if a state 
regulation is held to be non-discriminatory and provided that there is no federal 
regulation about the same subject matter, the courts had to assess the regulation from 
two aspects.1113 They first had to examine ‘whether the state legislature … has acted 
within its province.’ Secondly, they had to establish ‘whether the means of regulation 
chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought.’1114 Regarding the first aspect, 
                                                          
1109 ibid. 
1110 ibid. 
1111 South Carolina State Highway Department et al v Barnwell Brothers, Inc, et al (1938) 303 US 177; 
Denning (n 893) 445. 
1112 Denning (n 893) 445. 
1113 South Carolina State Highway Department et al. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., et al. (n 1111) 190. 
1114 ibid 190; Noel T Dowling, ‘Interstate Commerce and State Power’ (1940) 27 Virginia Law Review 
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Justice Stone held that a non-discriminatory measure about the size and weight of 
trucks could be imposed by the states if it was “a safety measure and […] a means of 
securing the economical use of its highways."1115 Under the second aspect, even 
though it was established that the state law was a means to attain the ‘safe and 
economical use of [the] highways,’ it was still held that it imposed an undue burden on 
interstate commerce and was thus held invalid under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.1116It would, thus, seem that the above approach following the one he adopted 
in the earlier case as well: the constitutional value to be protected was that of the 
creation of a uniform national market, which required a non-originalist method of 
interpretation to ensure its protection to the fullest. 
In Southern Pacific Co v Arizona,1117 Justice Stone, acting as then Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, was finally provided with the opportunity to apply the test he 
previously developed. This case concerned a statute enacted in Arizona regarding the 
length requirements for ‘passenger and freight trains’ substantially distinct from the 
same requirements in the neighbouring states.1118 Chief Justice Stone, however, 
decided to refine his previous approach, and stated that the Supreme Court first had 
to assess whether the subject matter of the regulation was of ‘local’ concern ‘in 
character and effect.’1119 In order to be upheld as a valid law, the state regulation in 
question also had to be demonstrated to have an ‘impact on the national commerce’ 
that ‘does not seriously interfere with its operation.’1120 This seems to support the 
ideology that the creation of the national market as a fundamental constitutional value 
was supported by Chief Justice Stone as well, since he also recognised that certain 
activities would have an impact on the national market that was worth protecting from 
harmful impacts. He consequently found the state law unconstitutional under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, as he held that it, in effect, interfered with the operation 
of interstate commerce. He further held that the claims of the state that these 
requirements would be advantageous for interstate commerce were unfounded, as it 
                                                          
1115 Winkfield F Jr Twyman, ‘Beyond Purpose: Addressing State Discrimination in Interstate Commerce’ 
(1995) 46 South Carolina Law Review 381, 391. 
1116 ibid 391 – 392. 
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was actually identified during the trial court decision that these requirements ‘would 
actually raise the accident rate.’1121  
The above methods devised by Chief Justice Stone formed the basis of the second 
tier test of the modern approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause. This new test was 
formulated in Pike v Bruce Church Inc.,1122 which also concerned a state regulation 
enacted in Arizona, yet involved a different subject matter. The state law in question 
required the cantaloupes cultivated and marketed in Arizona to comply with packaging 
approved by the state.1123 This requirement was argued to have been created by the 
state of Arizona out of:  
the fear that some growers were shipping inferior or deceptively packaged 
produce, with the result that the reputation of Arizona growers generally was 
being tarnished and their financial return concomitantly reduced.1124  
Bruce Church Inc., a cultivator of cantaloupes, however, packed and processed their 
cantaloupes in California, which was argued to have contravened Arizona state 
law.1125 When that law was challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause, Justice 
Stewart devised the method of examining laws if they were found to be non-
discriminatory under the now first tier enquiry. He held that first, one had to determine 
whether ‘the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest.’1126 He subsequently held that in the case in question, the ‘protecting and 
enhancing the reputations of the growers were “surely legitimate state interests.”’1127 
The Court, however, also highlighted that this legitimate interest transformed into 
‘enhanc[ing] their reputation [of the State] through the reflected good will of the 
company’s superior produce.’1128 
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If a legitimate interest is found in the state regulation, the Court will have to perform a 
balancing enquiry to assess the extent of the effects of the regulation on interstate 
commerce. If this effect is found to be ‘only incidental,’ the regulation will be upheld, 
however, a ‘clearly excessive’ effect will result in the invalidation of the state law.1129 
When determining the above, the Court takes into consideration two aspects: ‘the 
nature of the local interest involved,’ and whether this interest ‘could be promoted as 
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.’1130 This clearly seems to support the 
ideal that the creation and subsequent protection of the national market were, in effect, 
deemed to be fundamental constitutional values and were, thus, regarded to occupy 
a more important position than the upholding of state regulations in areas of ‘local’ 
concern. 
It is to be highlighted that this balancing test will place a high judicial scrutiny on the 
state regulation, which at this point will have already passed a strict judicial scrutiny 
under the first-tier test. What the second-tier test, however, focuses on is not the 
interpretation of the definition of ‘commerce’ or ‘among the states,’ but rather the extent 
of the regulatory powers of the states. How the states exercise such a power is placed 
under scrutiny by examining the burdens and the effects of the regulations as a whole 
against the national market. However, it is argued that the Supreme Court still adopts 
an interpretation method to achieve this goal and the Pike test is, in effect, in line with 
the living constitutional values approach, where the creation and subsequent 
protection of the national market are seen as the constitutional values the Constitution 
and the Supreme Court set out to protect. 
It would therefore seem that under the modern approach to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, the powers of the states have decreased substantially, as their regulations will 
be scrutinised from several aspects under a two-tier test if they are found to be non-
discriminatory.  
 
                                                          
1129 ibid. 
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IV.2.a. Discriminatory laws investigated under the balancing test 
 
Even though many of the cases mentioned during the analysis of the first-tier test 
found that state laws were discriminatory and thus invalid, in many of them the 
Supreme Court still engaged in the examination of the state law under the second-tier 
test.  
Despite Pike v Bruce Church Inc1131 not having been decided at this point, origins of 
the subsequent balancing test can be found in Dean Milk Co v City of Madison.1132 
The Supreme Court, in this case, found that the state law aimed to regulate the 
commerce of milk to pursue a legitimate local public interest, which was the ‘protection 
of the health and safety of state citizens’ is a legitimate local purpose.1133 However, 
the state wished to achieve this by protecting ‘the economic welfare’ of the state 
industry through prohibiting the sale of milk produced out-of-state completely.1134 
Regulation through these measures, the Supreme Court held, was not even-handed, 
as other measures were available to attain the same goal that were non-
discriminatory, such as the wider inspection of the milk originating from out-of-
state.1135 Thus, whilst recognising that certain restrictions may be necessary, the 
Supreme Court already set out to protect the national market as a constitutional value 
in this case. 
Even though the per se rule of invalidity had been established and Pike v Bruce Church 
Inc1136 had already been decided by then, the state law imposing high fees on out-of-
state hazardous waste in Chemical Waste Management, Inc v Hunt1137 was still 
examined under the Pike test and was found to be unconstitutional under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.1138  The Supreme Court, following the same approach as above, 
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1133 Allison Q Gerhart, ‘Dormant Commerce Clause Implications of Pennsylvania Dairy Regulations’ 
(2011) 19 Penn State Environmental Law Review 361, 373. 
1134 ibid. 
1135 ibid. 
1136 Pike v Bruce Church Inc (n 1122). 
1137 Chemical Waste Management, Inc v Hunt (n 1058). 
1138 William J Cantrell, ‘Cleaning Up the Mess: United Haulers, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and 
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arrived at this decision by holding that there were other non-discriminatory means to 
attain the legitimate local interest end of limiting the amount of hazardous waste within 
the state that the state sought.1139  
Whilst the decision in Maine v Taylor1140 seemed to have departed from the first-tier 
test of holding a discriminatory state regulation invalid if it was discriminatory, as it 
passed the second-tier test, it was upheld as a constitutional exercise of the regulatory 
powers of the state under the Dormant Commerce Clause. According to the Supreme 
Court, the legitimate local purpose of the protection of the baitfish could only be 
attained by enacting the discriminatory measure and no other non-discriminatory 
measures were available for the state.1141 Thus, the state could actually impose a 
discriminatory measure that affected interstate commerce. This decision, in effect, 
arguably also became an area where the regulatory powers of the states over 
interstate commerce could be extended to: the protection of local wildlife, which is 
unique to that area. It could, however, also be argued that if baitfish was a unique 
animal in that particular state out of the whole nation, the discriminatory measure in 
effect allowed for the protection of the national market as a whole, in line with the 
creation and protection of such as a constitutional value under the living constitutional 
values approach.  
One trend that seems to emerge from these cases is that if an alternative, non-
discriminatory, method is available that would achieve the desired results by the state, 
it is highly likely that the state regulation will be held unconstitutional. 
Whereas it has been demonstrated above that under the modern approach to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, a state regulation will have to satisfy the highly strict two-
tier test, separate lines of cases also emerged that utilised this approach to extend the 
regulatory powers of the states in the area of interstate commerce. 
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IV.3. The new trend: Increasing the powers of the states to regulate interstate 
commerce 
 
The modern approach to Dormant Commerce Clause provides a clear demonstration 
of how the same method of constitutional interpretation may result in different 
outcomes. This approach may be utilised to restrict the activities that states are 
allowed to regulate, and may also result in the extension of the areas that the states 
are allowed to regulate. On the other hand, it is fundamental to highlight, that under 
the modern approach, contrary to the dual federalist approach, the decision whether 
a state regulation violates the Dormant Commerce Clause will not be made based on 
its subject matter, but on a case-by-case basis, scrutinising the state law from several 
distinct aspects. Hence, it may be argued that the characterisation of the regulatory 
powers of Congress and the states over interstate commerce as ‘mutually exclusive’ 
under the dual federalist approach is not only blurred, but inadequate.1142 Furthermore, 
this approach provides a clear illustration of the non-originalist method of interpretation 
being used by the Supreme Court in order to apply the Constitution in light of the 
development of each era. 
Furthermore, a new trend seems to have emerged in the Supreme Court, where it is 
highly likely that a decision whether a state regulation is valid under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause will be made in favour of the state. These cases may be divided 
into four main categories. Whilst these categories have been limited in number, while 
Justice Scalia – one of the key opponents to the ideal of a Dormant Commerce Clause 
and a devout originalist - was a Justice of the Supreme Court, this number has been 
extended by two to the total of four.  
 
3.1. The market participant state 
 
                                                          
1142 Williams, ‘The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism’ (n 1008) 1851; O’Fallon (n 
1126) 396. 
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The first category of these cases includes state laws that regulate the activities of the 
states when it is acting as a participant in the market and not its regulator.1143 
This extension of regulatory power originates from the decision in Hughes v Alexandria 
Scrap,1144 which concerned a ‘scheme’ established by a law enacted by Maryland that 
allowed the state to purchase ‘crushed automobile hulks from in-state scrap 
processors at a premium price.’1145 The Supreme Court held that this law could not be 
challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause because Maryland simply acted in 
its capacity as a market participant, specifically, ‘as a purchaser’ and ‘was not 
interfering with the natural functioning of an interstate market.’1146 Whilst this decision 
seemingly allowed the states to claim power to regulate wider areas of interstate 
commerce, the Supreme Court has not refrained from applying it in subsequent 
cases.1147 
On the other hand, the Court having recognised that this extension of powers may 
‘undermine the national common market,’ Williams and Denning highlight two 
limitations that have been placed on this expansion of powers.1148 The first may be 
invoked where a state regulation has a “substantial regulatory effect outside of a 
particular market,” where it has been held to act as the market participant.1149 This 
limitation was devised in South-Central Timber Development v Wunnicke,1150 where 
Alaska intended to regulate the ‘timber-processing market,’ when it was only a 
participant of the ‘timber-sale market.’1151 It was clear for the Supreme Court that the 
purpose of the regulation was ‘to benefit the local timber-processing industry,’ and the 
requirement of the state law of local processing of timber was consequently held 
invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause for the above reason. 1152 
                                                          
1143 Norman R Williams and Brannon P Denning, ‘The “New Protectionism” and the American Common 
Market’ (2009) 85 Notre Dame Law Review 247, 294.  
1144 Hughes v Alexandria Scrap Corp 426 US 794 (1976). 
1145 Tribe (n 171) 1088. 
1146 ibid. 
1147 One such case was Reeves, Inc v Stake 447 US 429 (1980) and see also Tribe (n 171) 1089. 
1148 Williams and Denning (n 1143) 295. 
1149 ibid. 
1150 South-Central Timber Development v Wunnicke 467 US 82 (1984). 
1151 Williams and Denning (n 1143) 295. 
1152 ibid. 
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The second restriction was set on the taxes imposed by the states on businesses that 
are not parties to transactions with the state.1153 Such was the case in New Energy v 
Limbach,1154 where a tax credit was offered as an incentive for the ‘sales of ethanol 
produced in the state.’1155 Whilst Ohio argued that it should have been identified as 
the market participant when it offered this tax credit, the Supreme Court disagreed and 
held that ‘the state was neither purchasing nor selling ethanol,’ but was merely 
performing a ‘governmental activity’ of calculating taxes.1156 
It may thus be argued that despite the two restrictions, a state may enact a valid 
discriminatory state regulation in the area of interstate commerce, if it can demonstrate 
that it acts as the ‘market participant’ in the area of commerce in question under the 
first group of cases of the new trend. It is key to highlight that no such distinction exists 
in the provision of the Constitution and the non-originalist method of interpretation in 
this area resulted in a different outcome. However, one may also argue that this 
method also followed the living constitutional values approach, where it found that it 
was actually the rights of states that should have been held to constitute these 
fundamental constitutional values. 
 
3.2. Manufacture as opposed to commerce 
 
Another way the powers of the states have been extended under this new trend 
occurred in the 2013 case McBurney v Young,1157 where the Supreme Court extended 
the manufacture exception under the Dormant Commerce Clause, as devised by Kidd 
v Pearson,1158 to state records. In this case, the Freedom of Information Act of Virginia 
was challenged by Mark J McBurney and Roger W Hurlbert under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.1159 Hurlbert argued that a state regulation that only allowed access 
to public records for citizens of the state was a violation of the Dormant Commerce 
                                                          
1153 Williams and Denning (n 1143) 296. 
1154 New Energy Co of Indiana v Limbach (n 1101). 
1155 Williams and Denning (n 1143) 296. 
1156 ibid and Tribe (n 171) 1093. 
1157 McBurney v Young (2013) 569 US ____. 
1158 Kidd v Pearson (n 1006). 
1159 McBurney v Young (n 1157). 
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Clause because it prevented him, a citizen of another state, from conducting the inter-
state business of procuring the ‘real estate tax records’ from Virginia.1160  
The Supreme Court rejected his argument for various reasons. Justice Alito held that 
the state law did not perform any regulatory function and did not ‘burden’ interstate 
commerce.1161 He argued that in previous cases where the state laws were invalidated 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, it could be demonstrated that the regulation 
was a hindrance on ‘the natural functioning of the interstate market’ in two ways: either 
by the regulation imposing a ban or by the state enacting a ‘burdensome 
regulation.’1162 As Justice Alito could not demonstrate that the state regulation 
performed any of the above two, he argued that it effectively formed the ‘benefit’ of 
creating and providing ‘to its own citizens copies […] of state records.’1163 
Even though he consequently asserted that the case was ‘not governed by the 
Dormant Commerce Clause,’ he still devoted a part of his judgment to assessing 
whether the act would be invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 1164 He then 
held that as Virginia was the ‘sole manufacturer’ of the state records, it could adopt 
such ‘protectionist’ measures as it ‘reflect[ed] the essential and patently 
unobjectionable purpose of state government – to serve the citizens of the State.’1165 
The decision of the Supreme Court in this case seems surprising, as it returns to the 
approach where the powers of the states were extended based on the subject matter 
of the regulation. It will have to be seen whether this return to the previous 
interpretation will be utilised by the Supreme Court in the future, and how such will fit 
into the modern approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause.  
 
3.3. Congressional authorisation 
 
                                                          
1160 ibid. 
1161 ibid. 
1162 ibid 13. 
1163 ibid 13 -14. 
1164 ibid 13. 
1165 ibid 14. 
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Another way for the states to be able to regulate an area that may have an effect on 
interstate commerce is through specific authorisation from Congress. Such was the 
case in Prudential Insurance v Benjamin,1166 where a tax imposed merely on out-of-
state insurance companies operating within South Carolina was held valid under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause as it had been authorised specifically by an act of 
Congress.1167  
Several other acts have been enacted by Congress that have authorised states to 
regulate areas that may affect interstate commerce, such as allowing the prohibition 
of the ‘importation of alcoholic beverages manufactured in other states or nations’ 
under the Wilson Act.1168 These acts have also justified state actions that discriminate 
against out-of-state interests, such as banking regulations or discriminatory state 
taxes.1169 
Therefore, a state is able to enact discriminatory laws in an area of commerce, 
provided that such action has been previously authorised by Congress, which seems 
to directly contradict the intention of the Framers.1170 As it has been demonstrated 
above, the Framers appeared to have agreed on the need for the creation of a uniform 
system for the regulation of interstate commerce, which may be argued to have 
subsequently become a fundamental constitutional value. They further decided that 
this area would be regulated by Congress. On the other hand, by the delegation of its 
authority to the states, it may be argued that Congress is effectively acting contrary to 
its powers under the Commerce Clause. 
 
3.4. Traditional state functions 
 
A novel way that expanded the regulatory powers of the states in the area of interstate 
commerce was created in 2007 through the decision in United Haulers Association v 
                                                          
1166 Prudential Insurance Co v Benjamin 328 US 408 (1946). 
1167 Williams, ‘Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (n 861) 157. 
1168 Wilson Act 27 USC § 121 (2000) and ibid 155. 
1169 ibid 155–156. 
1170 ibid 155. 
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Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority.1171 This case concerned a state 
law enacted by the State of New York that ‘forced haulers’ ‘to bring waste to facilities 
owned and operated by a state-created public benefit corporation.’1172  
Whilst Chief Justice Roberts, in delivering the opinion of the Court, adopted the 
modern approach to assess whether the state law violated the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, he effectively created an exception to the first tier test.  
This exception was created when he held that discrimination could only be present 
between ‘similar entities’ following the decision in General Motors v Tracy.1173 Chief 
Justice Roberts interpreted this standpoint by claiming that discrimination could only 
be present between ‘private entities’ and not between states, who are responsible for 
the protection of ‘the health, safety and welfare’ of their citizens.1174 
He subsequently argued that the state law in question regulated ‘waste disposal,’ 
which was “both typically and traditionally” a function that rested with the states, as 
also recognised by Congress.1175 Thus, he failed to examine whether the state law 
discriminated between the state entity and the private entities that are operating in the 
same area. On the other hand, he held that the state law was non-discriminatory 
because it did not treat the in and out-of-state private entities differently.1176 
Whilst it is indisputable that Chief Justice Roberts claimed that he investigated the 
state law in question under the anti-discrimination principle, it is argued that his 
interpretation of the test effectively created immunity for state monopolies from 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges. Whether this was the intention of the Framers 
is highly arguable if the viewpoint is adopted that they intended to create a uniform 
national market. 
                                                          
1171 United Haulers Association, Inc, et al v Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority et al 
(2007) 550 US ___. 
1172 ibid (Chief Justice Roberts) 1. 
1173 General Motors Corp v Tracy 519 US 278, 298 (1997). 
1174 United Haulers Association, Inc, et al v Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority et al 
(n 1171). (Chief Justice Roberts) 10. 
1175 ibid 12. 
1176 ibid 13. 
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As Chief Justice Roberts found that the state law in question satisfied the first tier test 
of the modern approach, he then set out to examine it under the second tier test. He, 
however, found it ‘unnecessary’ to determine whether the state law imposed an 
‘incidental burden on interstate commerce,’ as he held the public benefits of the state 
law would outweigh any such burden in the balancing enquiry.1177  
The Court also subsequently acknowledged that the state law in question effectively 
amounted to a policy adopted by New York, which ousted “competition with regulation 
or monopoly control.”1178 On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts found no powers 
vested in the Supreme Court in the Constitution to decide whether this policy of 
creating monopolies is contrary to the Commerce Clause.1179 It would thus seem that 
the Supreme Court had not been persuaded by the arguments that the Commerce 
Clause was to create a uniform national market. If such an approach had been adopted 
by the Supreme Court, it is argued that the decision would have been the reverse and 
the creation of a monopoly would have been found to clearly burden interstate 
commerce. 
Consequently, if a state law has been enacted in an area that may pose a burden on 
interstate commerce, it will escape scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce Clause if 
the area is a traditional function of the states and where an entity operated by the state 
enjoys a monopoly in the area in question. 
This decision, however, also attracted a wide range of criticism from commentators for 
two reasons. Firstly, the facts of the case were highly similar to those of C & A 
Carbone, Inc v Town of Clarkstown,1180 but the Court distinguished this case from the 
latter on the basis that the latter enacted regulation favouring a ‘private’ entity, whilst 
in this case the operator in question was a ‘public’ entity.1181 Secondly, the Court with 
the determination of traditional public functions of state government effectively 
resurrected a principle that had previously been held ‘unworkable’ in cases decided 
                                                          
1177 ibid 14 -15. 
1178 ibid 12. 
1179 ibid 12 – 13. 
1180 C & A Carbone, Inc v Town of Clarkstown (n 1068). 
1181 Dan T Coenen, ‘Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the State-Self-Promotion 
Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule’ (2010) 95 Iowa Law Review 541, 544 and Denning 
(n 49) 649. 
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under the affirmative Commerce Clause following Garcia v San Antonio 
Metropolitan,1182 which will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
Despite the wide criticism of the above case, the approach of the Supreme Court has 
not changed in this area, as the same exception was applied in the subsequent case 
of Department of Revenue v Davis.1183 This case effectively extended the above 
exemption to apply to state laws that regulate ‘the issuance of bonds to raise revenue 
for public projects.’1184 Justice Souter held that such activity fell under the ‘traditional’ 
function of state governments because it served to protect ‘the health, safety and 
welfare of’ the citizens of the state.1185 
It is thus highly probable that this exemption will be extended in future cases to 
activities that were previously held to be discriminatory if the same activity is provided 
by the state. On the other hand, this approach has also resulted in the broadening of 
the regulatory powers of the states. It may, therefore, also provide an incentive for 
states to enter into areas where they have not been previously present when they are 
seeking to limit the entry and/or the activities out-of-state actors in that area. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
The chapter demonstrated that despite having a clear definition of ‘commerce’ and 
‘interstate commerce’, the interpretation of the Commerce Clause has mostly 
supported the ideology that a uniform national market should be created and protected 
within the United States as a fundamental constitutional value. 
First, the chapter emphasised how the concept of commerce and interstate commerce 
has developed since the drafting of the Constitution with the passage of time. This 
constitutional uncertainty was demonstrated through commentators being unable to 
identify a clearly uniform definition of commerce at the time of the Constitutional 
                                                          
1182 Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) 469 US 528; Denning (n 893) 471. This 
decision will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
1183 Department of Revenue v Davis (2008) 553 US __. 
1184 Williams and Denning (n 1143) 260. 
1185 Department of Revenue v Davis (n 1183). (Justice Souter) 11 and Coenen (n 1181) 560. 
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Convention. It has subsequently been established that this uncertainty has had a 
fundamental effect on the development of the Commerce Clause. Whilst Chief Justice 
Marshall in the first Commerce Clause case adopted the definition of ‘intercourse’1186, 
and also attempted to define the ‘among the states’ provision, it is unlikely that the 
same definitions in the Commerce Clause would stand today.  
Second, the chapter argued that one of the main reasons for the calling of the 
Constitutional Convention was the commercial warfare that the states engaged in 
against each other. It has been established that the Constitutional Convention aimed 
to solve this problem by creating a uniform regulation of interstate commerce and, 
thus, it was argued that this may be regarded as the constitutional value that this 
Clause aimed to protect under the living constitutional values approach. It has, 
however, also been underlined that the Framers also created a constant constitutional 
conflict between federal and state powers. The reason for this is that the Constitution 
failed to unequivocally assert whether the grant of power under the Commerce Clause 
amounted to an exclusive grant of power to Congress, and whether it was intended to 
limit the regulatory powers of the states in the area of interstate commerce. The 
importance of the creation of a uniform national market, however, has been also 
highlighted by demonstrating that the usual debate between the Federalist and Anti-
Federalist was almost non-existent in this area.  
Third, the chapter historically analysed the development of the application of the 
Commerce Clause: the decision in Gibbons v Ogden1187 was analysed, particularly 
how Chief Justice Marshall devised the dual federalist interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause, to ensure that the federal and state governments could co-regulate the area 
of commerce in the dual, federal-state, system. Moreover, the section also 
emphasised that one of the characteristics of this interpretation was that state 
regulations could be held unconstitutional if they regulated areas where the regulatory 
power belonged to Congress exclusively. 
The novel concurrent authority approach of Chief Justice Taney was subsequently 
examined. It was argued that even though Chief Justice Taney expressly rejected the 
                                                          
1186 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100) 189 – 190 and 193 - 194. 
1187 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
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previous dual federalist interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, certain 
characteristics of the latter approach were still traceable in his unique approach. It was 
also highlighted that Chief Justice Taney recognised that certain subject matters were 
of ‘truly national concern,’1188 which may demonstrate that he supported the ideology 
of creating a uniform national market in certain areas of interstate commerce. 
The national-local test originating from Cooley v Board of Wardens of the Port of 
Philadelphia1189 was then argued to fall within the dual federalist interpretation of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, but also to have adopted certain aspects of the 
concurrent authority approach. It was also claimed that a new area was created in this 
decision, which allowed Congress to transfer its exclusive authority to the states in the 
area of interstate commerce. Moreover, it was also argued that similar to Chief Justice 
Taney, Justice Curtis also recognised that certain subject matters were of national 
concern that needed to be addressed in a uniform manner nationally.  
The reasons for the exclusion of ‘manufacture’ from the definition of commerce was 
subsequently analysed through Kidd v Pearson.1190 This resulted in a brief period of 
regression to a decision based on the subject matter of the regulation, which 
consequently also led to the ideal of a national market being placed in the background. 
On the other hand, the ideology returned with the direct-indirect test, where, if a state 
regulation placed a direct burden on the interstate commerce, it could not be upheld. 
This approach, however, proved ineffective in many cases related to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. This resulted in the development of a modern two-tier test soon 
afterwards. Both tiers of the test have been analysed respectively and it was also 
demonstrated that a state regulation will be subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny 
under the modern test. Special emphasis has also been placed on the development 
of the first anti-discrimination tier, and how that may be closely related to the ideology 
of the creation of the national market as a constitutional value deemed worthy of 
protection under the living constitutional values approach. 
                                                          
1188 McGinley (n 877) 413. 
1189 Aaron B. Cooley, Plaintiff in Error, v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, to the use 
of the Society for the Relief of distressed Pilots, their Widows and Children, Defendants (n 986). 
1190 Kidd v Pearson (n 1006). 
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It has, however, also been established that whereas it may seem that the powers of 
the states were consequently limited under the strict judicial scrutiny, a new trend may 
be identified where the regulatory powers of the states were, in fact, extended and not 
limited. After discussing the decisions of the Supreme Court under this new trend 
under four different groups, it seems that the ideal that the purpose of the Commerce 
Clause was that of creating a uniform national market has been pushed to the 
background. 
In conclusion, it is argued that the constitutional uncertainty created by the lack of the 
definition of commerce has resulted in various interpretations of commerce and the 
Commerce Clause throughout the years. This development is argued to be in line with 
‘living Constitution’ approach.1191 Nevertheless, the variety of interpretations of what 
commerce means has resulted in legal uncertainties, which, consequently, 
materialised in debates around the constant conflict and the limits of the powers of the 
states and Congress.   
Furthermore, it is argued that changes in the definition of commerce and the 
development of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine effectively resulted in the 
gradual return to the position, where states are restricted in their regulatory powers 
under the Commerce Clause, but are still allowed to enact certain discriminatory 
measures. This standpoint, however, seems remarkably similar to the one that 
ultimately called for the re-drafting of the Articles of Confederation, where the main 
problem was the lack of the authority of Congress to address the discriminatory state 
measures in a uniform manner. It, assuredly. seems that the four areas where the 
powers of the states have been increased may also result in the federal government 
being deprived of the opportunity to assert its authority over all areas of interstate 
commerce under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Consequently, under this position, 
it may be argued that both the fundamental questions posed after the adoption of the 
Commerce Clause have been answered: Congress was not granted exclusive 
authority to regulate all areas of interstate commerce, and states were not 
automatically limited from regulating in the area of interstate commerce.  
                                                          
1191 Balkin (n 93). 
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As it is highly unlikely that a Constitutional Convention would be called nowadays, it is 
argued that the Justices of the Supreme Court have been interpreting the Commerce 
Clause from a standpoint that aimed to adapt to the developments and changes in 
each era of the decisions, often adopting a non-originalist method of interpretation. 
Whether our times require the return to discriminatory and protectionist measures by 
the states and limited regulatory powers possessed by Congress is questionable. 
 [244] 
 
 
Chapter 5: Creating and subsequently protecting a uniform national market in 
the United States: Part II 
 
The constitutional value set out in the Affirmative Commerce Clause 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Whereas the previous chapter concentrated on how the development of the dormant 
aspect of the Commerce Clause managed the constitutional uncertainties created by 
the Commerce Clause, this chapter sets out to examine how these uncertainties have 
been handled by the affirmative aspect of the Commerce Clause. Similar to Chapter 
4, Chapter 5 will also examine whether the constitutional value of the creation and 
protection of the uniform national market has influenced the development of this 
aspect of the Commerce Clause. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the positive or affirmative understanding of the 
Commerce Clause examines the power of Congress to regulate in the area of 
interstate commerce, and what the limits of this regulatory authority are.  
The first part of this chapter will examine the initial textualist interpretation that the 
Supreme Court Justices adopted when making decisions about the affirmative 
Commerce Clause. It will also analyse how this formalistic interpretation relied on a 
division of interstate and intrastate commerce based on the subject matter of the 
challenged federal regulation. It will also demonstrate how the constitutional value of 
the creation of a uniform system of interstate commerce was already present in the 
first case based on the Commerce Clause following the adoption of the Constitution. 
Subsequently, the chapter will analyse key decisions of the Supreme Court in this area 
until the Great Depression, and will categorise these based on the creation and 
development of interstate commerce as the purpose of the Commerce Clause and, 
thus, the constitutional value set out to provide protection for. The chapter will 
demonstrate that the previous textualist interpretation was adopted by the Justices in 
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one set of decisions, however, this method of interpretation also commenced to 
disappear with the passage of time. 
The creation of the uniform national market and the constant conflict between the 
federal and state governments came to the limelight during the Great Depression once 
again. This chapter will demonstrate that the Great Depression resulted in the people 
of the United States recognising the importance of and the interconnectedness of their 
intrastate economies. The chapter will, subsequently, further study the reactions of the 
Supreme Court to the election of President Roosevelt, who wished for a stronger 
government policy about the national economy through the so-called New Deal. The 
Supreme Court Justices, whilst initially reluctant to accept the New Deal measures as 
constitutional exercises of the commerce power of Congress, in a somewhat surprising 
change, decided to uphold the subsequent measures and many federal legislation for 
decades. The fundamental cases of this era will, thus, be examined, placing special 
attention on whether the decisions were influenced by the purposes of the Commerce 
Clause and the resolution of the constant conflict between federal and state 
governments by the Court. 
After a brief study of the subsequent cases that signalled a limitless extension of the 
national market and, thus, the power of Congress, the decisions in United States v 
Lopez1192 and United States v Morrison1193 will be analysed. This will demonstrate that 
the purpose of the Commerce Clause came to be interpreted differently at the time of 
these decisions, which consequently placed limits to the extension of the national 
market and the power of the federal government. 
It will, however, subsequently be demonstrated that the restrictive interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause by the Supreme Court was rather short-lived, as it returned to 
extending the reach of the national market to areas, such as the home cultivation of 
marijuana in Gonzales v Raich,1194 by adopting the newly devised classification of 
United States v Lopez.1195 
                                                          
1192 United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549. 
1193 United States v Morrison (2000) 529 US 598. 
1194 Gonzales v Raich (2005) 545 US 1. 
1195 United States v Lopez (n 1192). 
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It, thus, came as a surprise to many that the Supreme Court held that the individual 
mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 was an 
unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power of Congress in National Federation 
of Independent Business v Sebelius.1196 The decision will  be examined, focusing on 
whether the Justices departed from the previous interpretations of the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause, and whether this decision demonstrates a realistic view of the 
national market in the United States of America at the moment. 
 
II. Interstate market after the adoption of the Constitution 
 
The initial discussions on the purposes and scope of the Commerce Clause, examined 
in the previous chapter, were all put to the test soon after the adoption of the 
Constitution.  
 
II.1. Gibbons v Ogden 
 
While Gibbons v Ogden,1197 the first fundamental case about the Commerce Clause, 
was decided based on the dormant angle of this clause, it also established key 
principles about the affirmative aspect of this Clause.  
In the decision of Chief Justice Marshall, two approaches may be identified, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. Adopting a ‘formalistic’1198 interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause, relying on defining the provisions in this clause, he firstly defined 
interstate commerce as ‘intercourse’ that was to do ‘with the states,’ that ‘intermingled 
with’ the states and that ‘concern[ed] more States than one.’1199 By ‘intercourse,’ it 
may be argued that he insinuated that commerce included all economic and non-
economic activity that comprised of an ‘interaction and exchange between 
                                                          
1196 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (2012) 567 US ___. 
1197 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
1198 Norman R Williams, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause: Why Gibbons v Ogden Should Be Restored 
to the Canon’ (2005) 49 Saint Louis University Law Journal 830. 
1199 Gibbons v Ogden (n 6) 189 – 190 and 193 - 194. 
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persons.’1200 Consequently, interstate commerce could include any of the above 
activities reaching across the physical borders of each state.  
Chief Justice Marshall secondly held that the regulatory power over this interstate 
commerce had been granted exclusively to Congress under the Commerce 
Clause.1201 On the other hand, he also held that the states still retained their regulatory 
power over areas that concerned ‘their own purely internal affairs, whether of trading 
or police.’1202 He thereby devised a ‘dual federalist’1203 interpretation of commerce in 
the United States: Congress was to regulate interstate commerce and states were to 
regulate intrastate commerce. To decide which area the challenged legislations 
belonged to, Chief Justice Marshall held, would be based on the subject matter of the 
regulation.1204  
Chief Justice Marshall thus aimed to resolve the constitutional uncertainty created in 
the Commerce Clause by creating an interpretation that relied on the differentiation of 
activities. However, such a differentiation would not necessarily resolve the constant 
conflict between the federal government and the states set out in Chapter 1 over which 
of them had power to regulate these activities. 
Chief Justice Marshall recognised that based on his interpretation, interstate 
commerce did not necessarily correspond to the crossing of physical boundaries of a 
state, and thus might ‘be introduced into the interior’ of these boundaries.1205 He thus 
argued that certain limitations had to be and were, in fact, imposed on the exclusive 
power of Congress to maintain this dual federalist structure. The limitations on this 
Congressional power were expressed through ‘the Constitution’s affirmative 
prohibitions on the exercise of federal authority,’1206 which he identified as ‘the wisdom 
and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people [and] the influence which 
their constituents possess at elections.’1207 However, it is argued that such a limitation 
                                                          
1200 Balkin (n 841) 5. and Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (n 47) 107. 
1201 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100); Corwin (n 101) 484.  
1202 Gibbons v Ogden (n 6) 209 - 210. 
1203 Corwin (n 101) 481. 
1204 Frankfurter (n 948) 30–31. 
1205 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100) 194; Arthur B Mark, ‘Currents in Commerce Clause Scholarship since 
Lopez: A Survey’ (2003) 32 Capital University Law Review 671, 674. 
1206 Tribe (n 171) 808.  
1207 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100) 197; Tribe (n 171) 808. 
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would have not provided a limitation with clear certainty. Moreover, arguing that people 
have influence over the Congress through elections also seems to ignore the constant 
threat in a republican government as discussed in Chapter 2: that of improper 
elections. It is, therefore, argued that reliance on this ‘wisdom’ and ‘discretion of 
Congress’ allows for highly political decisions to be made and a somewhat blind trust 
to be placed with Congress, without any checks and balances over its decision. 
It may be inferred from the decision of Chief Justice Marshall, that one of the evident 
purposes of the Commerce Clause was the creation of a uniform system of interstate 
commerce that would be regulated centrally and exclusively by Congress. This has 
also been argued to have become a fundamental constitutional value that would be 
deemed protection under the living constitutional values approach, advocated for by 
this work. However, the constitutional uncertainties and the constant conflict that this 
clause has created did not disappear with this decision.  
 
III. Interstate commerce: the various early approaches of the Supreme 
Court    
 
In the decisions of the Supreme Court following Gibbons v Ogden1208 and prior to the 
New Deal, the formalistic and dual federalist approaches adopted by Chief Justice 
Marshall may be clearly identified. This, however, not only resulted in the extension of 
the power of Congress in some cases, but also led to holding certain acts of Congress 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. 
 
III.1. Extending interstate commerce 
 
Firstly, in cases following Gibbons v Ogden1209 an extension of the reach of the system 
of interstate commerce may be observed. This was achieved through the extension of 
the regulatory powers of Congress, adopting a dual federalist approach. 
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In the first line of cases that may be identified, and similar to the original approach 
adopted to cases decided by the Supreme Court under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, reliance was placed on the definition of interstate commerce. In United States 
v Marigold,1210 the Supreme Court held that the ‘power to regulate commerce’ also 
included ‘the power to exclude commerce.’1211 Subsequently, in The Daniel Ball1212 
adopting this interpretation of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court held that 
interstate commerce included requiring the ‘licensing of [all] ships’ that were 
transporting articles of commerce that originated from or were ‘destined for’ another 
state.1213  
 
On the other hand, a novel interpretation also seemed to emerge in this case to justify 
the extension of this area of commerce. The Supreme Court, intriguingly, held that 
Congress could regulate the previously exclusive intrastate licensing requirements 
based on an approach that - instead of placing an emphasis on the differentiation of 
interstate commerce - argued for the prevention of harm to interstate commerce. The 
Supreme Court, thus, held that the safety of the vessels participating in this kind of 
commerce not only had an effect, but could also ‘harm’ interstate commerce.1214 
Moreover, this approach strongly signals that the creation of a unified national market 
was one of the key reasons for the enforcement of the Commerce Clause of the era. 
This approach, thus, further supports the ideology that the creation of this market was 
also deemed to be a constitutional value. 
 
This novel approach was consequently adopted when extending the activities that 
were to be included in the system of interstate commerce. Champion v Ames1215 
transformed the interpretation of interstate commerce once again, however, this time, 
in the area of lottery tickets. The Supreme Court in this decision ultimately allowed 
Congress to regulate this area, after examining the purpose of the challenged federal 
                                                          
1210 United States v Marigold (1850) 50 US (9 How) 560.  
1211 ibid 566 - 567; Tribe (n 171) 808.  
1212 The Daniel Ball (1871) 77 US (1 Wall) 557. 
1213 Tribe (n 171) 808; Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 161.  
1214 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 161. 
1215 Champion v Ames (1903) 188 US 321. 
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regulation on the sale of lottery tickets. The Court found the federal law was 
constitutional because the aim of the regulation was to protect the nation as a whole 
‘from the evils that inhere in the raising of money’ through lottery.1216 Whilst seemingly 
quite a policy-driven approach, this decision still appears to follow the dual federalist 
approach, as it declared that such activity could only be regulated by Congress 
through the ‘prohibition of interstate shipments’ of lottery tickets.1217 On the other hand, 
this approach further demonstrates that the protection of the nation as a whole and 
the creation of a uniform national market was a fundamental constitutional value. 
 
With the passing of time, the Supreme Court commenced to abandon the dual 
federalist approach for Commerce Clause cases. Instead, it decided to rely on the 
above two cases and their novel aspects: the effect that the federal regulation has on 
interstate commerce. In Swift & Co v United States,1218 the Supreme Court held that if 
the effects of the activity were direct, i.e. the activity was placed in ‘a current of 
commerce among the States,’ it formed part of interstate commerce and could be 
regulated by Congress.1219 Thus, it was held on this basis, that Congress was allowed 
to prohibit ‘price-fixing in livestock markets’ under the Sherman Antitrust Act.1220 
 
Justice Hughes subsequently adopted this novel direct effect test in his decision in the 
subsequent Shreveport Rate Cases.1221 He held that the Interstate Commerce 
Commission was allowed ‘to set intrastate railroad rates’ as those had a direct, ‘close 
and substantial effect on interstate commerce.’1222 Spreading the reach of interstate 
commerce into clearly intrastate areas, firstly, resulted in the regulatory powers of the 
state being reduced. Moreover, this position highlights the importance of interstate 
commerce: this would take priority over intrastate commerce at all occasions, since it 
                                                          
1216 ibid 356; Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 168. 
1217 Lino A Graglia, ‘United States v Lopez:  Judicial Review under the Commerce Clause’ (1995) 74 
Texas Law Review 719, 734. An examination of decisions similar to that in this case may be found in 
the judgment of Justice Day in Hammer v Dagenhart (1918) 247 US 251, 270–271. 
1218 Swift & Co v United States (1905) 196 US 375. 
1219 ibid 399; Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 166. 
1220 Tribe (n 171) 810; Swift & Co v United States (n 1218) 394. 
1221 Shreveport Rate Cases (1914) 243 US 342. 
1222 ibid 351; Arthur B Mark, ‘United States v Morrison, the Commerce Clause and the Substantial 
Effects Test: No Substantial Limit on Federal Power’ (2000) 34 Creighton Law Review 675, 703; 
Williams, ‘The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism’ (n 1008) 1893.  
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may be argued that the protection of the state powers over that of the creation of a 
uniform national market as a constitutional value took priority. Physical state 
boundaries in this area were no longer relevant for these regulatory purposes. 
 
On the other hand, recognising the implications of this extension of powers, Justice 
Hughes placed certain limitations on the regulatory powers of Congress, while also 
considering the protection of the uniform national market as a fundamental 
constitutional value. A federal regulation had to firstly demonstrate that the measures 
imposed were ‘necessary or appropriate to’ attain the end of ‘foster[ing] and 
protect[ing] interstate commerce.’1223 Such an end could be classified as ‘the security 
of [interstate] traffic, […] the efficiency of the interstate service, and […] the 
maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon 
fair terms and without molestation or hindrance.’1224 It appears that the limits of the 
power of Congress commenced to become identified in line with the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause that argued for the development of interstate commerce through 
the creation of the national market, including its protection, as set out initially in the 
Federalist Papers.1225 It is, however, also argued that with the passage of time the 
Supreme Court commenced to recognise that such a market should not become 
limitless, since it may result in placing too much power in the hands of Congress. This 
would, thus, be completely contrary to republican values and defeat the aim of the 
constitutional values as a whole. 
 
It may therefore be established that before the arrival of the Great Depression, the 
Supreme Court already commenced to recognise that the dual federalist interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause was no longer a viable approach in the evolving interstate 
market. It also emerges from the above decisions that it was no longer intrastate 
commerce that had to be protected from interstate commerce, but the Supreme Court 
would have to adopt its interpretative approach to the extended system of interstate 
commerce that was progressively developing. This system was regarded so essential 
in the United States, and was deemed by Congress and the Supreme Court to require 
                                                          
1223 Shreveport Rate Cases (n 1221). 
1224 ibid 351.  
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protection from the damaging effects of certain intrastate commercial activities. This 
clearly signals a shift in this approach, in line with the economic developments of the 
era. 
 
On the other hand, in a second line of cases, it may be demonstrated that the Supreme 
Court was not always willing to extend the reach of this interstate system to areas that 
were previously regulated by the states.  
 
III.2. Protecting the powers of the states over certain areas of intrastate 
commerce  
 
It has been demonstrated in the above line of judgments, that following the decision in 
Gibbons v Ogden,1226 the Supreme Court aimed to resolve the constant conflict 
between the federal and state governments in this area, and protect the creation of a 
uniform national market, by further extending the powers of the federal government, 
allowing for the expansion of a uniform system of interstate commerce. Such an 
approach, however, is not apparent in the decisions declaring federal regulations 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. The interpretation that the Justices 
adopted to hold such acts unconstitutional may also be characterised into two groups, 
which were based on the formalistic and dual federalist interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause.  
 
2.1. Traditional state police powers 
 
The cases that may be firstly grouped together relied on the dual federalist 
interpretation to hold federal regulations unconstitutional by examining whether the 
subject matter of the challenged federal regulation constituted – as declared in 
Gibbons v Ogden1227 - ‘police power’ of the states.1228 
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Of key importance is the decision in United States v Dewitt,1229 where an Act of 
Congress was held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause for the first time.1230 
The challenged Act criminalised ‘the sale of grades of naphta or illuminating oils that 
burned at a temperature of less than 110 degrees Fahrenheit.’1231 Chief Justice Chase 
held, based on the dual federalist approach, that the Commerce Clause was 
understood as ‘a virtual denial of any power to interfere with the internal trade and 
business of the separate States.’1232 He subsequently declared that this act was ‘a 
police regulation, relating exclusively to the internal trade of the States,’1233 the 
regulatory power over which belonged to the states and not to Congress.1234 By re-
establishing the importance of physical state boundaries, the defendant in the case, 
who was selling oils contrary to the above Act merely within his state, therefore, could 
not be charged with a criminal activity under that act.1235 
 
It may, however, also be highlighted that similar to the limits placed on Congress by 
Justice Hughes in the Shreveport Rate Cases,1236 Chief Justice Chase recognised that 
certain exceptions to the dual federalist interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
existed. Such exception, Chief Justice Chase held, existed when it could be 
demonstrated that federal regulation was ‘a necessary and proper means for carrying 
into execution some other power expressly granted or vested’ to Congress.1237 It could 
be argued that the commercial activity could become part of interstate commerce 
through its regulation by the exercise of another enumerated power of Congress under 
the Constitution. In the current case, Chief Justice Chase held that this had not been 
proven as the enactment of the prohibition of the sale of these oils was ‘merely that of 
increasing the production and sale of other oils, and, consequently, the revenue 
derived from them, by excluding from the market the particular kind described.’1238 
                                                          
1229 United States v Dewitt (1870) 76 US (9 Wall) 41, 41; Tribe (n 171) 809; Mark (n 1222) 696; 
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 161.  
1230 Tribe (n 15) 809; Mark (n 31) 696; Chemerinsky (n 22) 161. 
1231 United States v Dewitt (n 38) 42. 
1232 United States v Dewitt (n 62) 44. 
1233 ibid 45. 
1234 Tribe (n 171) 809; Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 161–162.  
1235 United States v Dewitt (n 62) 45; Mark, ‘United States v. Morrison, the Commerce Clause and the 
Substantial Effects Test’ (n 56) 696.  
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‘This consequence,’ he held, was ‘too remote and too uncertain’ to include it under the 
exception highlighted.1239 
 
The adoption of the dual federalist approach, however, continued in The Trademark 
Cases,1240 where the Supreme Court held that the establishment of a uniform and 
federal trademark registration system was unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause.1241 Justice Miller held that the regulation and enforcement of trademarks had 
belonged to the states traditionally, who had also been exclusively entrusted with ‘the 
security and protection’ of these.1242 Consequently, the challenged Act that merely 
attempted to regulate previously existing trademark registration and enforcement, and 
did not make specific reference to the regulation of trademarks that were ‘to be 
transported from one State to another,’ was held unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause.1243  Subsequently, it has now become an integral requirement under the 
current federal trademark registration system to use the registered federal trademark 
in interstate commerce.1244 
 
Based on the above cases, another aspect of the Commerce Clause materialised. If 
Congress attempted to regulate activities the regulation over which was considered a 
traditional state power, and the market seemed to constitute an integral part of 
intrastate commerce, these could not become part of interstate commerce and had to 
be protected from such an invasion of sovereignty. However, returning to the dual 
federalist approach, if the activities involved the crossing of state borders, they could 
immediately become part of interstate commerce, thus rendering the distinction 
challenging to establish. 
 
2.2. A restrictive interpretation of commerce 
 
                                                          
1239 ibid. 
1240 The Trademark Cases (1878) 100 US (10 Otto) 82. 
1241 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 162.  
1242 The Trademark Cases (n 71) 92-93. 
1243 The Trademark Cases (1878) 100 US (10 Otto) 82, 97 - 98. 
1244 ‘Fact Sheets Selecting and Registering a Trademark’ (International Trademark Association) 
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The second group of cases also followed the dual federalist approach, however, they 
relied on adopting a more restrictive formalistic interpretation of commerce than the 
one adopted by Chief Justice Marshall, which included all ‘intercourse,’1245 to hold 
federal laws unconstitutional.  
The case of United States v EC Knight1246 involved questioning whether the Sherman 
Antitrust Act prohibiting the creation of monopolies applied to the nation-wide 
acquisition activities of American Sugar. Even though American Sugar acquired ‘over 
98% of the refined sugar manufacturing capacity in the US,’ Chief Justice Fuller held 
that the regulation of commerce did not include manufacture. 1247 Thus, he held that 
the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to their acquisition activities.1248 
‘Manufacturing,’ the Court argued, ‘involved turning raw materials into finished 
products, while commerce […] involved transportation of finished goods between the 
states.’1249 Manufacturing activities could, therefore, not become part of interstate 
commerce, regardless of their importance on the interstate market, and Congress 
could not regulate these uniformly.  
The Supreme Court adopted the same approach in Hammer v Dagenhart,1250 which 
included a challenge to the Owen-Keating Child Labor Act that was to regulate child 
labour in mines and factories.1251 Arguably disregarding the purpose of the Act - 
protecting children while regulating child labour, - Justice Day held that since this Act 
was to regulate ‘the production of articles’ and not ‘commerce,’ it was to be regulated 
by states and was thus unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.1252 According 
to him, an activity became part of interstate commerce ‘by [the] actual delivery [of the 
product] to a common carrier for transportation; or the actual commencement of its 
                                                          
1245 Gibbons v Ogden (n 6) 189 – 190 and 193 - 194. 
1246 United States v EC Knight (1895) 156 US 1. 
1247 Mark (n 1205) 677; Mark (n 1222) 701. 
1248 Mark (n 1205) 677; Mark (n 1222) 701. 
1249 United States v EC Knight (n 1246) 14.  
1250 Hammer v Dagenhart (n 1217). 
1251 ibid 275; Vanue B Lacour, ‘The Misunderstanding and Misuse of the Commerce Clause’ (2003) 30 
Southern University Law Review 187, 190.  
1252 Lacour (n 1251) 190; Hammer v Dagenhart (n 1217) 272.  
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transfer to another state.’1253 The production, therefore, regardless of its purpose, 
could not be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
It would, therefore, seem that a wide interpretation of commerce was no longer an 
acceptable method for the Supreme Court to determine whether the regulated activity 
formed part of the interstate system. This view, however, is in stark contrast with the 
decisions where the Justices opted to extend the limits of this interstate system, 
recognising the interconnectedness of not only the regulated activities, but their 
markets as well. 
Based on the above it may be established that the Justices of the Supreme Court 
before the Great Depression devised various distinct methods to determine whether 
an Act of Congress adopted under the Commerce Clause was constitutional. It, 
however, appears, that if they agreed that an activity formed an integral part of the 
constantly evolving interstate commerce, they were willing to adopt new interpretations 
of the Commerce Clause. At the same time, they were also ready to revert to the dual 
federalist approach or devise a more restrictive formalistic interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause to protect activities traditionally governed by states or when they 
considered the regulated activities to be merely intrastate with no physical state 
crossing involved.  
However, as argued above, it may also be claimed that the protection of the rights of 
states to regulate certain areas could be regarded a constitutional value that was 
deemed more important based on the circumstances of each than that of the creation 
of a uniform national market. 
IV. The Great Depression: signs of an even more interconnected 
economy? 
 
Similar to the most recent financial crisis, which demonstrated the current 
interconnectedness of the global economy, one of the key aspects that the Great 
Depression demonstrated was how the ‘entire American economy was 
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interconnected,’ and could be affected by harm caused to even one of its parts.1254 To 
manage the harmful effects of the Great Depression, President Franklin Roosevelt 
was elected, who advocated for a more powerful federal government to ensure that 
the nation as a whole would be saved from ‘economic ruin.’1255 In order to succeed 
with his programme devised for this purpose called the ‘New Deal,’1256 however, he 
needed a degree of co-operation from all branches of the federal government with his 
programme. On the other hand, the co-operation he required from the judiciary was 
not present initially. A distinctive feature of these initial decisions is the stance that 
Supreme Court took towards the interpretation of the Commerce Clause. 
One of the first federal acts enacted as part of the New Deal programme was the 
National Industrial Recovery Act, which in its preamble declared how the Great 
Depression ‘burdened interstate commerce’ and amongst other provisions, required 
the payment of ‘minimum wages and maximum hours of labour.’1257 The Live Poultry 
Code, enacted pursuant to this Act, laid down the same requirements for those 
working in slaughterhouses.1258  
 
In ALA Schechter Poultry Corp v United States,1259 it was argued that a 
slaughterhouse in Brooklyn violated the above Code,1260 resulting in the challenge of 
the National Industrial Recovery Act under the Commerce Clause. The federal 
government, adopting the approach of the Supreme Court when it decided to extend 
the scope of interstate commerce based on the effect of the activities on interstate 
commerce, claimed that ‘the wages and hours of slaughterhouse employees and the 
quality of birds sold’ had an effect on interstate commerce as it ‘influenc[ed] the price, 
                                                          
1254 Eric R Claeys, ‘The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive Political Theory and the 
Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison’ (2002) 11 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 403, 426. 
426. 
1255 Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court : The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution 
(Oxford University Press 1998) 3; Donald G Morgan, Congress and the Constitution : A Study of 
Responsibility (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1966) 163.  
1256 Cushman (n 1255) 3. 
1257 ibid 156; Claeys (n 1254) 427. 
1258 Cushman (n 1255) 156.  
1259 ALA Schechter Poultry Corp v United States (1935) 295 US 495; Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 
(n 77) 165; Tushnet (n 83) 165–166. 
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quantity, and quality of poultry shipped from one state to another.’1261 It may further be 
claimed that their approach adopted the viewpoint that the creation and protection of 
a national market was, in fact, a constitutional value. 
 
The Supreme Court, however, refused to accept these arguments. Justice Hughes, in 
delivering the opinion of the Court, held that the National Industrial Recovery Act was 
‘an unconstitutional delegation of authority,’ and the Live Poultry Code was therefore 
invalid.1262  He subsequently, however, devoted a separate part of his opinion to 
whether the activities of the defendants could constitute part of interstate commerce, 
if the Code had been upheld.1263 In doing so, he first devised a novel approach to hold 
that the intrastate origin of the article of commerce was no longer relevant. It was its 
interstate destination, he held, that determined whether it formed part of the interstate 
system.1264 Once the article ‘had come to a permanent rest within the State’ and was 
not being ‘held, used, or sold’ for interstate purposes,1265 it left the ‘stream of interstate 
commerce.’1266 Once it had done so, it was no longer subject to uniform regulation by 
Congress, but was to be regulated by the states.  
 
It is argued that this approach followed the first group of cases relying on the dual 
federalist approach analysed above, and traces of that approach may also be 
identified subsequently in the case. For instance, Justice Hughes, consequently 
returned to his decision in the Shreveport Rate Cases,1267 and accepted the view that 
Congress could regulate certain intrastate commercial activities, but such a regulation 
– consistent with the purpose of the Commerce Clause – had to be enacted with the 
aim of preventing ‘interstate commerce’ from harm caused by the intrastate 
activities.1268 It is, thus, claimed that he seemed to have recognised the creation and 
protection of a uniform national market as a constitutional value the Commerce Clause 
                                                          
1261 David P Currie, ‘The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-1940’ (1987) 54 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 504, 524; Cushman (n 1255) 158.  
1262 Cushman (n 1255) 157. 
1263 ibid. 
1264 ibid 158; Mark (n 1222) 710.  
1265 Cushman (n 1255) 158; Mark (n 1222) 710.  
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was set out to protect. He subsequently argued that the aim of Congress through the 
National Industrial Recovery Act was ‘merely the regulation of cost,’ which amounted 
to ‘a question of discretion and not of power,’1269 and thus could not be upheld under 
the above exception. It is interesting to highlight this activity could not be regulated 
under the Commerce Clause in Hammer v Dagenhart,1270 however, it was held 
otherwise in this case. 
 
Justice Cardozo further claimed that ‘to find immediacy or directness here is to find it 
almost everywhere.’1271 His opinion supported the rejection of the extension of 
interstate commerce to include activities of interstate origin, but with no interstate 
destination.1272 He claimed that such an extension would have resulted in an 
encroachment upon the unenumerated powers of the states that was to be protected 
under the Tenth Amendment.1273 It seems, therefore, that Justice Cardozo placed 
more of an emphasis on the protection of state powers as a constitutional value rather 
than focusing on the protection of interstate commerce from the probable harmful 
effects of intrastate activities as a constitutional value.  
 
It, however, should not be forgotten that one of the main aims of the New Deal 
programme was to ensure that the nation as a whole was set on the road to recovery 
from the Great Depression. If this aim was to be attained through a nation-wide 
programme, the evaluation by the Supreme Court of each challenge under the 
Commerce Clause individually meant that this aim of the New Deal programme was 
placed in grave jeopardy. However, if Congress was to regulate areas previously 
regulated by the state in the ‘national interest,’ the only method available to oversee 
and challenge such an expansion of powers was through the Supreme Court.  
 
Another area of commerce where the federal government recognised nationwide 
problems was the bituminous coal industry, which was at ‘a state of collapse’ by the 
                                                          
1269 ibid. 
1270 Hammer v Dagenhart (n 1217). 
1271 ALA Schechter Poultry Corp v United States (n 1259) 554. 
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time of the Great Depression following long-lasting troubles.1274 An attempted answer 
to this problem was the adoption of the Bituminous Coal Act 1935, which set out ‘wage 
and price standards’1275 in the industry, and also imposed a ‘heavy tax’ on coal 
‘producers’ who refused to join the Bituminous Coal Code.1276 
  
This Act was challenged in Carter v Carter,1277 where the majority of the Supreme 
Court Justices found that the Act was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause 
from the formalistic interpretation approach and following the effects test. Justice 
Sutherland firstly held, seemingly reviving the decision in United States v EC Knight1278 
and adopting the restrictive interpretation of commerce, that Congress could not 
regulate the bituminous coal industry since the coal industry included activities of 
‘production, not […] commerce.’1279 Despite the different approach adopted in ALA 
Schechter Poultry Corp v United States,1280 Justice Sutherland seemed to prefer the 
approach adopted in the earlier case of Hammer v Dagenhart.1281 
 
The intended interstate destination of the produced article of commerce, he held, was 
no longer relevant,1282 since the aim of production was to bring ‘into being’ the article 
and ‘commerce disposed of it.’1283 Consequently, the article of commerce only became 
part of interstate commerce after ‘negotiations, agreements and circumstances 
entirely apart from production’ commenced about its ‘disposal.’1284 Thus, the line of 
where interstate commerce began was no longer set at the production of the article 
with the purpose of being sold on the interstate market, but was pushed to the end of 
the production process. However, it may be argued that negotiations and agreements 
could have commenced even before the production of the article was initiated, thus 
                                                          
1274 Robert L Stern, ‘The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946’ (1946) 59 Harvard 
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making the decision when interstate commerce began quite blurred. Justice 
Sutherland, however, justified his differentiation by arguing that all articles in interstate 
commerce that were of local origin, such as ‘mining, manufacturing, or crop growing’ 
could, in effect, be argued to form part of interstate commerce otherwise.1285 
 
Justice Sutherland also acknowledged that, despite not forming part of commerce, all 
production activities could be held to have an effect on interstate commerce. 
Nevertheless, Congress was only allowed to regulate those with ‘direct’ effects.1286 For 
such a determination, he argued, the Court would look ‘not upon the magnitude of 
either the cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has 
been brought about.’1287 Therefore, if there was ‘an intervening agency or condition’ 
and the extent of the effect is not ‘logical[ly]’ related to ‘its character,’ such as in the 
current case, he held that the effect was an indirect one.1288   
 
He further seemed to have, however, adopted the view that the protection of the 
national market should be recognised as a constitutional value. His opinion, thus, also 
focused on the protection of interstate commerce from ‘evils’ as a purpose of the 
Commerce Clause.1289 However, he differentiated these ‘evils’ as being of ‘local’ and 
‘national’ concern, and held that it was only the evils of national concern that could be 
regulated uniformly by Congress on national level.1290 It is, therefore, argued that in 
his approach to the protection of this value he also adopted a somewhat dual federalist 
approach, focusing on the differentiation between what constituted federal and state 
concerns. 
  
It consequently seemed that President Roosevelt would not achieve the required co-
operation from the Supreme Court to achieve the aims of his New Deal programme, 
and the Justice would return to the approach that was aimed at protecting those areas 
                                                          
1285 ibid. 
1286 ibid 307. 
1287 ibid 308. and Currie (n 1261) 525–526. 
1288 Carter v Carter Coal Co (n 103) 307-308. 
1289 ibid 308–309. 
1290 ibid. 
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that used to be regulated by the states from Congressional overreach. The famous 
‘switch’ in the attitude of the Justices towards the New Deal was, however, near.1291  
 
V. The switch in time that saved nine 
 
Whilst the Justices of the Supreme Court were initially hesitant to uphold the Acts 
enacted under the New Deal programme under the Commerce Clause, their position, 
and mainly that of Justice Roberts, transformed radically in 1937.1292 Whether this was 
an effect of the Court packing plan announced by President Roosevelt or the 
realisation by the Justices that the interconnected nature of the national economy 
required a nation-wide response and a powerful federal government, is still 
debated.1293 
 
V.1. Close and substantial relation to interstate commerce 
 
The first sign of this transformed approach became apparent in NLRB v Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp,1294 in which the National Labor Relations Act was challenged 
under the Commerce Clause. The defendant in the case was a ‘steelmaker’ 
processing ‘ores’ of interstate origin and placing three quarters of ‘its products in 
interstate commerce.’1295  
The question, thus, became whether the Supreme Court would follow the restrictive 
interpretation and hold that the regulated activities merely concerned production 
following the decision in Carter v Carter,1296 or whether it would adopt the approach 
that could argue that the activities of the steelmaker were situated in the ‘current of 
commerce’ following the decision in Swift & Co v United States.1297  
                                                          
1291 G Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal (Harvard University Press 2000) 202. 
1292 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 169.  
1293 ibid. 
1294 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (1937) 301 US 1. 
1295 Currie (n 1261) 543.  
1296 Carter v Carter Coal Co (n 1277). 
1297 Swift & Co v United States (n 1218). 
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Chief Justice Hughes surprisingly devised a somewhat novel interpretation of the 
concept of interstate commerce instead of following either approaches. 
He, firstly, held that instead of focusing on the subject matter of the regulation and 
their nature, the emphasis should be placed on the relation of the activities in question 
to interstate commerce.1298 If this relation of the activities was ‘close and substantial,’ 
making the ‘control [of these activities] essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions,’ he held that the regulatory power over 
these should belong to Congress.1299 Even though Chief Justice Hughes placed the 
emphasis on the ‘close and substantial […] relationship’1300 in this case, it may be key 
to highlight that the same ‘close and substantial’ nature was already present in the 
earlier case of the Shreveport Rate Cases.1301 The only distinguishing feature was the 
reference was now to a ‘relationship’ and not to an ‘effect,’ hence the reference to this 
interpretation as ‘somewhat novel’ above.  
Furthermore, this approach also appears to correspond to the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause and the fundamental constitutional value it sets out to protect being 
the protection of interstate commerce in order to enhance its development. 
Subsequently, this becomes apparent in his claim that the commerce power of 
Congress included the plenary ‘power to enact “all appropriate legislation”’ as long as 
its aim was to protect or advance interstate commerce, “promote its growth and insure 
its safety” and “to foster, protect, control and restrain” it.1302  
Chief Justice Hughes, however, recognised that this novel ‘open-ended test’1303 
resulted in the inclusion of certain activities in interstate commerce, that if examined 
separately, would have been considered intrastate.1304 On the other hand, he argued 
that such an examination required the Court to assess the activities in an ‘intellectual 
                                                          
1298 Williams, ‘The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism’ (n 1008) 1909.  
1299 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (n 117) 37. 
1300 ibid.  
1301 Shreveport Rate Cases (n 1221). 
1302 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (n 1294). 36 - 37. This decision also seems to adopt the 
language of his previous decision in Shreveport Rate Cases (n 55) and ALA Schechter Poultry Corp v 
United States (n 70). See also Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 165; Tushnet (n 83) 165–166. 
1303 Claeys (n 1254) 430.  
1304 Stern (n 1274) 680; Claeys (n 1254) 430. 
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vacuum,’1305 which would have been unrealistic in the interconnected economy of the 
United States, which was in effect reflecting the experience of the people of the United 
States at the time.1306 
Chief Justice Hughes, relying on this non-originalist method of interpretation that 
adapted to the circumstances of each era, thus upheld the National Labor Relations 
Act to be constitutional under the Commerce Clause. In reaching this decision, he 
argued that a conflict in the steel industry ‘would have […] immediate and catastrophic 
effects […] upon interstate commerce.’1307 Congress was allowed to exercise its 
regulatory powers uniformly over this national area. Consequently, this allowed 
Congress to regulate employment practices in the area to protect the employees from 
the ‘unfair labor practices of their employer,’ which was held to be in ‘close and 
substantial’ relation with interstate commerce.1308 
The above test was soon adopted by the Supreme Court and utilised to extend the 
powers of Congress in Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co v NLRB.1309 In this case the 
characterisation was further defined as that between ‘remote’ and ‘close and 
substantial’ effects.1310 The determinant for which category the activity belonged to 
was held to be ‘one of degree’ and not one that was to be expressed in “mathematical 
or rigid formulas.”1311 This position, thus, indicated that the non-originalist method of 
interpretation was held to be more suitable for this area of constitutional law. 
In NLRB v Fainblatt1312 this ‘close and substantial’ relation was further identified as 
one not requiring a considerable amount of ownership as even ‘relatively small units’ 
could amount to “in the aggregate a vast volume of interstate commerce.”1313 The 
activities of an employer not engaged in interstate commerce could, thus, become part 
                                                          
1305 Stern (n 1274) 680.  
1306 Barry Friedman and Genevieve Lakier, ‘“To Regulate,” Not “To Prohibit”: Limiting the Commerce 
Power’ (New York University School of Law 2013) Working Paper No 13-13 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2244496> accessed 14 February 2014. 
1307 Stern (n 1274) 680; Mark (n 1205) 678; Currie (n 1261) 543. 
1308 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (n 117) 473. 
1309 Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co v NLRB (1938) 303 US 453. 
1310 Stern (n 1274) 683. 
1311 ibid. 
1312 NLRB v Fainblatt (1939) 306 US 601. 
1313 Stern (n 1274) 683. 
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of interstate commerce if those had a substantial and close effect on it.1314 This 
decision, therefore, extended the scope of interstate commerce into areas within the 
physical state boundaries, reducing the importance of these under this novel 
interpretation. 
The Supreme Court further extended the powers of Congress under the part of the 
test that followed the purpose of the Commerce Clause and required the federal 
regulation ‘to foster, protect, control and restrain’ interstate commerce1315 in United 
States v Carolene Products.1316 Justice Stone held in this case that the regulatory 
powers of the states could in fact be encroached upon by the federal government. 
However, this was only possible if the aim of the federal regulation was ‘to protect 
consumers in the state of destination with respect to health and fraud.’1317 It may be 
argued that the initial approach developed in the Shreveport Rate Cases1318 arguing 
for the protection of interstate commerce as a constitutional value was also extended 
to the actual protection of individuals as a result of uniform interstate regulations in this 
case.   
 
In the subsequent decision in Mulford v Smith1319 Justice Roberts further extended the 
reach of interstate commerce by holding that Congress was allowed to ‘regulate the 
quantity of a commodity,’ which effectively resulted in the ‘control’ of ‘the amount 
produced in an interstate industry.’1320 He also decided that the ‘legislative motive’ of 
Congress was no longer relevant even if that was to control an activity that was 
previously held to be clearly intrastate based on its subject matter.1321 
 
V.2. Any reasonable mean allowed to attain the purpose of the Commerce 
Clause  
 
                                                          
1314 Consolidated Edison v NLRB (1938) 305 US 197, 222; Stern (n 1274) 684. 
1315 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (n 117) 36 - 37. 
1316 United States v Carolene Products Co (1938) 304 US 144. 
1317 Stern (n 1274) 685. 
1318 Shreveport Rate Cases (n 1221). 
1319 Mulford v Smith (1939) 307 US 38. 
1320 Stern (n 1274) 692. 
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The second of the three fundamental cases that represent ‘the switch in time that 
saved nine’1322 was United States v Darby.1323 The case concerned a challenge by ‘a 
lumberyard in Georgia’ to the requirement of a minimum wage to be paid to employees 
of ‘industries engaged in “production for interstate commerce”’ of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 under the Commerce Clause.1324 
 
Justice Stone, in delivering the unanimous decision of the Court, upheld the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 as constitutional, ‘explicitly overrul[ing]’1325 the decision in 
Hammer v Dagenhart.1326 Firstly, he appears to have adopted the transformed 
viewpoint that one of the purposes of the Commerce Clause was the protection of 
individuals in the United States through uniform national regulation. He thus held that 
the Act was a ‘means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end,’1327 
which end could include the ‘preservation of public health, morals or prevention of 
crime.’1328 The permitted end in the Act in question was found to be to ‘protect against 
the adverse effects of low wages on interstate commerce’ and to assist ‘to effectuate 
the exclusion from interstate trade.’1329 It is, however, highlighted that the protection 
of individuals from such evils was previously considered to be the responsibility of the 
states.  
 
It emerges from the above decisions that following the Great Depression, such a 
responsibility was progressively placed in the hands of Congress. Justice Stone further 
held that since the challenged Act was used as a ‘suppression of unfair methods’ in 
interstate commerce,1330 the activities regulated had become part of the national 
system to enhance their development. Consequently, through the Fair Labour 
                                                          
1322 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 169. 
1323 United States v Darby (1941) 312 US 100. 
1324 White (n 1291) 227.  
1325 Currie (n 1261) 545.  
1326 Hammer v Dagenhart (n 1217). 
1327 Robert L Stern, ‘The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946. Part Two’ (1946) 
59 Harvard Law Review 883, 889. 
1328 ibid 888. 
1329 Currie (n 1261) 545; Mark (n 1222) 715. 
1330 Stern (n 1327) 889; Friedman and Lakier (n 1306) 285. 
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Standards Act, all employees in production activities would be guaranteed uniform 
minimum ‘labour conditions’ constitutionally.1331 
 
With the passage of time and the adoption of the living constitutional values method 
of interpretation of the Constitution, it may, thus, be argued that Justice Stone in his 
decisions allowed the Constitution to adapt to the circumstances of each era. 
 
Whereas previously the Supreme Court attempted to define the limits of this 
Congressional power, Justice Stone further appeared to have handed this 
responsibility back to ‘Congress to determine public policy’ and the limits of its own 
powers under the Commerce Clause.1332  He also claimed that the Tenth Amendment 
‘states but a truism that all is retained, which has not been surrendered’1333 and that 
the Court would no longer examine the motive for the enactment of the federal 
regulation.1334 It thus seems that Justice Stone in fact attempted to abolish the judicial 
limits of the extent of interstate commerce,1335 while maintaining, however, that 
Congressional limits could be established to this network based on public policy. 
 
V.3. All activities are economically interdependent 
 
The third fundamental case demonstrating the ‘switch’ was Wickard v Filburn.1336 In 
this case, Filburn, the owner of ‘a relatively small farm’ brought a challenge of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1939 to the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds 
after he was asked to pay a penalty for using more than double of the size of the 
allotment granted to him under the above Act.1337  
 
Filburn argued that he did not intend for all the harvest to be destined for neither the 
interstate, nor the intrastate market, but mostly utilised these for home consumption 
                                                          
1331 Mark (n 1222) 715. 
1332 Stern (n 1327) 889. 
1333 United States v Darby (n 146) 124. 
1334 Graglia (n 1217) 740. 
1335 ibid. 
1336 Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. 
1337 Stern (n 1327) 903–904. 
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and thus his activities did not fall under the interstate system.1338 A unanimous 
Supreme Court, in a surprising opinion delivered by Justice Jackson, decided to break 
with previous case law completely and further extend the powers of Congress by 
upholding the challenged Act under the Commerce Clause.  
 
Justice Jackson firstly held that it was no longer required for the activities of production 
to be shown that the articles produced were intended ‘for interstate commerce.’1339 He 
further held, recognising that all activities had become economically interdependent, 
that distinguishing activities based on their subject matter ‘would have wreaked 
financial chaos to try’ to argue at the time.1340  
 
He subsequently adopted an economic interpretation of the Commerce Clause, and 
argued that the ‘home-consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price 
and market conditions’ as it was in competition with ‘the wheat in commerce.’1341 This, 
he argued, occurred because of the aggregate or cumulative effects that the 
‘appellee’s own contribution […] taken together with that of many other similarly 
situated’ was ‘far from trivial’ on the commerce of wheat.1342 This novel approach was 
subsequently named ‘the substantial economic effect test.’1343  
 
It would, thus, seem that he adopted the living constitutional values approach 
advocated for by this work, in which the creation and subsequent protection of a 
uniform national market would be deemed a constitutional value. It may also be argued 
that through this novel test Justice Jackson seemed to extend the scope of the 
activities that belonged to such system even further. Following his decision, it seemed 
to be sufficient to demonstrate that the ‘class’ of an insignificant ‘individual act’ could 
become part of this interstate system if the effects of this class of activity were 
substantial on interstate commerce.1344 
                                                          
1338 Tribe (n 171) 813. 
1339 As held in United States v Darby (n 125). See also Stern (n 1327) 905 and 908.  
1340 Wickard v Filburn (n 1336); Claeys (n 1254) 431. 
1341 Wickard v Filburn (n 1336); Stern (n 1327) 904. 
1342 Wickard v Filburn (n 1336); Friedman and Lakier (n 1306) 284. 
1343 Stern (n 1327) 906.The origins of which are, however, identifiable in the decision of the Supreme 
Court in NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (n 1294). 
1344 Tribe (n 171) 813. 
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Based on the above, it emerges that towards the end of the New Deal programme, the 
scope of interstate commerce became so extensive that it resulted in the inclusion of 
activities that were previously regarded as traditionally belonging to the states. The 
aim of this extension of power, however, appeared to be the protection and 
development of the interstate system, which may be regarded as the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause and the constitutional value it set out to protect, rather than the 
protection of the traditional state powers. Moreover, with the protection provided to 
individuals through these traditional state activities, the transfer of these also resulted 
in such protection being assumed by Congress on certain occasions. Such transfer of 
protection of individuals could be justified by the devastating effects of the Great 
Depression and the support by citizens through the re-election of President Roosevelt. 
However, it also resulted in the loss of regulatory powers by the states, which 
consequently resulted in the transformation of the regulatory landscape of interstate 
commerce. 
 
VI. A limitless interstate commerce? 
 
Following the Great Depression, the Supreme Court for a period of almost sixty years 
refused to hold any federal law unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. It, thus, 
further extended interstate commerce into such areas that it seemed that slowly all 
limits to the power of Congress would disappear. These cases may be categorised 
into three separate groups based on the interpretation of the clause by the Justices. 
 
VI.1. Commerce that crosses state borders 
 
In the first group of cases of this era, the re-introduction of the importance of physical 
state boundaries to determine whether the regulated activity formed part of interstate 
commerce may be witnessed.  
 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 5: Creating and subsequently protecting a uniform national market in the United 
States: Part II 
 
[270] 
 
For instance, in United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association1345 Justice 
Black held that due to the highly interstate nature of the insurance business, the 
insurance market was included in the interstate system and Congress was allowed to 
regulate these uniformly across the nation.1346  
 
In Scarborough v United States1347 the Supreme Court returned to its previous 
interpretation arguing that for the activity to be considered interstate, it was sufficient 
for the article of commerce regulated to have ‘crossed a state line’ at some point after 
it came into existence.1348 Whilst not directly regulating commerce, however, the 
Omnibus Crime Control Act 1968 was therefore upheld under the Commerce Clause 
in this case, allowing the prohibition of the possession of ‘a firearm’ by ‘a convicted 
felon.’1349 In Maryland v Wirtz1350 it was subsequently held that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act could also apply constitutionally to ‘schools and hospitals’ as they 
‘made [interstate] purchases.’1351 
 
Whereas the re-introduction of the importance of crossing state boundaries could have 
resulted in a restriction of the powers of Congress, these cases demonstrate the 
opposite. The crossing was still important, however, the actors were placed further 
into the heart of an intrastate commercial system. For instance, the regulation of 
activities by schools and hospitals is a matter in which local interests would be high. 
However, the regulation of this traditionally intrastate area became possible through 
the affirmative Commerce Clause in this era. 
 
VI.2. Federal protection of individuals 
 
The extended purpose of the Commerce Clause that argued for the protection of 
individuals through uniform federal legislation may be clearly demonstrated when the 
                                                          
1345 United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association (1944) 322 US 533. 
1346 ibid 541. and Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Subtitle F, Part I, s 1501 (a) (3). 
1347 Scarborough v United States (1977) 431 US 563. 
1348 Mark (n 1205) 682. 
1349 Graglia (n 1217) 744. 
1350 Maryland v Wirtz (1968) 392 US 183. 
1351 Graglia (n 1217) 745. 
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clause was utilised to uphold the provisions of the Civil Rights Act arguing that racial 
discrimination by public establishments ‘affected interstate commerce.’1352  
 
In Hodel v Indiana,1353 for instance, this purpose also surfaced when it was held that 
the Congress could regulate activities under the Commerce Clause in order to ‘protect 
“public health and safety” and the “environment,” as well as agriculture’ that could 
result in harm to the interstate system.1354 In order to demonstrate this aim of the 
regulation, the Supreme Court held that it was merely sufficient for the act to form part 
of ‘an integral part of the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when 
considered as a whole satisfies this test.’1355 
 
VI.3. The resurgence of traditional state functions and the political safeguard 
theory 
 
Whilst the Supreme Court made an attempt to hold a federal law invalid under the 
Commerce Clause during this period, this attempt proved quite short-lived. In National 
League of Cities v Usery1356 the Supreme Court seemed to have returned to its 
previously adopted position under the dual federalist approach using the Tenth 
Amendment, and, thus, claiming that the protection of state rights was a more 
fundamental constitutional value than that of the creation and protection of the national 
market. It held in its majority decision that the Fair Labor Standards Act was aimed at 
regulating the ‘traditional state functions.’ These functions were guaranteed to be 
protected under the Tenth Amendment, and consequently, the Act was declared 
unconstitutional.1357 Whilst this approach seems to have been a return to the dual 
federalist interpretation, what constituted such a ‘traditional state function,’1358 
however, remained unclear. 
                                                          
1352 ibid 743; Claeys (n 1254) 433. See also Katzenbach v McClung (1964) 379 US 294 and Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc v United States (1964) 379 US 241. 
1353 Hodel v Indiana (1981) 452 US 314. 
1354 Graglia (n 1217) 747. 
1355 Hodel v Indiana (n 1353). 
1356 National League of Cities v Usery (1976) 426 US 833. 
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On the other hand, this approach was rejected indirectly by the Supreme Court until 
1985,1359 when in Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,1360 the 
Supreme Court finally overruled the above case. While doing so, Justice Blackmun 
held that the “traditional government functions” distinction was ‘unworkable’ and 
‘inconsistent with established principles of federalism.’1361 He argued, recognising the 
special place, that states occupied in the federal system, that the ‘political safeguards 
of federalism’ were what guaranteed that Congress would not abuse its powers under 
the affirmative Commerce Clause.1362 Under this theory, he claimed that because 
states participate in the enactment of federal legislation, no federal act could be 
enacted that ‘unduly burden the States.’1363 Such a theory, however, raises further 
issues. It could, ultimately, lead to the regulatory powers of Congress becoming 
limitless. This may result in Congress acting unconstitutionally, which would, 
consequently, remain unchallenged by the Supreme Court. Such actions would, 
however, contravene one of the key republican principle of separation of powers 
underlying the Constitution.  
It, thus, appears that following the ‘switch in time that saved nine,’1364 the Supreme 
Court had not only recognised the interconnectedness of the state and federal 
economies, but had also enabled the development and the actual extension of a 
uniform and centralised system of interstate commerce, which may be claimed to 
constitute the original purpose of the Commerce Clause and the constitutional value it 
was set out to protect. This system, however, was faced with the challenge that it was, 
in fact, on the route to becoming limitless, where the state boundaries or traditional 
state functions were no longer protected if these were related to activities harmful to 
the interstate network.  
                                                          
1359 ibid 185. It had also undergone various alterations and had various limits set to its scope These 
included, for instance, the requirement that Tenth Amendment violations by Congress were only present 
when Congress regulated ‘state governments’ or ‘states as states’ and not ‘private conduct.’ Hodel v 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association (1981) 452 US 264. and Chemerinsky, 
Constitutional Law (n 77) 185. 
1360 Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (n 1182). 
1361 ibid 531. 
1362 Schütze (n 994) 86.  
1363 Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (n 1182); James Hinshaw, ‘The Dormant 
Commerce Clause After Garcia: An Application to the Interstate Commerce of Sanitary Landfill Space’ 
(1992) 67 Indiana Law Journal 511, 513. 
1364 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 169. 
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VII. The limits of interstate commerce: protecting the traditional state 
powers  
 
Until 1995, the Justices were willing to extend the scope of interstate commerce to 
enhance its development and protect the citizens of the United States in a uniform 
manner. However, the opinion of the Justices transformed once again.  
The Supreme Court, in a surprising decision in United States v Lopez,1365 held the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which criminalised the possession of a firearm 
in a school zone, unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.1366 An issue that was 
apparent in the Act itself was that it did not make a specific reference to how the 
regulated activity was related to interstate commerce.1367  
The government consequently argued that the possession of guns in a school zone 
could affect interstate commerce in three ways. First, possessing a firearm could ‘lead 
to violent crime,’ the ‘costs’ of which the government ‘spreads throughout the 
population’ through ‘insurance.’1368 Secondly, the insurgence of violent crimes would 
lead to the reduction of ‘travel to areas within the country that [we]re perceived to be 
unsafe.’1369 Thirdly, the ‘learning environment’ would be ‘threaten[ed],’ which would 
lead to ‘a less productive citizenry,’ having ‘an adverse effect on the Nation's economic 
well-being.’1370 
 
Whereas it could have clearly been established following Scarborough v United 
States1371 that Congress could regulate the possession of firearms if those passed a 
state line,1372 the Supreme Court focused its attention on the regulation being related 
to educational establishments. 
                                                          
1365 United States v Lopez (n 1192). 
1366 Tribe (n 171) 817. 
1367 Graglia (n 1217) 750. 
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The majority of the Justices first rejected the findings of the government, and argued 
that ‘Congress had not done what was necessary to locate the Act within the 
Commerce Clause.’1373 Chief Justice Rehnquist subsequently identified three types of 
activities that Congress, according to previous cases, was allowed to regulate.1374 
Firstly, Congress could regulate ‘the use of the channels of interstate commerce,’1375 
for instance, to ensure that those are kept ‘free from immoral and injurious uses.’1376 
Secondly, Congress could regulate and protect ‘the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce’ regardless of their intrastate 
origin.1377 Thirdly, Congress was allowed to regulate those activities that had a 
‘substantial relation to interstate commerce,’ as devised by Chief Justice Hughes in 
NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,1378 which included the test of ‘whether the 
regulated activity “substantially affect[ed]” interstate commerce.1379  
Applying these categories to the case in question, Chief Justice Rehnquist established 
that it was clear that the challenged Act did not belong to the first two categories and, 
thus, it had to be demonstrated that the regulated activity had a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.1380 While holding that the possession of the firearm did not affect 
interstate commerce substantially, he identified a novel distinction of previous case 
law based on the ‘economic’ nature of the regulated activity.1381 He held that the 
challenged Act included the ‘non-economic’ activity of possession of firearms, and 
notably, even the cultivation of wheat was an ‘economic activity.’1382  
 
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument1383 that the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990 could be held to form an ‘essential part of a larger regulation of 
                                                          
1373 Graglia (n 1217) 751. 
1374 United States v Lopez (n 421) 558. 
1375 ibid 558. Following the decisions in United States v Darby (n 146) and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v 
United States (n 1352). 
1376 United States v Lopez (n 421) 558. 
1377 ibid 558. Such as they did in the Shreveport Rate Cases (n 1221). 
1378 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (n 1294). 
1379 United States v Lopez (n 421) 558 – 559.  
1380 ibid 558–559; Graglia (n 1217) 752. 
1381 Tribe (n 171) 819. 
1382 United States v Lopez (n 421) 560. 
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economic activity.’ 1384 It could consequently not be demonstrated that the Act had a 
‘substantial’ effect on interstate commerce, when ‘viewed in the aggregate.’1385  
 
However, according to this decision, it may be argued that since Scarborough v United 
States1386 formed part of previous case law, which also regulated economic activity, it 
was, in fact, the same activity that was regulated as in this case: the possession of 
firearms. Justice Stevens in his dissent also argued that possession of firearms should 
have been held to affect interstate commerce as firearms ‘are both articles of 
commerce and articles that can be used to restrain commerce,’ the possession of 
which is a result ‘of commercial activity.’1387 This recognition would have effectively 
made the Act to be upheld even utilising the newly adopted interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause.  
On the other hand, it would seem, that while the Supreme Court considered the 
protection of citizens from convicted felons possessing firearms a matter of interstate 
concern, the protection of children from individuals possessing firearms near their 
schools, adopting the non-originalist method of interpretation, was an unwelcome 
extension of the interstate system of commerce. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that 
such an extension could not be upheld as it could lead to the inclusion of ‘the 
educational process’ in the interstate system, which could clearly not be conceived as 
such.1388 This decision, however, seems to overrule the decision in Maryland v 
Wirtz,1389 where the Supreme Court upheld a federal regulation to apply for 
educational establishments. 
Even though the Chief Justice agreed with the government that it was not generally 
necessary ‘to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity ha[d] 
on interstate commerce,’1390 he created a novel procedural requirement in this area. 
He effectively asked for such findings to be provided for the Supreme Court ‘to 
                                                          
1384 United States v Lopez (n 421) 561. 
1385 ibid 561. 
1386 Scarborough v United States (n 1347). 
1387 Graglia (n 1217) 762. 
1388 United States v Lopez (n 421) 564. 
1389 Maryland v Wirtz (n 1350). 
1390 United States v Lopez (n 1192). 
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evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected 
interstate commerce’ if that was not ‘visible to the naked eye.’1391 
 
The Chief Justice further emphasised Congress was only to exercise its ‘enumerated 
powers’ under the Constitution, the ‘outer limits’ of which powers were ‘judicially 
enforceable.’1392 He did accept that this would lead to legal uncertainty, since it would 
be decided by the Supreme Court at the time what limits were acceptable at the era 
on a case-by-case basis. However, he held that this was set out to be an ‘inherent’ 
characteristic of the federal system of the United States, which the Supreme Court 
was unwilling to disturb by setting out the clear limits of ‘what is truly national and what 
is truly local.’1393 This approach, however, appears to revive the previously overruled 
traditional state function argument and the dual federalist approach. It further suggests 
that education would remain a ‘truly local’1394 concern that could not become part of 
interstate commerce. 
 
The novel approach of Chief Justice Rehnquist in United States v Lopez1395 was 
adopted in the subsequent of United States v Morrison,1396 when the Supreme Court 
held that ‘gender-motivated violence’ was not “economic” activity’ and thus ‘the tort 
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act’ were unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause.1397  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, adopting his previous approach, held that the Act did not 
belong to the first two categories, it therefore had to be demonstrated that the 
regulated activity had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
Even though Congress provided the Supreme Court with substantial findings that 
‘violence against women was a national problem,’1398 and could thus be argued to fall 
within the constitutional value of ensuring the protection of citizens through a national 
                                                          
1391 ibid 563. 
1392 ibid. Thus seemingly rejecting the political safeguard theory. 
1393 ibid 566–568. 
1394 ibid. 
1395 ibid. 
1396 United States v Morrison (n 1193). 
1397 Claeys (n 1254) 435. 
1398 Mark (n 1222) 687. 
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market, the majority of the Supreme Court remained unconvinced.1399 Similar to their 
decision in United States v Lopez,1400 Chief Justice Rehnquist held that if they were to 
find that the criminal activities had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, they 
would effectively “allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide 
aggregated impact of that crime had substantial effects on employment, production, 
transit, production or consumption.”1401 He then took a step further and actually 
acknowledged the revival of the ‘traditional state regulation’ or dual federalist 
approach. He argued that the above activities belonged to this category and thus could 
not be regulated uniformly by Congress as this would ‘obliterate the Constitution’s 
distinction between national and local authority.’1402  
In his dissent, Justice Breyer, however, highlighted that Congress actually provided 
reasons for the substantial effect of the regulated activities on interstate commerce 
and if these were ‘rational,’ they should not be overruled.1403 He further supported the 
viewpoint that it should be Congress, who determines what constitutes ‘economic 
activity’ and not the Court. 1404 This approach, however, would have resulted in the 
same consequences as Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,1405 
where it was argued that there would have been no limits and checks created for the 
exercise of the regulatory powers of Congress. 
The above two decisions, with a transformation in the approach of the majority of the 
Justices, suggest that a desire arose for limits to be placed on the further extension of 
interstate commerce towards the very end of the twentieth century. Both decisions 
appear to be highly concerned with Congress being able to extend its regulatory 
powers to areas that states have a strong interest in and regard to belong to them 
traditionally. It is, thus, argued that if the Supreme Court was to adopt the living 
constitutional values approach, it could argue that the protection of state powers has 
                                                          
1399 Mark (n 1205) 685. 
1400 United States v Lopez (n 1192). 
1401 Mark (n 1222) 687. 
1402 United States v Lopez (n 421) 556-557; United States v Morrison (n 422) 605 and 618. 
1403 Mark (n 1222) 688. 
1404 ibid. 
1405 Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (n 1182). 
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become a more significant constitutional value than that of the creation and protection 
of a uniform national market. 
Whilst the Justices did accept that novel interpretations developed since Gibbons v 
Ogden1406 about the Commerce Clause, their approach in these two cases, seem to 
have reverted to the ‘police power’ distinction of Chief Justice Marshall in that same 
case.1407 This surprising move, however, appears to reject the approaches that 
previously recognised the interconnected nature of local and national commerce. The 
forefront of their interpretation of the purpose of the Commerce Clause thus became 
the protection of ‘traditional state’ powers as opposed to the previously held purposes 
of protecting individuals from harm. The latter interpretation, however, no longer fit the 
restrictive definition of commerce or the newly devised tests.  
 
VIII. The return of the interconnected commerce 
 
The subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court until 2012 demonstrated a return to 
the approach that recognised the interconnected nature of local and national activities 
in commerce. Surprisingly, for this purpose, the Justices did not initially devise a novel 
approach, but adopted that of the decision in United States v Lopez.1408 
In Pierce County, Washington v Guillen,1409 for instance, the Justices ‘unanimously’ 
held that federal regulation about ‘road safety’ belonged to the first category of ‘the 
use of the channels of interstate commerce,’1410 and the Act in question was thus 
constitutional.1411 Therefore, if the federal regulation belonged to the first two 
categories of cases identified in United States v Lopez,1412 it appeared to be redundant 
to prove that the activities regulated had ‘substantial effect’ on interstate commerce. 
                                                          
1406 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
1407 Gibbons v Ogden (n 6) 209 – 210. 
1408 United States v Lopez (n 1192). 
1409 Pierce County, Washington v Guillen (2003) 537 US 129. 
1410 United States v Lopez (n 421) 558. 
1411 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 209. 
1412 United States v Lopez (n 1192). 
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Their inclusion in the first two categories was sufficient for the activity to be 
characterised as interstate commerce.  
 
A transformation in the approach of the Supreme Court towards determining what 
activities amounted to interstate commerce under the third category of United States 
v Lopez,1413 however, did take place in Gonzales v Raich.1414 The challenged federal 
law in this case was the Controlled Substances Act, since the home-grown marijuana 
plants of the defendants were appropriated from them under this Act.1415 
 
Justice Stevens, in delivering the opinion of the Court, and adopting the 
characterisation in United States v Lopez,1416 held that it had to be examined whether 
the activities regulated had substantial effect on interstate commerce under the third 
category as those did not belong to the first two.1417 Firstly, he held that the facts of 
the case were highly similar to those of Wickard v Filburn.1418 He argued that the 
respondents in both cases were ‘cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible 
commodity for which there is an established […] interstate market,’ the only difference 
being that in the case in question this market was an ‘illegal’ one.1419 He further held 
that both federal Acts in question were aimed at ‘control[ling] the supply and demand’ 
of the commodity in question.1420 He, therefore, held that if it had been found in 
Wickard v Filburn1421 that Congress had ‘a rational basis for believing’ that the 
aggregate effect of home-consumption of a commodity would be substantial ‘on price 
and market conditions,’ the same ‘rational basis’ could be demonstrated in the 
Controlled Substances Act.1422  
 
                                                          
1413 ibid. 
1414 Gonzales v Raich (n 1194). 
1415 ibid 1. 
1416 United States v Lopez (n 1192). 
1417  Gonzales v Raich (n 423) 18. 
1418 Wickard v Filburn (n 1336). 
1419 Gonzales v Raich (n 423) 18. 
1420 Gonzales v Raich (n 1194). 
1421 Wickard v Filburn (n 1336). 
1422 Gonzales v Raich (n 423) 19; 22 and 31. This also seems to echo the dissent of Justice Breyer in 
United States v Morrison (n 1193). 
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To distinguish the case in question from that of United States v Lopez1423 and United 
States v Morrison,1424 he further held that the activity in question was, in fact, an 
‘economic’ activity according to the definition provided by Webster of “economics” that 
includes “the production, distribution and consumption of commodities.”1425  
 
He also rejected the novel procedural requirement of requiring a finding of the 
substantial effects of the activities in the federal Act.1426 He declared that the mere 
‘absence’ of the above ‘does not call into question Congress’s authority to 
legislate.’1427 Contrary to the rejection by Chief Justice Rehnquist of the determination 
of whether an activity had substantial effect on interstate commerce as part of a ‘larger’ 
regulatory scheme, 1428 Justice Stevens seemingly reverted to this approach. He 
consequently refused to invalidate the Controlled Substances Act, since he held that 
it was an ‘individual component of [a] larger scheme.’1429 
 
Following the above decision, it, therefore, appeared that Congress had regulatory 
power over the areas of ‘economic’ activities, as defined by Justice Stevens, that ‘had 
an “established … interstate market”’ over which Congress had a ‘rational basis’ to 
believe that the activity in question had a substantial aggregate effect. 1430 This 
viewpoint also seems to follow the interpretation that the purpose of the Commerce 
Clause and the constitutional vale it encompassed was the development and 
protection of interstate commerce. It may therefore be contended that the national 
interest in this area of commerce took precedence over the ones of the states.  
 
This position, however, was highly dependent on the less extensive scope chosen for 
the examination of the regulated activity. Justice Stevens, similarly to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, could have argued that the regulation of the cultivation of marijuana could 
lead to Congress regulating criminal activities uniformly in states, which is a traditional 
                                                          
1423 United States v Lopez (n 1192). 
1424 United States v Morrison (n 1193). 
1425 Gonzales v Raich (n 423) 25. 
1426 United States v Lopez (n 421) 563. 
1427 Gonzales v Raich (n 423) 21.  
1428 United States v Lopez (n 421) 561. 
1429 Gonzales v Raich (n 423) 22. 
1430    
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area of state concern. On the other hand, he opted to focus on the more restrictive 
market the activities belonged to (the market of illegal drugs) and not the widest 
possible categorisation (criminal law). 
 
IX. A novel limit: Congress to regulate and not create interstate commerce 
  
Undoubtedly, when learning that almost 14.6% of the population of a country is 
uninsured,1431 most of them being young adults,1432 it looks like a worrying scenario 
not only for those who are used to receiving free health care from their states. Whereas 
health care is often provided for free in industrialised nations, the uninsured individuals 
often mention the high costs of obtaining health insurance for their lack of such and 
data shows that two-thirds of this class of citizens live on income ‘twice [below] the 
poverty line.’1433 They are, therefore, restricted to accessing health care from, for 
example, emergency departments,1434 however, if they stay in hospital as a young 
adult, they may leave with an average bill of $17,195.1435 As many uninsured 
individuals live under the poverty line, they are, however, highly unlikely to be able to 
pay these, which in effect results in unpaid medical bills causing half of the personal 
bankruptcies in the country.1436 
This situation has economic consequences for both the state and federal 
governments. In 2008, for instance, they had to pay $43 billion to cover for the 
                                                          
1431 Relevant data from 2008 about uninsured people in the United States, which amounted to 44 million 
people out of the 304.5 million individuals living in the United States that year. Population Reference 
Bureau, ‘2008 World Population Data Sheet’ (2008) <http://www.prb.org/pdf08/08WPDS_Eng.pdf> 
accessed 10 April 2014; Robin A Cohen and others, ‘Health Insurance Coverage Trends, 1959–2007: 
Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey’ (2009) 17 
<http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr017.pdf> accessed 10 April 2014; Jenna Levy, ‘In U.S., 
Uninsured Rate Lowest Since 2008’ (GALLUP, 7 April 2014) 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/168248/uninsured-rate-lowest-2008.aspx> accessed 10 April 2014. 
1432 Levy (n 1431). 
1433 Jonathan Gruber, ‘Covering the Uninsured in the US’ (National Bureau of Economic Research 2008) 
11 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w13758> accessed 14 April 2014. 
1434 Somin mentions in a recent article that the emergency departments of hospitals are required to 
stabilise all individuals free of charge. Ilya Somin, ‘A Mandate for Mandates: Is the Individual Health 
Insurance Case a Slippery Slope’ (2012) 75 Law and Contemporary Problems 75, 86. 
1435 Pfizer, ‘A Profile of Uninsured Persons in the United States’ (Pfizer 2008) 23 
<http://www.pfizer.com/files/products/Profile_of_uninsured_persons_in_the_United_States.pdf> 
accessed 10 April 2014. They can also rely on free clinics, but around half of them are unlikely to see 
a doctor at all. ibid 46. 
1436 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Subtitle F, Part I, s 1501 (a) (2) (E). 
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emergency care of the uninsured.1437 Furthermore, nearly twice of the share of the 
economic output of the United States is spent on health care compared to other 
industrial nations.1438 In the meantime, the revenues of the health insurance industry, 
who impose the high costs, surpassed $500 billion per year.1439 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, or as it is more widely known 
‘Obamacare,’ was aimed at providing a reform to this health care system.1440 The 
‘individual mandate,’ one of the most controversial parts of the above Act, ‘compelled 
people who earned a certain income to purchase health insurance.’1441 Failure to do 
so required the individual to ‘pay a penalty.’1442 One of the constitutional bases on 
which this mandate was adopted was the Commerce Clause. 
Whilst it seemed that Justice Stevens indicated in Gonzales v Raich1443 that 
constitutional findings were not essential to decide whether the regulated activities had 
substantial effect on interstate commerce, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act did provide such findings. It firstly held that the individual mandate was 
‘commercial and economic in nature’ and ‘substantially affect[ed] interstate 
commerce.’1444 These effects were claimed to be many.  
Firstly, it was claimed that mandate regulated commercial and economic activities as 
it regulated ‘economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid 
for, and when health insurance is purchased.’1445 It was subsequently established that 
a significant interstate market of health insurance had already been established, where 
the sellers of insurance are mostly ‘national or regional’ companies.1446 Therefore, 
following the purpose of and constitutional value encompassed in the Commerce 
                                                          
1437 Barry Friedman, ‘Obamacare and the Court: Handing Health Policy Back to the People’ (2012) 91 
Foreign Affairs 87, 88. 
1438 Michael J Graetz and Jerry L Mashaw, ‘Constitutional Uncertainty and the Design of Social 
Insurance: Reflections on the Obamacare Case’ (2013) 7 Harvard Law & Policy Review 343, 356. 
1439 Gruber (n 1433) 28. 
1440 Josh Blackman, Unprecedented: The Constitutional Challenge to Obamacare (Public Affairs 2013) 
29. 
1441 ibid. 
1442 ibid. This was similar to the provisions of the Bituminous Coal Act 1935, which was challenged in 
Carter v Carter Coal Co (n 1277). 
1443 Gonzales v Raich (n 1194). 
1444 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Subtitle F, Part I, s 1501 (a) (1). 
1445 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Subtitle F, Part I, s 1501 (a) (2) (A). 
1446 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Subtitle F, Part I, s 1501 (a) (2) (B). 
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Clause, it could have been argued that the aim of the Act was the protection of this 
already established strong interstate market. 
The findings also claimed that the mandate would contribute to the increase in ‘the 
supply of, and demand for, health care services.’1447 On the other hand, to 
demonstrate the above, Congress had to prove that it had ‘a rational basis for 
believing’ that the aggregate effect of the economic activity in question would be 
substantial ‘on price and market conditions.’1448 This was further demonstrated in two 
separate sections. Firstly, the findings argued that by requiring ‘healthy individuals’ to 
purchase health insurance, the ‘health insurance premiums’ could be reduced, which 
was crucial in ‘creating effective health insurance markets’ and, secondly, in increasing 
the ‘financial security’ of families whose bankruptcy was a result of unpaid health care 
bills.1449 These did not only seem to follow the purpose and constitutional value of the 
Commerce Clause that argued to provide for the protection of interstate commerce, 
but also appear to follow the more extended purpose of providing uniform protection 
for individuals under such a system. 
Lastly, the findings also claimed that the regulation of insurance had already been held 
to be an activity that Congress was allowed to regulate in United States v South-
Eastern Underwriters Association.1450 
Soon after the adoption of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act constitutional 
challenges to the Act had been filed by ‘twenty-eight states.’1451 During the challenges 
at the district courts the arguments of the Department of Justice focused on identifying 
the limitations on the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause.  
Firstly, it argued that Congress “can[not] act in attenuated ways, [as in] Morrison,” for 
which it must demonstrate that there was a ‘close link’ between its regulatory powers 
and the ‘regulated market.’1452 The second limitation was claimed to be based on the 
                                                          
1447 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Subtitle F, Part I, s 1501 (a) (2) (C). 
1448 Gonzales v Raich (n 423) 19; 22 and 31.  
1449 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Subtitle F, Part I, s 1501 (a) (2) (E) and (G). 
1450 United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association (n 1345). and Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Subtitle F, Part I, s 1501 (a) (3). 
1451 Blackman (n 1440) 79. 
1452 ibid 136. 
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national-local distinction, according to which Congress could not impinge upon ‘areas 
of traditional state responsibility.’1453 The Department of Justice argued that the 
challenged Act did not fall into either of these categories: firstly, the end of the Act was 
to control ‘rising health care costs,’ which constituted interstate commerce, and 
secondly ‘health insurance ha[d long] been subject to federal regulations.’1454 
The constitutional challenge of Obamacare arrived at the Supreme Court in 2011, with 
a change in the approach of the Department of Justice.1455 During the oral arguments, 
the novel approach was set out: ‘there was no individual mandate,’ the issue in 
question was merely ‘the “method of financing health [care].”’1456  
The ‘health care market’ was also subsequently argued to be “unique” as “virtually 
everybody in society is in this market.”1457 This market was also distinguishable from 
the one where people could ‘buy broccoli’1458 as “everyone knows when they will need 
food, but they do [not] know when they will need medical treatment.”1459 This was a 
favourite comparison of those opposed to this Act. Interestingly, however, comparing 
the mandate of compelling people to buy health insurance to that of buying broccoli is 
an even widest categorisation of the regulation than those previously identified by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in United States v Lopez1460 or United States v Morrison.1461 
This categorisation now places the focus on the method of the regulation, not the 
activity regulated. The comparison, thus, did not take place with the mandate in 
existence in 47 states that requires the purchase of car insurance by individuals to be 
able to keep a driving licence.1462 
The Department of Justice no longer focused on whether there were any limits to the 
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause1463 and that there was an already 
established and strong federal health insurance market. Subsequently, the petitioners 
                                                          
1453 ibid.  
1454 ibid.  
1455 ibid 167 and 175. 
1456 ibid 191. 
1457 Blackman (n 1440). 190. 
1458 United States v Lopez (n 421) or United States v Morrison (n 1193).  
1459 Blackman (n 1440) 191. 
1460 United States v Lopez (n 421). 
1461 United States v Morrison (n 1193). 
1462 Friedman (n 1437) 95. 
1463 Blackman (n 1440) 193–194. 
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could masterfully argue that what the individual mandate effectively did was ‘to compel 
people to enter [into] commerce,’ thus, effectively ‘creat[ing] commerce’ and extending 
the powers of Congress to previously inconceivable areas.1464 
In delivering the opinion of the majority, Chief Justice Roberts, firstly devised a novel 
definition of the part ‘regulate Commerce’ of the Commerce Clause, and claimed that 
this power ‘presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated,’ which 
he held could be demonstrated in all the preceding cases involving a challenge under 
the Commerce Clause.1465 
It is, however, interesting to highlight that what constituted ‘commercial activity’ based 
on the characterisation of the previous cases by Chief Justice Roberts, could be 
argued to include a non-commercial activity, such as the one included in Wickard v 
Filburn,1466 that had ‘a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.’1467 This 
characterisation further seems to fail to adopt the distinction of the activities that was 
previously decided based on the ‘economic’ nature of the activity, which Justice 
Stevens in Gonzales v Raich1468 held included “the production, distribution and 
consumption of commodities.”1469  
 
Thus, how it will be decided under this novel commercial – non-commercial activity 
test what constitutes commercial activity becomes questionable. Chief Justice 
Roberts, however, provided some examples, such as the purchase of ‘health 
insurance, […] cars and broccoli,’1470 but did not provide further explanation as to how 
the activities in the above two cases fit into this novel pre-requisite. 
 
Chief Justice Roberts subsequently held - adopting the argument of the petitioners - 
that the ‘individual mandate […] does not regulate existing commercial activity’1471 and 
holding so would ‘override’ the limits placed on the power of Congress in Wickard v 
                                                          
1464 ibid 195; Somin (n 1434) 84. 
1465 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Chief Justice Roberts) 18 - 20. 
1466 Wickard v Filburn (n 1336). 
1467 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Chief Justice Roberts) 20. 
1468 Gonzales v Raich (n 1194). 
1469 ibid 25. 
1470 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Chief Justice Roberts) 27. 
1471 ibid. (Chief Justice Roberts) 20. 
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Filburn.1472 In that case, he argued, the activity of Filburn fell under the regulatory 
powers of Congress because he was engaged in a commercial activity, ‘the production 
of wheat.’1473 He, thus, contended that holding the individual mandate constitutional 
under the Commerce Clause would result in the extension of these powers to requiring 
‘individuals’ to engage in an activity that they ‘are not [currently] doing.’1474 Interstate 
commerce, therefore, may only include activities already initiated. 
 
It is apparent that the ‘production of wheat’ constitutes an economic activity based on 
the decision in both Wickard v Filburn1475 and Gonzales v Raich.1476 On the other hand, 
classifying it as a commercial activity would need further explanation as the only 
connecting factor of the activity seems to be its substantial effects on commerce. If 
this was adopted as the definition of a commercial activity, since the decision of the 
individual not to purchase health insurance has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, the inactivity of the individual could effectively be classified as ‘commercial 
activity.’ Thus, it is of crucial importance that a more detailed guidance is provided in 
future cases about how to determine what may constitute commercial activity. 
 
Surprisingly, Chief Justice Roberts recognised that economists may argue that ‘there 
is no difference between activity and inactivity [as] both have measurable economic 
effects on commerce.’1477 Whereas previously the Justices of the Supreme Court did 
not shy away from the interpretation of this clause from the angle of an economist,1478 
Chief Justice Roberts, adopting the textualist method of the originalist interpretation 
approach of the Constitution, argued that since the Framers of the Constitution must 
have understood this distinction, but still decided to use the word ‘regulate’ and not 
‘compel’ in the Constitution, the Supreme Court had always interpreted the clause 
accordingly since the adoption of the Constitution.1479 This, however, raises the 
                                                          
1472 Wickard v Filburn (n 159) and National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Chief 
Justice Roberts) 22. 
1473 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Chief Justice Roberts) 22. 
1474 ibid. (Chief Justice Roberts) 22. 
1475 Wickard v Filburn (n 1336). 
1476 Gonzales v Raich (n 1194). 
1477 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Chief Justice Roberts) 24. 
1478 which, it may be argued, resulted in the Supreme Court devising the substantial effects test in 
Wickard v Filburn (n 1336). 
1479 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Chief Justice Roberts) 24. 
Eszter Belteki 
 
Chapter 5: Creating and subsequently protecting a uniform national market in the United 
States: Part II 
 
[287] 
 
question whether the adoption of a viewpoint in 1787 is a workable and realistic 
interpretation of the Constitution nowadays. The Framers could not have foreseen the 
development of the concept of commerce to where it stands nowadays. If the Supreme 
Court is to adopt an interpretation from 1787, it may effectively transform the 
Constitution to a document that is unable to reflect the realities of our days and may 
therefore become ineffective. 
 
Chief Justice Roberts subsequently returned to the findings of the Act. He highlighted 
that the claim that by requiring ‘healthy individuals’ to purchase health insurance, 
‘health insurance premiums’ would be reduced and ‘effective health insurance 
markets’ would be created.1480 He held that this was not a constitutional exercise of 
the regulation of a “class of activities,” since it was aimed at regulating ‘classes of 
individuals.’1481 Whereas it was argued that the uninsured individuals were inactive 
participants in the health insurance market, it would have been interesting to examine 
what their position was in the health care market through the individual mandate, since 
they could have easily been identified as active participants in such a market. For 
instance, an argument could have been that a mere $43 billion was being spent on 
their emergency care.1482  
Whereas the findings emphasised that the mandate would assist the families who had 
to declare bankruptcy due to unpaid medical bills, Chief Justice Roberts argued that 
the mandate would have an adverse affect on the ‘healthy, often young adults’ who 
cannot afford to increase their medical expenses, and thus were ‘targeted at a class’ 
characterised by its ‘commercial inactivity.’1483 On the other hand, it may be significant 
to highlight that the ‘commercial inactivity’1484 of these individuals had a clear 
substantial effect on interstate commerce and could thus be argued to effectively be 
characterised as a commercial activity. Furthermore, if one could characterise a class 
based on its ‘commercial inactivity,’1485 the respondents in both Wickard v Filburn1486 
                                                          
1480 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Subtitle F, Part I, s 1501 (a) (2) (G). 
1481 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Chief Justice Roberts) 25. 
1482 Friedman (n 1437) 88. 
1483 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Chief Justice Roberts) 25. 
1484 ibid. (Chief Justice Roberts) 25. 
1485 ibid. (Chief Justice Roberts) 25. 
1486 Wickard v Filburn (n 1336). 
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and Gonzales v Raich1487 were commercially inactive: they did not participate in 
interstate commerce, since their activities were not destined for commercial purposes. 
Chief Justice Roberts consequently held that the individual mandate was an 
unconstitutional exercise of the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause 
regardless of the “inherently integrated” nature of ‘health insurance and health 
care.’1488 It would thus seem that the decision of Justice Stevens in Gonzales v 
Raich1489 became impliedly overruled. Following the decision of Justice Stevens would 
have likely resulted in finding the mandate constitutional, since it could have been 
demonstrated that the mandate regulated ‘economic’ activities that ‘had an 
“established … interstate market”’ over which Congress had a ‘rational basis’ to 
believe that the activity in question had a substantial aggregate effect. 1490  
 
Whereas the findings of the Act seemed to have satisfied most of the above 
requirements, the majority of the Supreme Court, through adopting a novel approach 
towards the interpretation of the Commerce Clause, ensured that the powers of 
Congress could not be extended further. On the other hand, even though the mandate 
was held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, it was subsequently upheld 
as a valid exercise of the tax powers of Congress.1491  
 
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion, and adopting a method of interpretation 
that would fall in line with the living constitutional values approach, also adopted the 
approach of the Department of Justice, and argued that the unique characteristics of 
the health care market deemed that individuals without a health insurance should have 
still been held to be active participants of the health care market as ‘[v]irtually everyone 
[…] consumes health care at some point in his or her life.’1492 She further argued that 
                                                          
1487 Gonzales v Raich (n 1194). 
1488 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Chief Justice Roberts) 27. 
1489 Gonzales v Raich (n 1194). 
1490 ibid. 19; 22; 25 and 31 and Pushaw (n 1430) 898. 
1491 Friedman (n 1437) 91. 
1492 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas 
and Alito) 11. 
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she had failed to identify in the previous cases the activity-inactivity distinction devised 
by Chief Justice Roberts.1493 
 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, on the other hand, rejected this approach 
and adopted that of Chief Justice Roberts. They claimed that because the individual 
mandate targeted young individuals, who would only consider purchasing health 
insurance ‘later in their lifetime,’ Congress acted outside its powers under the 
affirmative Commerce Clause, when it enacted the Act in question.1494 It may, 
however, be crucial to highlight that such a decision of these young individuals seems 
to be delayed not by choice,1495 but by necessity due to the costs of health 
insurance.1496 
 
The Supreme Court once again seems to have returned to its usual method of devising 
a novel approach to the Commerce Clause to justify its decision based on a view 
contrary to the economic realities of their era. The majority of the current Justices 
appear unwilling to accept the purposes of the Commerce Clause as the development 
and protection of an already established and significant interstate market, and the 
protection of individuals from the harmful effects of the lack of a uniform national 
regulation. It will, thus, be fascinating to follow how they will decide about other 
commercial activities in the future. After all, the financial crisis that struck the world in 
2008 only demonstrated how an activity in the United States may have a harmful effect 
not just in all areas of life in the nation, but all over the world.  
X. Conclusion 
 
                                                          
1493 Robert J Pushaw and Grant S Nelson, ‘The Likely Impact of National Federation on Commerce 
Clause Jurisprudence’ (2012) 40 Pepperdine Law Review 975, 988. 
1494 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 5) (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas 
and Alito) 13. 
1495 1.5% of the young uninsured adults chose not to purchase health insurance in 2012, according to 
a recent survey. ‘Key Facts about the Uninsured Population’ (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 
26 September 2013) <http://kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-
population/?__hstc=43953530.0446700af0d7452db714a0c580c0249e.1397425237746.13974252377
46.1397466342083.2&__hssc=43953530.1.1397466342083&__hsfp=1786422178> accessed 10 April 
2014. 
1496 The same survey showed that 61% of the uninsured young adults does not possess health 
insurance due to its high costs (31.6%) or because they have recently lost their job (29.4%). ibid. 
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It has become apparent from the above analysis that the interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause has been constantly transforming since 1787. These 
transformations, under the ‘living Constitution’1497 theory could be argued to have 
occurred as a result of the transformation of the understanding of the various concepts 
included in the Constitution through the eras. After all, at the time of the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia, it is quite certain that the delegates could not imagine how 
the innovations and the developments in our societies and economies could change 
our world. If the Constitution was still interpreted based on the original interpretation 
of the Constitution at all times, the constitutional system of the United States would be 
far behind the developments of each era and could become highly ineffective.  
It is further argued that this interpretation of the Commerce Clause was made possible 
due to the constitutional uncertainty that was created at the time of its drafting by the 
lack of definition of what commerce and interstate commerce entailed and what the 
limits on the power of Congress were. 
In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated that despite the lack of an express 
provision in the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court has been willing 
to interpret the Commerce Clause in line with its purposes of the creation, 
development and protection of the interstate or national market as a constitutional 
value. In order to do this, the chapter has focused on identifying whether the Justices 
of the Supreme Court recognised these purposes and consequently supported the 
ideal of a national market.  
This chapter has also adopted the approach of Chapter 4, which argued that one of 
the purposes of the adoption of the Commerce Clause was to ensure that the 
regulation of the national or interstate market would be uniform by placing the powers 
over this area in the hands of Congress. This effectively became the affirmative aspect 
of the clause. 
The analysis of the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v Ogden1498 
established that the Chief Justice seemed to have adopted the view that the purpose 
                                                          
1497 Claeys (n 1254); Balkin (n 93). 
1498 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
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of the Commerce Clause was the creation of a uniform and centrally regulated system, 
and based his decision on the above. His formalistic and dual federalist approaches 
to the Commerce Clause have also been examined and it was found that he adopted 
a very wide definition of commerce, which had created an extensive interstate system 
of commerce, which was, however, still limited on most occasions by physical state 
boundaries. 
It was subsequently demonstrated that whilst the adoption of the above approach 
resulted in the extension of the interstate market, it also led to certain federal Acts 
being held unconstitutional. It was argued that as the Supreme Court commenced to 
recognise the interconnected nature of local and national commercial activities, it 
resulted in not only the further extension of the national market, but also the disregard 
of the dual federalist interpretation.  
A conservative Supreme Court, however, arguably, refused to acknowledge that to 
effectively manage the harmful effects of the Great Depression a strong, uniform and 
national answer was required. The Court, therefore, did not recoil from holding two 
initial Acts of the New Deal programme unconstitutional in ALA Schechter Poultry Corp 
v United States1499 and Carter v Carter.1500 It has also been demonstrated that both 
decisions had deviated from the interpretation of this work of the original purpose of 
the Commerce Clause and focused on the protection of local activities from national 
intervention. 
Surprisingly, another ‘switch’ of the approach of the Supreme Court resulted in the 
extension of the powers of Congress, mostly through the three fundamental cases of 
the New Deal era: NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,1501 United States v Darby1502 
and Wickard v Filburn.1503 The examination of these cases demonstrated that towards 
the end of the New Deal programme, the scope of interstate commerce became so 
extensive that activities that were previously regarded as traditionally belonging to the 
                                                          
1499 ALA Schechter Poultry Corp v United States (n 1259); Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (n 77) 165; 
Tushnet (n 83) 165–166. 
1500 Carter v Carter Coal Co (n 1277). 
1501 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (n 1294). 
1502 United States v Darby (n 1323). 
1503 Wickard v Filburn (n 1336). 
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states could be considered part of the interstate system. It has, however, been argued 
that the aim of this extension followed the original purpose of the Commerce Clause: 
the protection of the development of the national market. It has also been claimed that 
the purpose of the clause itself commenced to extend as it took over the role of the 
states in the areas of commerce that became part of the national market, by affording 
protection to the individuals, but such protection was now provided in a uniform 
manner nation-wide.    
The brief study of the subsequent cases until 1995 signalled a limitless extension of 
the national market, even though the cases developed in line with the original purpose 
of the Commerce Clause. Such an extension logically resulted in the state boundaries 
and traditional state functions enjoying less protection if these were related to activities 
harmful to the national market. Unsurprisingly, in a federal union of states, this 
extension of the national power resulted in the states becoming more protective over 
activities that they had a strong local interest in. 
The decisions in United States v Lopez1504 and United States v Morrison1505 seem to 
have provided a welcome limitation on the extension of the national market to the 
states. On the other hand, the newly devised approach of the Supreme Court seems 
to have reverted to the ‘police power’ distinction, rejecting to acknowledge the 
interconnected nature of the local and national market. This, however, also appears 
to have resulted in a return to the approach of the states before the adoption of the 
Articles of Confederation: it was, once more, the local market that had to be protected 
from the evils of the national market and not vice versa. The uniform and national 
protection of individuals could not even be considered. 
This restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause was rather short-lived because 
the Supreme Court returned to extending the scope of the national market to areas 
such as the home cultivation of marijuana in Gonzales v Raich.1506 Surprisingly, the 
Justices did not devise a new test to extend the national market, but adopted the one 
in United States v Lopez.1507 On the other hand, these cases clearly demonstrate the 
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adoption of the development and protection of the national market as a purpose of the 
Commerce Clause and the constitutional value it set out to protect. 
The unexpected decision of National Federation of Independent Business v 
Sebelius1508 was subsequently examined, where it was argued that in order to justify 
a decision reflecting on the current situation of the health insurance and health care 
markets, the Supreme Court devised a novel interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 
once again. The decision of Chief Justice Roberts also seems to reject the purpose of 
the Commerce Clause as the protection of not only the national market, but the 
participants of it through uniform national regulation. 
Whether the approach of Chief Justice Roberts will be adopted in future cases will 
depend on how long this transformation in the approach of the Supreme Court lasts. 
Furthermore, whether a novel situation may arise where the interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause would need to be transformed is, however, not predictable. 
 
                                                          
1508 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 1196). 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
The drafting of the Constitution of the United States of America could have taken two 
different routes during the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787. Firstly, 
the Framers could have provided clear definitions for all provisions of the Constitution 
as these were understood at the time. This would have guaranteed that the 
interpretation of these provisions would have been more consistent throughout the 
ages and would have provided more legal certainty. The Framers, however, decided 
to take the second approach in the areas of interstate commerce, the protection of 
fundamental rights and the guarantee of a republican form of government: they opted 
not to preserve their understanding of these areas in the Constitution, with the purpose 
of allowing the Constitution to be able to adapt to the advancements of society.  
However, adopting this technique to drafting the Constitution has raised two 
fundamental ambiguities in the constitutional system of the United States of America: 
first, the constitutional uncertainty surrounding the wording of the provisions, and 
second, the constant conflict that this creates as a result between the federal and state 
governments. This thesis has aimed to assess how the United States of America has 
been managing these two uncertainties since its Founding era.  
We can identify two hermeneutic techniques that have been used to manage these 
uncertainties. The originalist method adopts the viewpoint that the interpretation of the 
Constitution should follow the original meaning of the provision examined, as viewed 
in 1787.1509 The second, non-originalist method argues for an interpretation of the 
Constitution that looks behind the text of the provision. One such method is that of the 
‘living Constitution’ that argues that the provisions of the Constitution should be 
interpreted in light of the changes to society, politics and/or the economy throughout 
the ages. 1510 
This thesis argued in Chapter 1 that this approach may be taken a step further and 
through the living constitutional values approach, it may provide for the most effective 
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protection of the fundamental constitutional values each of the examined provisions 
were set out to provide protection for. 
 
I. Managing the constitutional uncertainties of the provisions of the 
Constitution  
 
When interpreting a provision of the Constitution, one could commence with the 
textualist method of determining what the terms included in the relevant provisions 
should be defined as. For instance, in order to determine whether Congress has the 
power to regulate interstate commerce under Article I section 8 of the Constitution,1511 
what constitutes interstate commerce could be assessed first. The interpretation of 
this provision, according to the originalist approach, would start with looking at 
interstate commerce at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. This would ensure 
legal certainty regarding the interpretation of this provision. 
However, given that these terms are not clearly defined in the Constitution, one could 
also adopt the approach that regards the Constitution a ‘living’ instrument and 
determine what would now qualify as ‘interstate commerce’.1512 While the second 
approach does not provide the same legal certainty as the originalist interpretation, it 
allows the Constitution to adapt to the advancements of society, politics and/or the 
economy. The living constitutional values approach stretches the limits of this 
approach and argues that it should be the constitutional values set out in this provision, 
i.e. the creation and subsequent protection of a uniform national market to which the 
interpretation of the Constitution should adapt. 
This method of interpretation is also present in other areas of the Constitution, and 
acts as the link between the management of these constitutional uncertainties in the 
three fundamental areas studied in the thesis. Moreover, it has been demonstrated 
that these constitutional uncertainties have been managed by one particular branch of 
the federal government, the Supreme Court, in most situations. However, it has also 
                                                          
1511 Constitution of the United States of America 1787, Article I section 8 clause 3. 
1512 Balkin (n 93) 551. 
Eszter Belteki 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
[296] 
 
been highlighted, that the Supreme Court gained its powers of judicial review, which it 
has used in the areas investigated not through a provision of the Constitution, but 
through the decision in Marbury v Madison.1513 This case gained prominence after 
holding that the Supreme Court could invalidate any legislation contrary to the 
Constitution, 1514 and has been used as the basis for such actions ever since. However, 
it is notable that this case itself arose out of a constitutional uncertainty: the silence of 
Article III section 1 of the Constitution over the power of the Supreme Court to review 
acts of other branches of the federal government.1515 
It has also been argued in this work that the constitutional uncertainties in the area of 
interstate commerce created through the Commerce Clause originated from a 
diverging understanding of commerce at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. 
Three definitions of commerce can be identified at that time: commerce as intercourse; 
commerce as manufacturing, agriculture and commerce; and commerce as trade. In 
the first case about the Commerce Clause, in Gibbons v Ogden,1516 the Supreme 
Court focused on resolving the uncertainty created by this provision by determining 
what commerce entailed. Chief Justice Marshall firstly adopted the widest 
interpretation of commerce and identified interstate commerce as ‘intercourse [..] 
concerning more States than one.’1517 While most of the ensuing interpretations 
focused on the constant conflict between the federal and state governments, in Kidd 
v Pearson1518 the Court returned to this constitutional uncertainty and held that 
manufacturing was not included in commerce. This method of managing the 
uncertainties created by the Dormant Commerce Clause has been abandoned since.  
Constitutional uncertainties may also be identified in the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
definition of the ‘due process of law.’ This has resulted in diverging interpretations as 
to how rights included in the first eight Amendments of the Constitution could be 
enforced against the states. For instance, in Hurtado v California, it was argued that 
‘settled usages and modes of proceedings’ that existed in ‘England before the 
                                                          
1513 William Marbury v James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States (n 63). 
1514 ibid 177. 
1515 ibid 178. 
1516 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
1517 ibid 189 – 190 and 193-194. 
1518 Kidd v Pearson (n 1006). 
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emigration of our ancestors’ and which had been used since then in the United States 
would constitute ‘due process of law.’1519 In Twining v New Jersey, however, the 
Supreme Court held that if the right was such an ‘immutable principle of justice’ that it 
had to be protected against ‘arbitrary’ government action in a free government, it 
should be considered to amount to ‘due process of law.’1520 
The lack of definition of a ‘republican form of government’ under the Guarantee Clause 
has, similar to the Commerce Clause, resulted in key uncertainties since the Founding 
era. Further, in parallel with the Commerce Clause, a republican form of government 
in 1787 could be characterised differently, resulting in increased uncertainties over the 
interpretation of this provision.  This has been illustrated, for instance, through the 
analysis of the debates before and during the Civil War, and the Reconstruction Era 
at Congress about whether the Southern states, where slavery was not abolished, 
could still be regarded republican states.1521 Subsequently, the uncertainties created 
by the Guarantee Clause have further tested the limits of what a state that is 
‘substantially republican’ means, such as in the case of its non-application against 
Huey P Long’s Louisiana.1522  
 
II. Managing the constant conflict between the federal and state 
governments 
 
A second connection between the three fundamental areas examined in the thesis has 
been identified as the management of the constant conflict between the federal and 
state governments. It has been argued that whilst the Constitution created a federalist 
system in the United States of America with two levels of government – federal and 
state – it also created a constant conflict between these levels. This constant conflict 
in the provisions of the Constitution investigated in the thesis arose by the Framers 
not having clearly defined which level of government – or in the case of the Guarantee 
Clause, which branch of the federal government – was clearly granted with the powers 
                                                          
1519 Hurtado v California (n 720). 
1520 Twining v New Jersey (n 731) 101 - 102. 
1521 Congressional Globe 37th Cong, 2nd Session 47 (1861). 
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to regulate a given area. Moreover, granting the federal government with powers that 
it had not previously possessed under the Articles of Confederation meant that those 
same powers would be withdrawn from the states.  
A clear illustration of this issue is reflected in the area of protection of fundamental 
rights of individuals. As it was examined further in Chapter 3, only certain states, such 
as New Hampshire, Vermont or Virginia, had enacted a bill of rights before the 
adoption of the Constitution. These bills of rights clearly granted the states with the 
power to protect the rights of the individuals living in these states. However, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, with the adoption of the federal Bill of Rights, the federal 
government was also entrusted with the task of protecting the rights of individuals 
contained in the first ten Amendments of the Constitution. To resolve this conflict of 
regulating the same area, the Supreme Court, in Slaughter House Cases, resorted to 
the ‘dual federalist’ method of interpretation of the Constitution.1523 This meant that the 
states were responsible for providing protection to the individuals of their rights 
guaranteed under state laws and the federal government was responsible for providing 
protection to the individuals of their rights guaranteed under the Constitution. 
Moreover, the rights contained in state laws could only be enforced against the states, 
and the rights contained in the Constitution could only be enforced against the federal 
government.  
However, the thesis has demonstrated that this approach was not followed 
consistently for all rights contained in the ten Amendments, and the Supreme Court 
has subsequently adopted the selective incorporation doctrine. According to this 
approach, through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, certain 
provisions of the Bill of Rights may be enforceable against the states as well, and not 
only the federal government. This would, however, only apply following the analysis of 
each case ‘clause by clause and right by right’ and if the provision is considered 
fundamentally fair in light of a non-originalist method of interpretation in most 
cases.1524  
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The thesis has also argued that the debates surrounding the constitutional 
uncertainties in the protection of fundamental rights and the Guarantee Clause 
contributed to conflicts that sparked the Civil War. They highlighted crucial differences 
between various aspects of the states that constituted the United States of America, 
for instance, in relation to slavery, and thus contributed to the North-South divide. 
 
The constant conflict between the federal and states governments also characterises 
the Commerce Clause, which was examined in Chapters 4 and 5, and has even 
resulted in its dual characteristics: its affirmative, and negative or dormant aspect. 
These aspects, it was argued, also demonstrate the conflict itself: while the affirmative 
aspect focuses on the limits of the regulatory authority of Congress over interstate 
commerce, the dormant aspect focuses on the limits this poses on the regulatory 
authority of the states. Similar to the initial position of the Supreme Court on the Bill of 
Rights, the Justices adopted the dual federalist approach in this area as well in 
Gibbons v Ogden.1525 Thus, Congress was to regulate interstate commerce and the 
states were to regulate in the area where they possessed ‘police powers.’1526 
However, it has also been established that parallel with the incorporation doctrine, this 
dual federalist interpretation of the Commerce Clause has been set aside, and a novel 
method of resolving the constant conflict between the states and the federal 
government is identifiable in most fundamental cases in this area.  
 
III. The Living Constitution and the living constitutional values approach 
 
A third uniting characteristic of the approaches adopted by the federal government to 
manage the constitutional uncertainties and the constant conflict between the federal 
and state governments in the areas examined in the thesis is identifiable. In all areas, 
the federal government seems to have adopted an approach at certain times that 
accepts the Constitution as a ‘living’ instrument,’1527 and a constitutional value in each 
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of the provisions examined in this work that the Constitution was set out to protect 
under the living constitutional values approach may also be identifiable. This means 
that the Constitution has been able to accommodate the advancements in society, 
politics and/or the economy, which has, in hand, assisted in the creation of these 
developments. However, in order for the Constitution to become such an instrument, 
constitutional uncertainties must have existed in the area, allowing room for different 
interpretations of the provisions in question to emerge. 
The adoption of this approach was evidenced through the Commerce Clause case-
law. For instance, Gibbons v Ogden,1528 the first Commerce Clause case, focused on 
the subject matter of the regulation. However, the current approach to determine 
whether a state law is contrary to the Dormant Commerce Clause is a novel, ‘two-
tiered standard.’1529 This requires (i) the assessment of the discriminatory aspect of 
the state law in question first, and (ii) the balancing test devised in Pike v Bruce Church 
Inc.1530 to determine whether ‘the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest.’1531  Therefore, it is argued that a clear transformation 
in the approach of the Supreme Court to these cases is identified, which reflects the 
current standards of society. It was further argued, however, that the constitutional 
value originally set out in the Commerce Clause – that of the creation of a uniform 
national market – always remained constant, it was merely adapting to the 
circumstances of each era and the understanding of interstate commerce by the 
societies at each point in time. 
A similar transformation has also been uncovered in cases where the affirmative 
Commerce Clause formed the basis of action. It has been demonstrated that following 
the Great Depression, the Supreme Court initially rejected the New Deal Programme 
in ALA Schechter Poultry Corp v United States.1532  
                                                          
1528 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
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However, the Supreme Court in the ‘switch in time that saved nine,’1533 changed their 
approach and accepted the New Deal Programme as a constitutional exercise of the 
regulatory authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause. The powers of 
Congress to regulate commerce, as a result, seemed to become limitless in the 
subsequent cases, until the decision in in United States v Lopez1534 and United States 
v Morrison.1535 In these cases, the Supreme Court held that Congress was not allowed 
to criminalise the possession of firearms in a school zone1536 or enact ‘tort provisions 
of the Violence Against Women Act’ to regulate ‘gender-motivated violence’ as 
“economic” activity.’1537 These cases, therefore, reflected a transformation in the 
approach of the Justices, and, importantly, the society in the United States of America 
towards the regulation of the interstate market, and, thus, the constitutional value of 
the creation and subsequent protection of a uniform national market as well.  
Nevertheless, the approach of the Supreme Court transformed once again, and, in 
effect, facilitated the expansion of the power of Congress in Gonzales v Raich,1538 
where the Court held that Congress could regulate the cultivation of marijuana for 
home consumption under the Commerce Clause as an ‘economic activity.’ 1539  
This approach of the Supreme Court, however, was not sustained for long. In National 
Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, the Court held that the powers of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause cannot be used to create commerce, but only 
to regulate commerce.1540 
This development of the case law, which is characterised by regular transformations 
of the approach of the Supreme Court to the Commerce Clause, would not have been 
possible had the Supreme Court adopted the originalist interpretation of this clause. It 
has, thus, been argued that by allowing the changes through different time periods to 
influence its decisions, by adopting a non-originalist method of interpretation, the 
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1534 United States v Lopez (n 1192). 
1535 United States v Morrison (n 1193). 
1536 Tribe (n 171) 817. 
1537 Claeys (n 1254) 435. 
1538 Gonzales v Raich (n 1194). 
1539 Gonzales v Raich (n 423) 25. 
1540 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 1196). 
Eszter Belteki 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
[302] 
 
Supreme Court has accommodated and facilitated the advancements of commerce. 
The thesis has, therefore, argued that the Supreme Court adopted the approach in 
these cases that the Constitution is a living instrument and regarded the creation and 
subsequent protection of a uniform national market as the living constitutional value 
that was set out to guide the development of this area in the Constitution. 
The study of the protection of the fundamental rights in the United States of America 
and the Guarantee Clause further provided a clear illustration of the acceptance of the 
approach that the Constitution is, in effect, a living document. An illustration of this 
approach was identified through the discussions on the existence and the abolition of 
slavery at both the federal and state levels of government. 
Slavery emerged in the debates surrounding the protection of the fundamental rights 
of individuals as a system that was incompatible with a government, where such 
protections were afforded to individuals. Since these rights could not be guaranteed 
to slaves and manumitted ex-slaves, the creation of a federal system protecting these 
rights had to be devised. Moreover, the existence of slavery was also considered to 
be contrary to the ideals of a republican form of government during the debates about 
the Guarantee Clause. One key standpoint claimed that slavery stood strongly 
opposed to the idea that ‘all men are created equal,’ which is a key provision of the 
Declaration of Independence that is claimed that all republican governments should 
follow.1541  
It has also been argued that these debates played a role in the start of the Civil War, 
and that the uncertainties around the status of slavery and the dynamic interpretation 
of these provisions allowed for the commencement of the re-building of the federal 
system.  
It has been further demonstrated that states where slavery was not outlawed before 
the Civil War were considered to be republican governments under the Constitution. 
If an originalist interpretation of the Constitution had been adopted, slavery would 
have, thus, remained an acceptable practice in a republican form of government. 
However, with the adoption of the non-originalist living constitutional values approach, 
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the Acts of the federal government and the Constitution itself were able to adapt to the 
changes in the standpoint of society on the issue of slavery. 
However, it has also been established that whereas the incorporation doctrine 
provides an opportunity to assess whether changes in society have taken place that 
will consequently allow for a certain right from the Bill of Rights to be incorporated 
against the state, this trend is not clearly visible for the Guarantee Clause. The current 
silence of this clause has, therefore, increased the uncertainties around this area and 
whether it will gain a Marbury v Madison1542 moment in the foreseeable future is 
questionable. 
Therefore, the development of constitutional law in these areas clearly shows that the 
federal government has adopted the approach when it deemed it appropriate that the 
Constitution is a living instrument, and in each of its provisions a constitutional value 
may be discovered that the Constitution set out to protect. This has further allowed for 
the law to react to situations as they arise. However, adopting this approach has also 
demonstrated its disadvantages, for instance, with the issue of slavery where the 
unresolved state of the constitutional uncertainties and the resulting conflict between 
the federal and state governments led to dire consequences.  
 
IV. A uniform system 
 
A fourth characteristic that unites the areas examined in the thesis is the purpose of 
the creation of a uniform system. This may be self-explanatory at first sight, since the 
creation of a novel federal system required the adoption of a uniform system. However, 
it has been argued that the creation of a uniform system may also be identified as a 
purpose, and, thus, the protection of citizens from the undesired consequences of 
diverging legal systems at federal level a constitutional value, where this has not been 
clearly laid down in the Constitution. 
                                                          
1542 William Marbury v James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States (n 63). 
Eszter Belteki 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
[304] 
 
Thus, for instance, it has been established that the decisions of the Supreme Court 
based on the Commerce Clause, demonstrate the aim to create and subsequently 
protect a national and uniform federal market as a constitutional value. Regardless of 
the definition of commerce adopted at the time, the nature of commerce in the United 
States commenced to transform in the last stages of the Confederacy and prior to the 
Constitutional Convention. While economic, political and social interactions became 
more regular between the states, this era was characterised by discriminatory 
measures and trade wars between the states.1543 It was, therefore, demonstrated that 
a change in the approach of the regulation of interstate commerce was also required. 
The debates at the Constitutional Convention illustrated the clear demand and desire 
for a federal Congress with stronger authority to regulate interstate commerce.1544 It 
has, therefore, been established that the creation of a national market in the United 
States of America was one of the purposes for the adoption of the Commerce Clause, 
which may, thus, also be identified as a constitutional value set out in this provision. 
However, in order to be able to create such a federal market, the actions of the states 
would have to be limited. As a result, the constant conflict will always remain in place 
as long as the national market remains incomplete, and with limits that may never be 
abolished. 
It has also been argued that following the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons 
v Ogden,1545  the subsequent concurrent authority approach of Chief Justice Taney 
recognised the creation of a national market as the main purpose and the 
constitutional value of the Commerce Clause.1546 The continued acceptance of this 
was also highlighted in a transformed approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
through the national-local test originating from Cooley v Board of Wardens of the Port 
of Philadelphia.1547 The acceptance of the same purpose can also be identified in the 
                                                          
1543 Eule (n 861) 430; Friedman and Deacon (n 860) 1889; Tribe (n 171) 1044; H P Hood & (and) Sons, 
Inc v Du Mond, Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets (n 873). 
1544 See Chapter 2, section II.3 for a further discussion about this. 
1545 Gibbons v Ogden (n 100). 
1546 McGinley (n 877) 413. 
1547 Aaron B. Cooley, Plaintiff in Error, v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, to the use 
of the Society for the Relief of distressed Pilots, their Widows and Children, Defendants (n 986). 
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modern approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause, which allows the Supreme Court 
to invalidate any discriminatory state regulation in this area.1548   
It has, however, also been recognised that through the novel trend of extending the 
powers of the states to regulate interstate commerce, a renewed view has, once again, 
emerged about the Dormant Commerce Clause. This trend, alarmingly, seems to 
return to accepting discriminatory state regulations in this area, thus contravening the 
purpose of the Commerce Clause as the creation of a uniform national market. 
Despite the various transformations of the interpretation of the Affirmative Commerce 
Clause throughout the years, the Supreme Court has been willing to interpret this 
aspect of the Commerce Clause in line with its purposes of the creation, development, 
and protection of the interstate or national market as a constitutional value. A key 
moment in the development of a uniform national market in the United States of 
America can be identified as the Great Depression, which reflected the 
interconnectedness of the various economies of the states within the United States of 
America.1549 Despite the initial rejection of the New Deal Programme by the Supreme 
Court, the Justices were willing to accept a wide extension of regulatory powers of 
Congress until 1995. It has, therefore, been argued that this demonstrates the 
adoption of the viewpoint by the Supreme Court that the creation of a national market 
could be identified as the purpose of the Commerce Clause, and in parallel the 
constitutional value it was set out to protect. Notwithstanding the limitations placed on 
this extension of powers in United States v Lopez1550 and United States v Morrison,1551 
the Justices returned to the expansion of the national market in Gonzales v Raich.1552 
The return of this approach illustrated that the creation and protection of a national 
market as a constitutional value came to the foreground once again.  
However, similar to the approach of the new trend of Dormant Commerce Clause 
cases, National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius1553 also illustrates that 
                                                          
1548 Petragnani (n 1052) 1218. 
1549 Claeys (n 1254) 426. 426. 
1550 United States v Lopez (n 1192). 
1551 United States v Morrison (n 1193). 
1552 Gonzales v Raich (n 1194). 
1553 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (n 1196). 
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this purpose of the Commerce Clause has been set aside in order to place limits on 
the powers of Congress. 
The federal Bill of Rights and the incorporation doctrine is an additional illustration of 
how the creation of a uniform system for the protection of fundamental rights could be 
identified as the purpose of the creation of these Amendments and this doctrine. The 
federal Bill of Rights provides a nation-wide protection for individuals in the United 
States of America against the federal government. Through the incorporation doctrine, 
and the selective incorporation of most rights contained in the federal Bill of Rights, 
individuals are now afforded protection against their states. Therefore, in effect, in this 
area, and as argued in Chapter 3, the United States has already achieved a uniform 
system on federal level and has been heading towards an almost uniform system on 
both federal and state level. 
The Guarantee Clause is a further example of how the purpose of creating a uniform 
system on both federal and state level contributed to the adoption of the clause. 
Guaranteeing the same form of government to each state would have guaranteed that 
certain principles of a republican government are observed not only on federal level, 
but in all states. Whilst the Guarantee Clause itself does not set out what these 
principles are, it is indisputable that there are common characteristics of the states 
that unite them. For instance, none of the states have a monarch or grant titles of 
nobility to their citizens. Moreover, the protection of certain fundamental rights of 
individuals is guaranteed in all states through the incorporation doctrine. Chapter 2 
further observed how the Guarantee Clause may also be claimed to have laid down 
the protection against the formation of a tyranny in the United States of America, and 
how adopting like forms of republican governments in the states would achieve this 
result. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the thesis has studied how the federal government of the United States 
of America has managed the constitutional uncertainties, and the constant conflict that 
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has arisen as a result between the federal and state governments. In order to assess 
this, the thesis has focused on the development of three key areas of constitutional 
law in the United States of America: the regulation of interstate commerce, the 
protection of fundamental rights, and the guarantee of a republican form of 
government. 
The thesis has established that the management of the uncertainties in these areas 
by the federal government has differed greatly at different times, based on different 
methods of constitutional interpretation at different times. Therefore, the method of 
managing these uncertainties and conflicts has become uncertain itself. Whilst this 
creates a state of legal uncertainty, it is not in contradiction to the standpoint that the 
Constitution itself is a living instrument, which should adapt to the changes of 
circumstances in each era.  
This work has further devised a new method of non-originalist constitutional 
interpretation that may be applied to the areas examined in this thesis: the living 
constitutional values approach. This method claims that each provision of the 
Constitution lays down certain fundamental constitutional values that the Framers 
intended to protect. However, to effectively provide protection for these, and 
recognising that the state of play in 1787 would not remain constant, the approach of 
non-originalists and those adopting a living constitutional approach should be 
followed: whilst the intent of the Framers as a constitutional value may remain 
constant, the interpretation and understanding of these values may change over time 
and the Constitution should be able to adapt to these. 
The ambiguity of what a republican government entails, however, also poses a 
substantial threat that an illiberal democracy, such as those in the European Union, 
may emerge in the United States, which may not necessarily comply with the values 
of the current republican ideal. Whether the federal government is equipped to predict 
such threats and if the United States of America is prepared for addressing such 
possible threat, based on this work, is quite doubtful. 
While it was argued that the constitutional value set out in the Fourteenth Amendment 
was to create a uniform method of the protection of fundamental rights of citizens, this 
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has not fully materialised up to date. Whilst it would create a complete uniform system 
for the protection of fundamental rights in the United States, it is unpredictable whether 
the views of society will ever change to argue for the total incorporation of all rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights.  
It is, moreover, lamentable that the current views of society support the restriction of 
the protection of the national market in support of local protectionist measures at times 
when, for instance, with the click of a button, a citizen of one state in the United States 
may be able to purchase goods or services from another state.  
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